Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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In 2010, Houston voters approved “Proposition One,” allowing the city to create a “Pay-As-You-Go” Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund. Perez and others filed an election contest while the city enacted the Drainage Fee Ordinance (DFO), creating a new public utility and requiring Houston to establish drainage fees “against all real property in the city subject to such charges” and “provide drainage for all real property in the city on payment of drainage charges unless the property is exempt.” The DFO based the drainage fees on the benefited property’s type and square footage. Failure to pay drainage fees carried various penalties.In 2015, the Supreme Court held that Proposition One’s ballot language was misleading, rendering the Amendment invalid. Perez then challenged Houston’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of the drainage fee. In 2018, Houston passed a new charter amendment curing many of the defects Perez alleged in the drainage fee ordinance. Perez was left with ongoing claims for reimbursement of the drainage fees she paid before 2018 and for an injunction against the future expenditure of fees collected before 2018. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims but remanded to allow Perez to replead in light of intervening events. Perez’s claims required her to articulate a viable theory of the DFO’s illegality to overcome Houston’s governmental immunity; her only theory failed as a matter of law. View "Perez v. Turner" on Justia Law

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TexCom sought to develop a commercial-waste-disposal facility on a 27-acre site in Montgomery County, near Conroe, that had one existing nonoperative injection well. TexCom sought to operate the existing well and construct up to three additional wells. Class I underground injection-control wells manage industrial waste by injecting it thousands of feet underground but can potentially harm drinking water and petroleum, so these injection wells undergo an extensive permitting process with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). A permit application must be accompanied by a letter from the Railroad Commission (RRC) concluding that the proposed wells “will not endanger or injure any known oil or gas reservoir.” RRC issued such a letter for TexCom but rescinded it after six years of administrative hearings, around the same time TCEQ issued its final order granting the permit application.The Texas Supreme Court affirmed TCEQ’s order granting the permit application as supported by substantial evidence; a migration finding, combined with the injection zone’s geological suitability, is sufficient to support TCEQ’s ultimate finding that the wells would be protective of water. The rescission did not deprive TCEQ of jurisdiction, and, on these facts, TCEQ did not violate the Texas Administrative Procedure Act by declining to reopen the administrative record for further proceedings. View "Dyer v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Homeowners' request seeking declaratory judgment that the Historic Preservation Ordinance adopted by the Houston City Council was void and unenforceable because it violated the City Charter's limits on zoning and did not comply with certain provisions of Chapter 211 of the Local Government Code, holding that the City did not violate either its Charter or the provisions of Chapter 211.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the ordinance did not implement zoning as that concept is ordinarily understood, and therefore, the City Charter's limits on zoning did not apply in this case; and (2) while Chapter 211 did apply to the ordinance, Plaintiffs failed to prove that the ordinance violated the requirements of Chapter 211 at issue in this case. View "Powell v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed with prejudice a land developer’s claim against a county commissioner in his official capacity, holding that the developer did not have standing to pursue its claim for injunctive relief against the county commissioner.In its complaint, the developer sought mandamus relief requiring the county engineer to submit the developer’s completed plat application to the Fort Bend County Commissioners Court for approval. At issue in this appeal was the injunctive relief the developer sought against the commissioner, alleging that the commissioner inappropriately instructed the county engineering department to delay processing the submitted plat and construction plans. The commissioner filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming that the developer’s suit against him in his official capacity was barred by governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because an individual county commissioner in Fort Bend County lacks legal authority to receive, process, or present a completed plat application to that county’s commissioners court for approval, the developer failed to show a substantial likelihood that the injunction it sought will remedy its alleged injury. View "Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd." on Justia Law

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The Tarrant Regional Water District supplies water to two million Texans across 11 counties and is a governmental agency with the power of eminent domain. In 2010, the Water District and the City of Dallas approved a financing agreement to build a 150-mile pipeline to transport water owned by Dallas in Lake Palestine to the Dallas/Fort Worth area. Construction began in 2014. The proposed route crosses the 1,000-acre LazyW Ranch five miles northwest of Athens in Henderson County, with a 150-foot-wide underground easement, about 3,375 feet long, covering 11.623 acres. The owner, Bennett, opposed to the project, obtained legislation creating the LazyW District, a municipal utility district. Bennett sued the Water District for violating the Texas Open Meetings Act; the court of appeals concluded that the Water District was immune from suit. Bennett repeatedly tried, unsuccessfully, to replace incumbent board members who support the Project’s use of the Ranch and dedicated a small cemetery on the Ranch in the proposed pipeline's path. The Water District offered the Lazy W $169,218 for the easement, and when the offer was rejected, petitioned for condemnation. Bennett asserted governmental immunity. The court refused to proceed further without deciding whether the case should be dismissed. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated, rejecting an argument that the trial court cannot rule on the Lazy W’s plea to the jurisdiction until the commissioners issue their award. It is important that the special commissioners convene and render an award expeditiously and without interference from the court. The trial court had the obligation to consider the Lazy W’s assertion of immunity when the plea to the jurisdiction was filed. View "In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

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The Town of Lakewood Village, a Type A general-law municipality in Denton County, has a population of 620; its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) extends one half-mile beyond its boundaries. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 42.021(a)(1). The ETJ encompasses part of the Sunrise Bay subdivision. Other parts of the Subdivision are within the city limits and ETJ of Little Elm, a home-rule city that has a larger population. When developers planned the subdivision in the mid-1990s, Little Elm and Denton County approved the final plat. The developers did not file a plat with the Town, which does not provide any services to the Subdivision. Little Elm provides water to the Subdivision. Little Elm and Denton County maintain its roads. In 2013, Bizios purchased a Subdivision lot, located entirely within the Town’s ETJ. Bizios obtained approvals and permits from Denton County, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Subdivision’s architectural review committee. The County inspected the construction. Bizios did not obtain building permits from the Town, although its ordinances adopt building codes and make them enforceable within its ETJ. The Town filed suit after Bizios ignored its orders to stop construction. The trial court granted the Town a temporary injunction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed that a Type A general-law municipality does not have authority to enforce its building codes and building-permit requirements within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. View "Town of Lakewood Village v. Bizios" on Justia Law

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Coyote Lake Ranch, about 40 square miles, in the Texas Panhandle, is used for agriculture, raising cattle, and hunting. It is primarily grass-covered sand dunes, with some is irrigated cropland. Water comes from the Ogallala Aquifer, the principal source of water for the Texas High Plains, including the City of Lubbock, about 90 miles southeast of the Ranch. In 1953, during “‘one of the most devastating droughts in 600 years,’” the Ranch deeded its groundwater to the city, reserving water for domestic use, ranching operations, oil and gas production, and agricultural irrigation, by one or two wells in each of 16 specified areas. In 2012, the city announced plans to increase water-extraction efforts on the Ranch, drilling as many as 20 test wells in the middle of the Ranch, followed by 60 wells across the Ranch. The Ranch objected that the proposed drilling would increase erosion and injure the surface unnecessarily. The court of appeal dissolved a temporary injunction entered in favor of the Ranch. The Supreme Court of Texas remanded, agreeing that an injunction “so broad as to enjoin a defendant from activities which are a lawful and proper exercise of his rights” was an abuse of discretion. The court cited the accommodation doctrine as applicable to a interests in groundwater: a lessee has an implied right to use the land as necessary for production and removal of the resource, with due regard for the landowner’s rights. View "Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock" on Justia Law