Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Tussahaw Reserves, LLC and Keys Ferry Crossing, LLC owned two parcels of land in Butts County, Georgia, zoned for agricultural and residential use. In 2020, they applied to rezone the property for use as a rock quarry, but the Butts County Board of Commissioners denied the applications in early 2021. Tussahaw then filed an “Appeal and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Verified Complaint” in the Butts County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision. The complaint named the Board and its members as “respondents-in-certiorari” and the County as “defendant.” The claims included a writ of certiorari against the Board and its members, and alternative claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County.After the Board and its members filed an answer and moved to be discharged from the case, the superior court denied their motion. Following the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, Butts County moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit violated the Georgia Constitution’s requirement that actions against a county be brought exclusively against the county and in its name. Tussahaw moved to drop the respondents-in-certiorari, but the superior court did not rule on that motion and instead dismissed the lawsuit, finding it barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the substance of the complaint sought relief against the Board, not just the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with the constitutional naming requirement is not a jurisdictional bar and does not preclude the trial court from considering motions to drop parties. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the superior court to vacate its dismissal order and address the pending motions. View "TUSSAHAW RESERVES, LLC v. BUTTS COUNTY" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

A hotel in the Town of Newburgh, New York, agreed to provide long-term housing to asylum seekers as part of a program initiated by New York City. In response, the Town alleged that the hotel’s actions violated local zoning and occupancy ordinances, which limited hotel stays to transient guests for no more than 30 days. The Town inspected the hotel, found modifications suggesting long-term use, and filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Orange County, seeking to enjoin the hotel from housing asylum seekers for extended periods. The state court issued a temporary restraining order, but allowed the asylum seekers already present to remain pending further orders.The hotel removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Town’s enforcement was racially motivated and violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The district court found that removal was improper because the hotel had not sufficiently pleaded grounds for removal under § 1443(1), and remanded the case to state court.While the hotel’s appeal of the remand order was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the underlying state court action was discontinued with prejudice after the asylum seekers left and the City ended its program. The Second Circuit determined that, because the state court case was permanently terminated, there was no longer a live controversy regarding removal. The court held the appeal was moot and, following standard practice when mootness occurs through no fault of the appellant, vacated the district court’s remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Town of Newburgh v. Newburgh EOM LLC" on Justia Law

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

Cable Matters Inc. sought a use variance from the zoning board of appeals of Northborough to build a 20,000 square foot warehouse in an industrial zoning district. The property is also within the town's groundwater protection overlay district, which does not permit warehouses. The zoning board granted the variance, and the planning board later issued a special permit with conditions, including restrictions on storage, lighting, landscaping, delivery hours, and driveway use.The plaintiffs, who live across the street from the proposed warehouse, appealed the zoning board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing they were aggrieved by the potential noise, light, vibration, odors, and loss of open space. The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for Cable Matters, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they failed to show they were aggrieved by the zoning board's decision. The judge found that the plaintiffs' claims were speculative and not supported by credible evidence.The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court, which vacated the judgment, instructing the judge to consider potential future uses of the warehouse. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court judge correctly assessed the plaintiffs' standing based on Cable Matters's proposed use. The court held that potential future uses unsupported by the record should not be considered in determining standing. The court affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. View "Stone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Northborough" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law