Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A business specializing in adult products sought to open a store in downtown Fargo, North Dakota, in a zone designated for mixed-use development. The proposed store intended to sell items such as lingerie and sexual wellness products, but not sexually explicit media like books or DVDs. To proceed, the business’s landlord applied for a change-of-use permit to allow retail sales and service at the location. The City of Fargo, through its Director of Planning and Development, denied the application, concluding that the business constituted an "Adult Bookstore" as defined by the city’s municipal code, which prohibited such establishments in the downtown zone. The city’s decision was upheld by both the Fargo Board of Adjustment and the Board of City Commissioners.Following these administrative decisions, the business filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, raising constitutional claims including violations of the First Amendment, the imposition of a prior restraint, denial of procedural due process, and unconstitutional vagueness in the city’s code. The business also challenged the Commissioners’ decision under state law, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. While the lawsuit was pending, Fargo amended its code to explicitly prohibit “Sexual Device Shops” in the relevant zone.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, holding that the business’s planned activities were not protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the permit process was not a prior restraint, and the business received adequate procedural process. The court also found the city’s ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court determined that denying the permit as an “Adult Bookstore” was arbitrary and capricious under state law, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claim, and remanded for further proceedings regarding possible relief. View "Romantix-Fargo, Inc. v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

The property at issue has a long history of agricultural use, initially for tobacco farming and processing. This activity predates the Town of Suffield’s zoning regulations, making it a legal nonconforming use. In 2019, the plaintiff obtained state approval to cultivate and process hemp at the property, which was determined by local officials to fall within the scope of the existing nonconforming tobacco use. Following Connecticut’s legalization of recreational cannabis in 2021, the plaintiff sought a zoning determination that cannabis cultivation and processing would also be a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use. The zoning enforcement officer denied this request, citing distinct licensing and regulatory requirements for hemp and cannabis.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield upheld the zoning officer’s decision, relying primarily on the legal and regulatory distinctions between hemp and cannabis. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. The trial court applied the factors from Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals to assess whether the proposed cannabis use impermissibly expanded the scope of the nonconforming use. The court found that the regulatory differences were relevant but not dispositive and concluded that cannabis cultivation and processing were sufficiently similar to the existing hemp operation to constitute a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. The trial court reversed the board’s decision.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. It held that a difference in state licensing or regulatory schemes is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether a proposed use constitutes an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. Instead, courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, considering the nature, purpose, character, and effects of the use. Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence that cannabis cultivation and processing would materially change the property’s use or impact the neighborhood. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment, allowing the cannabis operation as a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. View "Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

A town served by a privately owned water utility experienced significant rate increases after the utility was sold to an investment fund. Responding to community concerns, the town decided to pursue public ownership of the water system. In 2015, it adopted two resolutions of necessity to begin eminent domain proceedings, aiming to take over the utility’s assets both within and just outside its boundaries. The utility, now owned by a new company, did not challenge the procedural validity of the resolutions but argued that the requirements of public necessity and more necessary public use, as mandated by California’s Eminent Domain Law, were not satisfied.The San Bernardino County Superior Court, presiding over a bench trial, determined that special statutory rules for takings of privately owned public utilities applied. The court found that, in this context, the utility could rebut the presumption of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than being limited to showing gross abuse of discretion by the public entity. After trial, the court found in favor of the utility, concluding that the town had not established the requisite elements to justify the taking. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed, holding that the trial court should have reviewed the town’s findings only for gross abuse of discretion and had failed to give proper deference to the town’s determinations.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the matter and held that, under the 1992 amendments to the Eminent Domain Law, a public entity’s resolution of necessity for taking privately owned utility property creates only a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive one. Therefore, the trial court is to exercise independent judgment as the trier of fact, determining whether the utility owner has rebutted the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property owner that purchased a vacant and dilapidated parcel in Nashville’s East Bank district, intending to redevelop it into a multi-family residential project in accordance with local zoning rules. The owner submitted a building permit application that, according to its allegations, fully complied with all applicable zoning requirements. However, in mid-2022, the local government placed an indefinite “development hold” on the property, effectively barring any consideration or approval of the permit. The stated reason was that authorities were assessing possible routes for a planned major roadway that might require acquisition of part of the property. As a result, the owner claims the property has become undevelopable and unsellable, resulting in millions of dollars in carrying costs.After unsuccessful efforts to have the hold lifted, the owner filed suit in state court, alleging violations of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, where the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including untimeliness and qualified immunity. The district court, on its own initiative, dismissed the complaint for lack of “jurisdictional” ripeness, reasoning that there had been no final decision on the permit application.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered only the ripeness issue. The court held that the owner’s claims were both constitutionally and prudentially ripe because the local government’s development hold constituted a definitive, final decision barring any development of the property. The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. View "SW Nashville EB Owner, LLC v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty." on Justia Law

Juanita C. Clark and her husband complained to the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) of the Town of Phippsburg about a neighbor, Dan Gurney, who was allegedly operating a nuisance wood-selling business in violation of the land use ordinance. The Board of Appeals found that Gurney’s business constituted a nuisance, but the Board of Selectmen later found that the nuisance had been abated. After the Superior Court affirmed the Board of Selectmen’s decision, Clark and her husband appealed, resulting in a prior ruling by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Board of Selectmen had exceeded its authority and violated due process. The matter was remanded for proper action.Following remand, the Board of Selectmen conducted a series of meetings, some involving ex parte communications with Gurney and limiting public participation. Ultimately, the Board agreed to enter into a consent agreement with Gurney and the CEO issued a cease-and-desist order. Clark later reported that Gurney continued to violate the order, submitting evidence to the CEO, who informed the Board that legal action should be considered. The Board held further discussions, some of which Clark was not notified about, and eventually voted that there was no violation and that no action would be taken. The CEO then notified Clark of this decision. When Clark sought formal findings, the Board clarified that its previous statement was just an opinion and that the CEO’s determination was final.Clark filed a complaint in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court challenging the Board’s actions and alleging due process violations. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Board’s clarification left no final government action for review. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Clark’s allegations regarding the Board’s refusal to take legal action presented a reviewable question of final government action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law

A company was ordered by a local Board of Zoning Appeals to remove LED displays from a billboard it was constructing. Disagreeing with this directive, the company sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Fulton County and brought additional claims. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision regarding the displays but left the company’s other claims unresolved.After this partial ruling, the company submitted a discretionary application for review to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application in an unpublished order, determining that the superior court’s decision was not final and thus not subject to discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which governs appeals from superior court reviews of certain administrative actions. The appellate court also considered, but did not resolve, whether the superior court’s order functioned as an interlocutory injunction under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(4), which could have permitted an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Court of Appeals erred by not considering whether the superior court’s order should be treated as an interlocutory injunction, which would allow immediate appeal by discretionary application. The Supreme Court clarified that OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a) and 5-6-35 are not conflicting but may overlap, and that certain immediately appealable orders may still require a discretionary application. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s dismissal and remanded the case for the appellate court to determine if the superior court’s order qualifies as an interlocutory injunction and whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC v. NORTH FULTON OUTDOOR, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer sought to construct an 82-lot residential subdivision on a 66-acre parcel in unincorporated Sussex County, Delaware, where the property’s current zoning permitted such use as of right. The Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission approved the developer’s subdivision plan but imposed 19 conditions. The developer objected to two of these: one eliminating a lot (lot 64) due to concerns about isolation and flooding, and another requiring a 25-foot fixed buffer from non-tidal wetlands, which the developer argued was inconsistent with existing regulations and a recently adopted ordinance that exempted pending applications.After the Commission declined to reconsider, the developer sought certiorari review in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The Superior Court found that the Commission had erred as a matter of law, holding that the elimination of lot 64 was based on generalized neighborhood opposition rather than minimizing adverse impacts, and that the buffer condition was inconsistent with the applicable code and improperly applied to the pending application. The Superior Court struck both conditions as unreasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the Commission had exceeded its discretion and clarified the standard for “reasonable” conditions. The Supreme Court held that local governments may impose reasonable, fact-based conditions on subdivision approvals, but those conditions must be rationally related to specific land use impacts and cannot be based only on generalized community opposition. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision striking the buffer condition, finding no code support or articulated rationale for it. However, it reversed and remanded the decision regarding the elimination of lot 64, instructing the Commission to further investigate the environmental and drainage concerns and to base any condition on substantial evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Smokey Hollow, LLC" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law