Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that rezoning by amending a local government's zoning ordinance is legislative in character, and therefore, due process did not require an impartial decision-maker.Trustee Jan Miller (Trustee Miller), who served on the Village Board of Lyndon Station, cast the deciding vote in favor of an application filed by her daughter and son-in-law to amend the Village's zoning ordinance to rezone their residential property for commercial development. Thomas Miller (Miller), a local business owner, sought certiorari review of the Village's Zoning Board Appeals' decision upholding the Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Trustee Miller was not a fair and impartial decision-maker, and therefore, her participation in the vote violated due process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Village Board's action was legislative in nature, and therefore, Miller was not entitled to an impartial decision-maker. View "Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Lyndon Station" on Justia Law

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Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.   The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law

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A group of Oklahoma landowners petitioned for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority violated the Open Meeting Act, 25 O.S.2021, §§ 301 to 314, regarding its notice to the public of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program. Both parties sought summary judgment. The district court rendered summary judgment in the landowners' favor, finding that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority willfully violated the Open Meeting Act. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority gave sufficient notice of the agenda items that the landowners challenged. Furthermore, the Court found that the lack of notice regarding the announcement of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program at the February 2022 meeting did not violate the Open Meeting Act because the announcement was for informational purposes only. View "Hirschfeld, et al. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Juliana and David Lonergan appealed a superior court order affirming a Town of Sanbornton’s (Town) Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) approval of a special exception for an excavation site for property that intervenor, R.D. Edmunds Land Holdings, LLC, owned. As a threshold matter, the Town and the intervenor argued that the New Hampshire Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based upon plaintiffs’ failure to timely move for rehearing with the ZBA as required by RSA 155-E:9 (2014). To this, the Supreme Court concluded that RSA 155-E:9 applied to plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing to the ZBA and that plaintiffs did not meet the ten-day filing deadline set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and vacated the superior court’s order. View "Lonergan v. Town of Sanbornton" on Justia Law

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Several organizations sought to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management challenging the grant of two rights-of-way. The district court denied intervention, and the proposed intervenors filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the district court held that the decision to grant the rights-of-way was arbitrary and capricious, vacated it, and remanded the matter to the agency.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court’s ruling mooted the intervention dispute. Generally, if the underlying litigation is complete, an appeal of a denial of intervention is moot and must be dismissed. The panel held that an intervention dispute would remain alive if this court could grant effectual relief or if there were some other way for the proposed intervenors to obtain their desired relief. Here, the district court’s proceedings are complete. No party has filed an appeal of the district court’s merits order, and under Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004), the court would not have jurisdiction over such an appeal brought by Appellants even if they were granted intervention. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. BLM, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

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Appellants Pike Off OTA, Inc., Amy Cerato, Mike Leary, Vince Dougherty, Terrie Club, Mike Club, Twyla Smith, Cali Coward, Karen Powell, Mike Powell, Cedric Leblanc, Darla Leblanc, Claudette Wispe, Mark Dooling, Nate Piel, Kara Piel, Nikki Whitson, John Whitson, Robert Wallace, Chelsea Wallace, Robin Stead, Anna Olson, Tassie Hirschfeld, Ice Blast LLC, and Janette Ward (collectively Appellants) brought claims challenging the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority's (OTA) authority to construct three proposed turnpikes: the Tri-City Connector, the East-West Connector, and the South Extension. The OTA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that Appellants' claims were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court granted the OTA's motion to dismiss, and Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court concurred it had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority is authorized to construct the proposed turnpikes in the bond validation matter. The Court further ruled that appellants failed to establish that they had a clear legal right to the injunctive and/or mandamus relief sought. View "Pike Off OTA v. Okla. Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

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In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

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In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

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The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law