Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the South Dakota Department of Corrections' (DOC) decision to purchase state-owned agricultural land in Lincoln County for a new men's state prison, authorized by House Bill 1017 (HB 1017). The plaintiffs, a group of private individuals and a non-profit corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Dakota, the DOC, and the DOC Secretary, arguing that the State must comply with local zoning regulations, which do not permit a prison in an agricultural district without a conditional use permit or rezoning.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The court found that only two plaintiffs had standing based on alleged property value decreases. However, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity and preemption, determining that the DOC's actions were discretionary and that state law preempted local zoning regulations.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable claim of right to enforce the local zoning ordinance against the State. The court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and that the plaintiffs failed to identify any statutory or other legal authority granting them a private right to enforce the zoning ordinance. Consequently, the case was deemed non-justiciable, and the court did not address the merits of the sovereign immunity and preemption claims. View "Jensen v. Dept Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Residents of South Seaside Park filed a petition to deannex their community from Berkeley Township and annex it to the Borough of Seaside Park. South Seaside Park is geographically isolated from the mainland section of Berkeley Township, requiring residents to drive 13-16 miles through seven other municipalities to reach the mainland. The community has limited municipal facilities and relies more on Seaside Park for services. The petitioners argued that deannexation would benefit them economically and socially, while not significantly harming Berkeley Township.The Township Council referred the petition to the Planning Board, which conducted 38 hearings over four years. The Planning Board's professional planner, who was supposed to be impartial, instead assisted the Township in opposing the deannexation. Additionally, some Planning Board members made public comments against the petition. The Planning Board ultimately recommended denying the petition, and the Township Council followed this recommendation.Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Council's decision. The trial court found that the Planning Board's process was biased and that the Township's denial of the petition was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court also found that the denial was detrimental to the economic and social well-being of South Seaside Park residents and that deannexation would not significantly harm Berkeley Township. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Planning Board failed to conduct an impartial review and that plaintiffs met their burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. The Court affirmed the trial court's order for deannexation, allowing South Seaside Park to seek annexation by Seaside Park. View "Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township" on Justia Law

In this case, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, engaged in a 2009 comprehensive rezoning process known as a sectional map amendment for subregions 5 and 6. Several property owners, including Christmas Farm and MCQ Auto Servicenter, were affected by this rezoning. Christmas Farm sought a more intensive zoning classification but failed to file the required ethics affidavit. MCQ’s property was downzoned, but MCQ successfully petitioned for a revisory petition, resulting in the restoration of its original zoning classification.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed the zoning decisions multiple times, resulting in several remands to the District Council. The courts found that the District Council failed to comply with procedural requirements, including the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The most recent remand occurred in 2019, where the District Council adopted sectional map amendments without holding a public hearing or notifying the affected property owners.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether a 2021 countywide rezoning constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners' assertions of error from the 2019 proceeding. The Court also examined whether the District Council erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether it complied with the Appellate Court’s prior remand order.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2021 countywide rezoning was not a comprehensive rezoning or a substantive change in the law that rendered the property owners' assertions moot. The rezoning was a technical mapping exercise intended to align zoning classifications with the new zoning ordinance. The Court also held that the District Council failed to comply with state and local laws requiring notice and a public hearing and did not follow the Appellate Court’s remand instructions. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "County Council of Prince George's County. v. Robin Dale Land LLC" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law

James and Kim McCormick own a 128.75-acre tract in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, accessed by a private driveway from Modica Lott Road. The property was part of a larger tract subdivided without adhering to the Bossier Parish Subdivision Code, which requires a plat description for split-out tracts. The McCormicks' deed, recorded in 2014, did not comply with these regulations. After a fire damaged their home in 2018, they applied for a building permit in 2020, which was denied by the Bossier Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) due to non-compliance with subdivision regulations.The McCormicks filed a mandamus action against Joe E. Ford, the Parish Engineer, seeking a court order for the permit. The trial court ruled in favor of the McCormicks, requiring the BPPJ to issue the permit, subject to certain conditions regarding the driveway. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the permit but removed the conditions, stating that the five-year prescriptive period for enforcing subdivision regulations had expired, making the property non-conforming.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case to determine if the McCormick Tract enjoyed non-conforming status under La. R.S. 9:5625, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for enforcement actions. The Court held that the prescriptive period began when the deed was recorded in 2014, and since no action was taken within five years, the property attained non-conforming status. Consequently, the McCormicks were entitled to the building permit without additional conditions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, confirming that the McCormick Tract complied with relevant statutes and regulations. View "MCCORMICK VS. FORD" on Justia Law

A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming, Board of Land Commissioners (State Board), granted Temporary Use Permits (TUPs) to permittees for the use of state land in Teton County. The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (County Board) issued abatement notices to the permittees, asserting violations of county land use regulations. The State Board sought a declaration that it and its permittees were not subject to these regulations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Board, and the County Board appealed.The district court found that the State Board and its permittees were not subject to Teton County's land use and development regulations. The County Board argued that Wyoming statutes required compliance with local zoning laws for state lands under long-term leases and TUPs. The State Board countered that sovereign immunity protected it from such regulations and that the statutes did not apply to TUPs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP are not subject to county land use and development regulations. The court reasoned that while Wyoming statutes require compliance with local zoning laws for long-term leases of state lands, they do not impose the same requirement for TUPs. The court emphasized that the legislature's omission of TUPs from the statutory requirement for compliance with local zoning laws was intentional. Therefore, the County Board lacked the authority to enforce its land use regulations against the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP. View "Teton County Board of County Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law