Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Jewels Helping Hands and Ben Stuckart challenged a proposed initiative by Spokane resident Brian Hansen, which aimed to expand the criminalization of camping within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, and childcare facilities. The initiative was a response to increased crime rates near a homeless encampment called Camp Hope. Spokane had previously adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating public camping, which included provisions to comply with the Ninth Circuit's Martin v. City of Boise decision, barring criminalization of camping when no shelter space was available.The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing but found their claims without merit, allowing the initiative to proceed to the ballot. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initiative was within the scope of the local initiative power, not a zoning ordinance, did not conflict with state law, and was legislative rather than administrative.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that the initiative was impermissibly administrative because it modified the details of Spokane's preexisting comprehensive policy on public camping. The court emphasized that local initiatives must be legislative in nature, creating new policies rather than administering existing ones. The court reversed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the initiative exceeded the scope of the local initiative power. View "Jewels Helping Hands v. Hansen" on Justia Law

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Three organizations, Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and RISE St. James, sued St. James Parish, the Parish Council, and the Parish Planning Commission, alleging violations of their constitutional and statutory civil rights. They claimed that the Parish discriminated against them by directing hazardous industrial development towards majority-Black districts and Black churches, where their members and congregants live. They also argued that the Parish's actions desecrated and restricted access to cemeteries of their enslaved ancestors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed all claims. It held that the plaintiffs lacked standing for some claims and that other claims were time-barred, as they were based on the Parish's 2014 Land Use Plan. The court also dismissed claims related to religious injuries, stating that the injuries were not traceable to the Parish's actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the claims as time-barred, noting that the plaintiffs alleged ongoing discriminatory practices, not just a single incident. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for property injuries and health-related injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Louisiana Constitution, as their alleged injuries were traceable to the Parish's conduct.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged ongoing discriminatory practices and injuries that were fairly traceable to the Parish's actions. View "Inclusive Louisiana v. St. James Parish" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation and its founder, applied for a special use permit to conduct church activities on agricultural land they purchased in Maui. The Maui Planning Commission denied their application, citing concerns about traffic, safety, and environmental impacts. Plaintiffs continued using the land for non-agricultural purposes without permits, leading to fines. They applied again, addressing some concerns, but the Commission denied the second application as well.The plaintiffs sued the County of Maui and the Commission, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and other constitutional claims. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment to the County on most claims, except for the RLUIPA equal-terms claim, which went to trial. An advisory jury found for the County, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the district court severed an unconstitutional provision from the zoning law and proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. The jury found for the County on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA should have been decided by the court, not the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA is a question of law for the court to decide. Although the district court erred in submitting this question to the jury, the error was deemed harmless because the jury's verdict was consistent with the required legal outcome. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the County of Maui. View "SPIRIT OF ALOHA TEMPLE V. COUNTY OF MAUI" on Justia Law

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A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

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Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

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The City of Hillsboro, Missouri, enacted ordinances prohibiting new private wells within city limits and requiring residences to connect to the city water system. The Antoinette Ogilvy Trust, owning a 156-acre property within Hillsboro, claimed these ordinances constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trustees, William Becker and Darcy Lynch, argued that the regulations made developing the property financially unfeasible due to the high costs of connecting to the city water system.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the City, rejecting the trustees' claims. The court found that the regulations did not constitute a per se taking, as they did not involve a physical invasion of the property or deprive it of all economic value. The court also determined that the regulations did not fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulatory takings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the regulations did not mandate a permanent physical invasion of the property, as the trustees were not compelled to build structures or dedicate land to the City. The court also found that the property retained substantial value, thus not constituting a taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Additionally, the court declined to consider the trustees' exaction claim, as it was not sufficiently raised in the lower court.Under the Penn Central test, the court concluded that the economic impact on the trustees was not significant enough to constitute a taking, and the regulations did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The character of the governmental action was deemed a legitimate exercise of the City's police powers to prevent water contamination and protect the aquifer. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Becker v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

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Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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The City of Fargo, a home rule municipality, adopted zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition as home occupations and in non-farm commercial use zoned districts. In 2023, the North Dakota legislature passed House Bill 1340, amending N.D.C.C. §§ 40-05.1-06 and 62.1-01-03 to limit the authority of political subdivisions, including home rule cities, regarding firearms and ammunition. Fargo filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 1340 and seeking a declaration that the amended statutes did not void its ordinances.The District Court of Cass County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that H.B. 1340 did not violate the North Dakota Constitution and expressly preempted and voided Fargo’s zoning ordinances. Fargo appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that H.B. 1340 was a valid exercise of the legislature’s constitutional authority to define the powers of home rule cities. The court concluded that the amended statutes were constitutional as applied to Fargo’s home rule charter and ordinances. The court also determined that H.B. 1340 preempted and rendered void Fargo’s zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition, as the legislature had expressly limited the authority of political subdivisions in this area. View "City of Fargo v. State" on Justia Law

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A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

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The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law