Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge to Proposition M, a San Francisco measure approved by voters in 2022 that imposed an annual “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of certain residential units kept vacant for more than 182 days in buildings with more than two units. The stated aim was to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase available housing. Plaintiffs included individuals and associations representing property owners, who argued that Proposition M violated statutory and constitutional protections, including property rights and familial relations, and was preempted by the Ellis Act, which protects property owners’ right to withdraw accommodations from the rental market.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted declarations detailing how Proposition M would force them to either rent out units against their wishes or pay substantial taxes, potentially resulting in financial hardship or effective eviction. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that their legal claims failed as a matter of law. After briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, burdened fundamental liberty interests in familial relations, violated equal protection, and infringed upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from administering or enforcing Proposition M.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the City’s appeal. The appellate court analyzed the measure’s conflict with the Ellis Act and concluded that Proposition M imposed a “prohibitive price” on owners’ right not to offer property for rent, directly contravening the Act’s protections. The court found that the Ellis Act preempts Proposition M and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, without reaching additional constitutional claims. The judgment prohibiting enforcement of Proposition M was thus upheld. View "Debbane v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

A business specializing in adult products sought to open a store in downtown Fargo, North Dakota, in a zone designated for mixed-use development. The proposed store intended to sell items such as lingerie and sexual wellness products, but not sexually explicit media like books or DVDs. To proceed, the business’s landlord applied for a change-of-use permit to allow retail sales and service at the location. The City of Fargo, through its Director of Planning and Development, denied the application, concluding that the business constituted an "Adult Bookstore" as defined by the city’s municipal code, which prohibited such establishments in the downtown zone. The city’s decision was upheld by both the Fargo Board of Adjustment and the Board of City Commissioners.Following these administrative decisions, the business filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, raising constitutional claims including violations of the First Amendment, the imposition of a prior restraint, denial of procedural due process, and unconstitutional vagueness in the city’s code. The business also challenged the Commissioners’ decision under state law, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. While the lawsuit was pending, Fargo amended its code to explicitly prohibit “Sexual Device Shops” in the relevant zone.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, holding that the business’s planned activities were not protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the permit process was not a prior restraint, and the business received adequate procedural process. The court also found the city’s ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court determined that denying the permit as an “Adult Bookstore” was arbitrary and capricious under state law, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claim, and remanded for further proceedings regarding possible relief. View "Romantix-Fargo, Inc. v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Juanita C. Clark and her husband complained to the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) of the Town of Phippsburg about a neighbor, Dan Gurney, who was allegedly operating a nuisance wood-selling business in violation of the land use ordinance. The Board of Appeals found that Gurney’s business constituted a nuisance, but the Board of Selectmen later found that the nuisance had been abated. After the Superior Court affirmed the Board of Selectmen’s decision, Clark and her husband appealed, resulting in a prior ruling by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Board of Selectmen had exceeded its authority and violated due process. The matter was remanded for proper action.Following remand, the Board of Selectmen conducted a series of meetings, some involving ex parte communications with Gurney and limiting public participation. Ultimately, the Board agreed to enter into a consent agreement with Gurney and the CEO issued a cease-and-desist order. Clark later reported that Gurney continued to violate the order, submitting evidence to the CEO, who informed the Board that legal action should be considered. The Board held further discussions, some of which Clark was not notified about, and eventually voted that there was no violation and that no action would be taken. The CEO then notified Clark of this decision. When Clark sought formal findings, the Board clarified that its previous statement was just an opinion and that the CEO’s determination was final.Clark filed a complaint in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court challenging the Board’s actions and alleging due process violations. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Board’s clarification left no final government action for review. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Clark’s allegations regarding the Board’s refusal to take legal action presented a reviewable question of final government action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications.After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement.The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

A company owned a vacant shopping center located within a city. The city repeatedly identified the property as blighted and unsafe, urging the owner to submit an abatement plan and later ordering the property to be boarded up and fenced. Over time, city officials considered and ultimately planned for the demolition of the shopping center by means of a controlled burn, citing concerns over trespassing and public safety. The owner neither expressly agreed to the controlled burn nor provided an alternative abatement plan. The city proceeded with the demolition by fire, after notifying the owner, and later removed the resulting debris.The owner filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, asserting claims against the city and contractors for intentional trespass, statutory business conspiracy, tortious interference with a business expectancy, waste, and a takings claim under the Virginia Constitution. The owner also sought declaratory relief concerning costs and penalties imposed by the city. The city raised sovereign immunity as a defense, filing a plea in bar to dismiss all claims except the takings claim. The Circuit Court denied the plea in bar, finding it could not determine whether the city’s actions were within its governmental function. The city then pursued an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo, based on the pleadings and exhibits. It held that the city’s actions in demolishing the shopping center constituted a governmental function—blight abatement—which is protected by sovereign immunity, even if the city had additional motives or failed to comply with all statutory requirements. The court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding the city immune from all tort and statutory claims, as well as most declaratory relief sought, but not from the constitutional takings claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the takings claim and claims involving third parties. View "City of Hopewell v. Shree Arihant Motel, Inc." on Justia Law

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments.Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

A special independent recreation district was established in 2018 to manage and improve recreational facilities within a residential community, including a country club and golf course. In 2019, the district issued $24 million in bonds to purchase and maintain these facilities, pursuant to a referendum and a master trust indenture. A provision in the first supplemental indenture for the 2019 bonds included bracketed language suggesting that no further bonds would be issued, except for certain purposes. However, in 2023, the district's Board proposed a new $21 million bond issue to fund additional improvements, which was approved by a majority of residents in a 2024 referendum. The Board subsequently amended the 2019 indenture, clarifying that the bracketed language was never formally adopted and authorized the new bonds.In the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court for Manatee County, a resident who moved into the district in 2021 challenged the district’s authority to issue the new bonds, arguing that the language in the 2019 indenture barred further bond issues, and questioned whether the special assessments to repay the bonds provided sufficient special benefit to the properties. He also raised due process concerns about the proceedings. The circuit court admitted evidence, including expert testimony on property value benefits, and found for the district, validating the 2024 bond issue. The court found the district had authority to issue the bonds and that the special benefits exceeded the debt burden.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that the district had statutory and referendum-based authority to issue the 2024 bonds, that the Board properly clarified and amended the indenture, and that legislative findings and expert testimony supported the conclusion that the special assessments conferred a special benefit. The Court also found no due process violation. View "Matt v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad.After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law