Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The United States initiated an eminent domain action to acquire land in Montecito, California, to build the Ortega Reservoir. Plaintiff’s property is located directly north of the Ortega Reservoir, and the maintenance road at issue (the Access Road) runs along the southern edge of Kimball-Griffith’s property, just within the boundaries of the federal reservoir land. The federal Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) granted an easement over the Access Road to the County of Santa Barbara, and the County installed locked gates across the road, blocking public entry. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting the right to use the Access Road based on its purported ownership. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claim against the BOR and its officials must be construed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act (QTA). The district court dismissed the remaining claims as time-barred and because Plaintiff failed to allege a property interest in the Access Road.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that in light of Wilkins, it need not decide whether the statute of limitations applied. The panel held that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record. The panel held that Plaintiff did not allege that, at the time of condemnation, the Access Road existed as a “public street.” As a result, Plaintiff cannot rely on the theory that the adjacent landowners acquired a private easement. Second, the panel held that Plaintiff had not alleged facts suggesting that the adjacent landowners acquired an easement over the Access Road as a third party by any other means or operation of law. View "KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P V. BRENDA BURMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant-landowner Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP (SBIG) appealed an environmental-division enforcement order: enjoining it from using real property in the City of Burlington; ordering it to address site-improvement deficiencies as required by an agreement executed by a prior owner and the City; and imposing $66,759.22 in fines. SBIG purchased the subject property in 2004, which was then in use as a gas and service station, a preexisting, nonconforming use permitted under the City’s zoning ordinance. The property had eighteen parking spaces that were required to be used in connection with the service-station business. Following an unappealed 2002 notice of violation (NOV), the prior owner and the City signed an agreement on June 16, 2004—one day before SBIG purchased the property—which set out specific requirements to cure those violations. The agreement required the prior owner to take certain steps if it wished to sell the property and provided that the agreement was “specifically enforceable and . . .binding upon the successors and assigns of” the previous owner. The City did not enforce compliance with the agreement before this action. At some point after 2004, SBIG began renting out a small number of parking spaces to private individuals. This was not a permitted use under the zoning ordinance. In July 2017, the gas and service station closed, and SBIG thereafter increased the number of parking spaces it rented out to private individuals. Following complaints about the private-parking use and graffiti, the City contacted SBIG in 2018 about bringing the property into compliance with the zoning ordinance. SBIG took no remedial action, and the City issued an NOV. In June 2019, the Development Review Board (DRB) affirmed the NOV with respect to the change-of-use violation, finding the nonconforming use as a gas and service station had been discontinued for more than one year, which constituted abandonment of that use. In March 2020, the City filed a complaint in the environmental division to enforce the decision and sought fines. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erroneously found that SBIG knew or should have known about the 2004 agreement, therefore, it reversed the judgment order, directed the trial court to strike the condition requiring SBIG to address the site-improvement deficiencies in the agreement, and remanded for the court to recalculate fines without considering whether SBIG violated the agreement’s terms. View "City of Burlington v. Sisters & Brothers Investment Group, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Appellants' complaint against Maricopa County for appeal of an administrative action and the final judgment on the County's counterclaim, holding that the plain meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A) did not bar jurisdiction.Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department fined Appellants for violations of the county zoning ordinance, and the decision was affirmed. Appellants filed a complaint against the County requesting declaratory relief and alleging due process violations. The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was deficient. The trial court denied the motion and allowed Appellants to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants brought an amended complaint seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. The County asserted a counterclaim seeking to enforce the fine. The trial court ruled the complaint failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A), and therefore, Appellants failed timely to file a "notice of appeal." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding that Appellants' complaint complied with section 12-904(A)'s three jurisdictional requirements that the timely filing's substance provide notice of the appeal, identify the decision being appealed, and state the issues argued on appeal. View "Shea v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Deadwood Historic District Commission to deny a certificate of appropriateness sought by Harlan Kirwan to conduct renovations on a building he owned that was located in the Historic District, holding that there was no error.Kirwan, who owned a saloon located in the Historic District, applied for a certificate of appropriateness from the Commission after renovating the saloon's facade. The Commission denied the application and ordered Kirwan to remove the facade. Kirwan subsequently applied for a new certificate of appropriateness to cover the existing facade. The Commission denied the permit, and the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the underlying decision. View "Kirwan v. City Of Deadwood" on Justia Law

The Map, filed with the Alameda County Recorder’s Office in 1854, depicts lots 15-18. In 1877, those lots were conveyed with others and were separately identified. Lots 15-18 were transferred in a single conveyance in 1885, 1887, and 1913. Lot 18 remained as depicted on the 1854 Map. In 1944, lots 17 and 18 and part of lot 16 were transferred in a single deed. In 2015, Crescent acquired those lots by a single deed. Crescent applied for a certificate of compliance for lot 18. The city surveyor agreed lot 18 “was legally created" but concluded, that lots “18 and 17, and a portion of 15 and 16 were merged" by a 1933 probate judgment because “[t]he adjudicated lines of the original lots were removed" by metes and bounds description, and they were effectively re-subdivided by the 1944 conveyance. There had “been no effort to divide the parcel into the original 25-foot configurations,” no separately assessed parcel existed for lot 18 in 1972, and the lot had not been “separately” conveyed.The court of appeal ruled in favor of Crescent. Lot 18, conveyed in conjunction with three or fewer other lots before the enactment of any ordinance governing such subdivisions, is presumptively lawful (Government Code 66412.6(a) and 66499.30(d)). It is irrelevant whether the original Map created legal parcels or whether lot 18 was ever “merged” into the adjoining lots, as the city never attempted to justify its denial of a certificate of compliance on that basis. View "Crescent Trust v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment and final judgment in favor of third-party defendants, Western Surety Company and the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (collectively, the Sureties) in this case concerning the scope of the sureties' liability under a performance and payment bond issued in conjunction with a public works project, holding that there was no error.The Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) was sued by Apex Development Company in this action alleging that RIDOT and its contractors trespassed and damaged Apex's private property. RIDOT filed a third-party complaint against the Sureties and others, seeking full indemnity and contribution. A hearing justice granted summary judgment for the Sureties, and a final judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that RIDOT was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error on appeal. View "Apex Development Co., LLC v. State of R.I. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County approving ConnectGen Albany County LLC's application for a Wind Energy Conversion System (WECS) permit to construct a wind farm on Albany County land, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Appellants' argument on appeal, ConnectGen was not required to obtain a conditional use permit in addition to the WECS special use permit; (2) the Board's approval of the WECS special use permit was not arbitrary or capricious; and (3) Appellants failed to establish that the Board's approval of the WECS special use permit was a taking of private property in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, 32. View "Aanonsen v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Albany County" on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service, together with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, managed the rapidly changing fire conditions and actively communicated with the public about the Lolo Peak Fire. After the fire, various affected landowners sued the federal government. They claim that the Forest Service is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failing to comply with its duty to consult with them about fire-suppression activities on and near their properties. Specifically, they argued that the Forest Service was required to consult with landowners through individualized—rather than public—communication channels. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owners’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel applied the requisite two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applied. First, the panel examined whether there was a federal statute, regulation, or policy that prescribed the Forest Service’s course of action regarding the agency’s communications with the landowners during the Lolo Peak fire in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana in July 2017. The panel held that the Forest Service’s specific communications with the landowners exceeded the incident decision’s instruction and involved an element of judgment or choice sufficient to satisfy the first step of the discretionary function exception. The panel held that the Forest Service’s decisions about notifying the landowners about fire-suppression activities likely to occur on and near their properties were susceptible to a policy analysis. View "MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the claim brought by the Back Beach Neighbors Committee alleging that the Town of Rockport, Massachusetts committed a class-of-one equal protection violation by failing adequately to enforce local rules against scuba divers at Back Beach, holding that the district court did not err.The Committee brought this complaint claiming that the Town's failure consistently to enforce various rules as to Back Beach led to the singling out of the beach as a place "to welcome divers." The district court granted the Town's motion to dismiss as to six of the complaint's eight counts and then granted summary judgment for the Town on the remaining counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the Committee did not plausibly allege the existence of similarly-situated comparators, its class-of-one equal protection claim failed. View "Back Beach Neighbors Committee v. Town of Rockport" on Justia Law