Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

A restaurant owner applied for a liquor license for a property in Providence, Rhode Island. Nearby property owners, including the appellant, filed an objection to the license under a state law that allows such objections to bar issuance of liquor licenses within 200 feet of their property. After the local licensing board could not issue the license due to this objection, the restaurant owner lobbied the General Assembly, which enacted a special law allowing the Providence Board of Licenses to exempt this specific address from the objection rule. This exemption applied only to the property at 225 Waterman Street and was enacted without a vote by local Providence voters.After the special law was passed, the restaurant owner reapplied, and the Board granted the license over objections. The appellant appealed to the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (DBR), which stayed the license but did not rule on the constitutional issue. The appellant then filed suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the special exemption was unconstitutional because Article 13, Section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution requires local voter approval for legislation relating specifically to the property, affairs, or government of a particular city or town. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that liquor licensing is a matter of statewide concern and does not require local voter approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the constitutionality of the special law. The court held that the legislation, which singled out a specific property in Providence for exemption from a generally applicable law, related to the property, affairs, and government of a particular city. Because the law did not receive local voter approval as required by Article 13, Section 4, it was void. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellant. View "Myles Standish Associates, LP v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments.Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

A group of registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition proposing to limit annual rent increases for residential properties. The petition would repeal the Statewide ban on rent control and instead institute a cap on rent increases, but it expressly exempted certain types of properties, including those in facilities operated solely for religious, educational, or nonprofit purposes. The Attorney General had certified that the petition did not contain excluded matters, issued the required summary, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared the petition for circulation and potential inclusion on the November 2026 ballot after sufficient signatures.The plaintiffs filed a civil action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the petition was invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution, an order quashing the certification, and an injunction preventing the petition from appearing on the ballot. The parties agreed to reserve and report the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The central argument was that the petition impermissibly “relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions,” which is prohibited by Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case de novo and concluded that, because the petition included an exemption for facilities operated solely for religious purposes, it “relates to religion” within the meaning of Article 48. The Court explained that the exemption makes religion a factor in the law’s application and would require governmental determinations about religious purpose, thereby conferring preferential treatment on religious institutions. The Court held that the petition is barred from the initiative process by Article 48 and directed that it may not be placed on the 2026 Statewide election ballot. The judgment was remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment and an injunction consistent with this holding. View "Cella v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

A Michigan-based real estate developer and related parties sought to redevelop a commercial property in the City of Pontiac to include medical marijuana cultivation and processing facilities. After purchasing the property in 2019, the developer obtained rezoning approval from the city, but the process of securing required permits and special exceptions for tenants became protracted. The city clerk cited deficiencies in tenant applications and, at one point, argued that the project violated city ordinances regarding overlay districts for marijuana businesses. Despite eventual approvals—including a court order requiring the city to issue permits—the tenants withdrew due to the delays, and the project collapsed. Subsequently, the developer’s affiliate lost another business opportunity, which plaintiffs attributed to city officials’ retaliation.The plaintiffs filed suit in Oakland County Circuit Court, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, and later brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment for the city and the city clerk, finding insufficient evidence of constitutional violations and concluding that the delays and alleged retaliation did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cognizable property interest under the Due Process Clause because city approval for marijuana facilities was discretionary, not a matter of right. The court also found that the delays did not constitute a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment, as the length and nature of the delays were not extraordinary. The equal protection claim failed for lack of evidence that similarly situated applicants were treated more favorably. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim could not proceed against the city because the mayor lacked final policymaking authority over zoning and no municipal policy or custom was established. View "Rubicon Real Estate Holdings v. City of Pontiac" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

Renewable Redevelopment, LLC, a subsidiary of U.S. Wind, owns property in Sussex County, Delaware, and sought a conditional use permit from Sussex County to build an electrical substation supporting a major offshore wind project. The county’s Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, but after a public hearing, the Sussex County Council denied the permit. Renewable Redevelopment challenged the denial in the Superior Court. While that case was pending, the Delaware General Assembly enacted Senate Bills 159 and 199, which retroactively mandated approval of qualifying electrical substation permits and prohibited counties from actions that would undermine such applications. The Governor signed the bills the same day.Following this legislative action, Sussex County and the Town of Fenwick Island filed suit in the Court of Chancery, claiming the new statute violated the Delaware Constitution’s separation of powers, Article II, Section 25 (delegation of zoning authority), Article II, Section 16 (one-subject rule), and public due process rights. The Court of Chancery expedited the case, denied a temporary restraining order, and ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that Fenwick Island lacked standing, that separation of powers did not bar the General Assembly’s actions, that the Assembly retained ultimate zoning authority, that the statute’s title and subject matter complied with constitutional requirements, and that due process protections did not apply to the counties in this context.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the constitutional challenges de novo, affirmed the judgment, and held that: (1) separation of powers does not operate vertically within a branch and the General Assembly may override delegated zoning decisions; (2) Article II, Section 25 does not restrict the Assembly’s power to reclaim zoning authority; (3) the statute’s title and subject matter satisfied Article II, Section 16; and (4) no due process violation was shown. The Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s summary judgment for the defendants. View "Town of Fenwick Island v. State" on Justia Law

This case concerns a group of landowners in Indiana who own property adjacent to former railroad corridors once operated by the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company (PIRC). The landowners asserted that they also hold fee simple title to the land underlying these corridors. They challenged the federal government's authorization of public recreational trail use on these corridors under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, claiming that this action constituted a taking of their property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the dispute. The main issue was whether PIRC’s interest in the rail corridors consisted merely of easements, rather than fee simple title. The Court of Federal Claims examined two sets of parcels: those associated with a 1907 Indiana Circuit Court quiet title judgment (the Manship Parcels) and those deriving from a lost 1849 instrument (the Vanlaningham Parcels). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that PIRC held only easements in both sets of parcels, meaning that when railroad operations ceased, full title reverted to the plaintiffs under Indiana law. Thus, the court found in favor of the landowners, holding that the government’s issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use (NITUs) resulted in an uncompensated taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the record demonstrated PIRC’s interests were limited to easements for both the Manship and Vanlaningham Parcels. The court concluded that, under Indiana law and the facts presented, the plaintiffs hold fee simple title to the corridor land, and the government’s actions constituted a taking for which just compensation is required. The judgment of the Court of Federal Claims was therefore affirmed. View "PRESSLY v. US " on Justia Law