Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Roger K. Moreau sought to operate an automotive repair shop on his lot in the Town of Parsonsfield, which is accessed via Reed Lane, a private road. The lot, created from a larger parcel, lacks frontage on a public road. Reed Lane, dating back to 1991, is a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way with a fifteen-foot-wide gravel road. Moreau had been operating the repair shop without a permit since 2015-2018. Nelligan, who owns adjacent property, opposed the business.The Town of Parsonsfield Planning Board initially denied Moreau's application for a site plan review permit but later approved it after Moreau acquired additional property. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) vacated this approval, stating the lot remained nonconforming. Moreau submitted a third application, which the Planning Board approved, but the ZBA again vacated the decision, citing the insufficient width of Reed Lane for commercial use. Moreau appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the ZBA's decision, finding the Planning Board's approval valid.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the commercial road standards in the Town’s Land Use and Development Ordinance required a sixty-foot-wide right-of-way for a business, which Reed Lane did not meet. The court concluded that Moreau's commercial use of the lot was not grandfathered and must comply with current ordinance standards. Consequently, the court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of Nelligan and the Town of Parsonsfield, affirming the ZBA's decision. View "Moreau v. Town of Parsonsfield" on Justia Law

Geoffrey S. Stiff and Carolyn B. Stiff own a lot on Long Pond in Belgrade, Maine. Their neighbors, Stephen C. Jones and Jody C. Jones, own an adjacent 1.23-acre lot within the limited residential district of the Belgrade shoreland zone. The Joneses' lot is legally non-conforming and already contains a non-conforming house and a shed. In 2017, the Joneses sought a permit to build a garage with a laundry room and playroom. However, they constructed a two-story structure with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, a laundry room, and a playroom with kitchen appliances, which was not in accordance with the permit.The Stiffs objected to the new structure, leading the Joneses to apply for an after-the-fact permit from the Town of Belgrade Planning Board. The Planning Board approved the permit with the condition that kitchen appliances be removed. The Stiffs appealed to the Board of Appeals (BOA), which remanded the matter due to a lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the permit, finding the new structure to be an accessory structure. The Stiffs appealed to the BOA again, and after the BOA denied their appeal, they filed a complaint in the Superior Court, which also denied their appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the Planning Board had misconstrued the Belgrade Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO). The court held that the new structure was not an accessory structure as defined by the SZO because it was not incidental and subordinate to the existing house. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the BOA, which would then remand to the Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Stiff v. Town of Belgrade" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a contract zone agreement that would have allowed development on a property in Saco, Maine. The property owners, Amarjit Singh Dhillon and Ajinder Kaur, appealed from a lower court's grant of partial summary judgment to Michael Dahlem, who owns neighboring property and challenged the contract zone agreement. Dahlem cross-appealed from the court's dismissal of his Rule 80B appeal and denial of his motion to reconsider that dismissal, and from the court's denial of summary judgment on two counts in his complaint.The lower court had granted summary judgment to Dahlem on several counts, declaring that the 2017 agreement became null and void in 2019 and thereafter could not be amended, was invalid and unlawful for noncompliance with the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and was inconsistent with Maine’s Mandatory Shoreland Zoning statute and therefore preempted and invalid. The court denied summary judgment to all parties on the count of whether the 2021 agreement was compatible with the City’s comprehensive plan.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects and dismissed Dahlem’s cross-appeal as moot. The court held that Dahlem properly challenged the 2021 agreement by asserting claims for declaratory relief, that the 2017 agreement became null and void on November 20, 2019, and could not thereafter be amended, that the 2021 agreement was invalid and unlawful under the City’s contract zoning ordinance, and that the 2021 agreement was preempted by the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning provisions. View "Dahlem v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The case centers around the dispute over the requirement for a supermajority vote in the Town of Bar Harbor's amendment to its Land Use Ordinance (LUO) concerning vacation rentals. Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith, both property owners in the town, argued that due to a 2-2 tie vote by the Planning Board on the proposed amendment, a two-thirds majority vote was necessary for the amendment to pass. The amendment, however, was enacted with a 60% majority vote. The Superior Court sided with the Town, asserting that the LUO language did not necessitate a supermajority vote.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision but did so on different grounds. The court agreed with the argument put forth by the Maine Municipal Association in an amicus brief, which asserted that irrespective of the LUO's language, under Maine statutes 21-A M.R.S. § 723(4) (2023) and 30-A M.R.S. § 2501 (2023), only a simple majority vote was required for the amendment to take effect, unless the Town's charter provided otherwise, which it did not. Therefore, the court concluded that the amendment was lawfully enacted with a simple majority vote, rendering the Town's supermajority requirement unenforceable. View "Brooks v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court affirming the order of the Saco River Corridor Commission denying Appellant's application to build a privacy fence along a portion of his property, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record.The Commission denied Appellant's application on the grounds that a privacy fence along a portion of his property would unreasonably despoil the scenic, rural, and open space character of the Saco River Corridor. On appeal, Appellant argued (1) the Commission's "scenic view" rule, 94-412 C.M.R. ch. 103, 2(G)(3), is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and conflicts with the Saco River Corridor Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 951-959; and (2) the Commission's decision to deny the permit was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the "scenic view" rule does not conflict with the Act, nor is it unconstitutionally void for vagueness; and (2) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Ouellette v. Saco River Corridor Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Boothbay Harbor's Board of Appeals (BOA) denying 29 McKown, LLC's administrative appeal from a code enforcement officer's (CEO) decision to life a stop work order he had issued to Harbor Crossing during the construction of the building, holding that 29 McKown was deprived of administrative due process.In this case concerning a real estate office building constructed by Harbor Crossing in Boothbay Harbor, 29 McKown sought review of the denial of its McKown's appeal. The superior court affirmed the BOA's decision. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding (1) 29 McKown was deprived of administrative due process; and (2) the CEO did not issue a judicially-reviewable decision in lifting the stop work order. View "29 McKown LLC v. Town of Boothbay Harbor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order entered by the superior court affirming the decision of the Town of Old Orchard Beach to deny Appellant's application to build a greenhouse in the front yard of her residential property, holding that Appellant was not prevented from building a greenhouse in her front yard.The Town's code enforcement officer denied Appellant's application because "an accessory structure cannot be located in the front yard." The Town's Zoning Board of Appeals upheld the denial, concluding that a particular provision of the Town's Zoning Ordinance prohibited Appellant from building the structure in her front yard. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that the provision at issue did not prevent Appellant from building a greenhouse in her front yard. View "Zappia v. Town of Old Orchard Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's complaint seeking judicial review of a decision of the Town of Kennebunkport's code enforcement officer (CEO) and a declaratory judgment, holding that the court should have dismissed Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.At issue was a decision of the CEO to life the CEO's previous suspension of building and land use permits issued to Plaintiff's neighbors, Lori Bell and John Scannell, and a declaratory judgment that structures on Bell and Scannell's property violated certain municipal ordinances. The superior court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Defendant argued that the court should have instead dismissed his complaint without prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded for a dismissal without prejudice, holding that Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) did not authorize dismissal with prejudice. View "Slager v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court reversing the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the Town of China code enforcement officer's (CEO) issuance of an after-the-fact permit to allow the placement of a trailer on Nicholas Namer's lot, holding that the operative decision of the CEO was deficient for purposes of judicial review.Kimberly and Anthony LaMarre, whose property abutted the lot at issue, objected to the trailer's placement, arguing that the trailer was not a "recreational vehicle" within the meaning of the town's land use ordinance allowing such placement. The Board of Appeals affirmed. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter with instructions to remand to the code enforcement officer, holding that the CEO's decision was deficient for purposes of judicial review. View "LaMarre v. Town of China" on Justia Law