Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

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Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

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The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership, a landowner in the Village of Mukwonago, Wisconsin, had a longstanding positive relationship with the Village, collaborating on several development projects. However, this relationship soured after a failed land deal in 2014 and several other conflicts. The Partnership sued the Village, alleging that it had been irrationally singled out for unfavorable treatment, violating its Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Partnership pointed to several adverse municipal decisions, focusing primarily on the failed land deal and a new road that was rerouted from the Partnership’s property.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. The district court concluded that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regarding the failed land deal, the new road, and other decisions affecting the Partnership’s properties. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the Partnership had failed to show that the Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis. The court found that the Village’s decisions were rationally related to its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives and protecting public funds. The court concluded that the Partnership was a disappointed landowner, but not a victim of unconstitutional discrimination. View "Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court in favor of the City of Des Moines, in a case brought by Lime Lounge, LLC. Lime Lounge, a bar, challenged a city ordinance requiring it to obtain a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate. After receiving noise complaints, the City revoked Lime Lounge's CUP, which was upheld in a prior appeal. Lime Lounge then challenged the ordinance arguing it was preempted by Iowa Code, violated equal protection and spot zoning prohibitions. The trial court dismissed Lime Lounge's claims and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the city's ordinance was not preempted by state law. Rather, it was a proper exercise of the city's zoning authority and did not create a separate local alcohol license. The Court also rejected Lime Lounge's equal protection claim, holding that the city had a legitimate purpose in imposing a CUP on specific businesses selling alcohol. Finally, the Court dismissed the claim of illegal spot zoning, as Lime Lounge failed to prove that the city had engaged in such activity. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of Lime Lounge's challenge to the ordinance. View "Lime Lounge, Inc. v. City of Des Moines, Iowa" on Justia Law

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In this case, the plaintiff, Chicago Joe's Tea Room LLC, had plans to open an adult entertainment business in a suburb of Chicago. However, the Village of Broadview denied the plaintiff's application for a special-use permit, which led to the plaintiff claiming that their constitutional rights were violated. The plaintiff sought millions of dollars in lost profits for the business that never opened. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois excluded most of the plaintiff's evidence and theories for lost-profit damages due to substantive and procedural issues. The court then awarded the plaintiff just $15,111 in damages. The plaintiff appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding no abuses of discretion. The appellate court stated that the plaintiff's calculations of lost profits were beyond the scope of the plaintiff's personal knowledge of a similar business and required expert-like analysis and adjustments. The court also ruled that the plaintiff failed to disclose necessary damages evidence in a timely manner, a violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff was also denied the opportunity to amend their complaint to challenge a state statute, as the request was made a decade after the issue became relevant. The court found that granting the amendment would have caused undue delay and prejudice to the Village. View "Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview" on Justia Law

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In October 2018, Warren G. Treme, a member of AJSJS Development, LLC, leased minerals on a tract of land in St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, from Dr. Christy Montegut and his siblings. AJSJS intended to join a joint venture formed in 2010 between Treme, AIMS Group, Inc., and Fred Kinsley. The joint venture aimed to extract and process clay material from the tract for a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project. However, to conduct mining and excavation activities, the plaintiffs needed to change the zoning classification of the tract. Despite multiple applications for rezoning, the Parish Council denied the applications after hearing complaints from affected residents. The plaintiffs then sued the Parish and the Council, alleging that the denial of the rezoning application constituted a regulatory taking without compensation in violation of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a takings claim because their mineral lease was not yet in effect, meaning they had no vested property interest in the tract. The court interpreted the lease to have a suspensive condition that required the plaintiffs to obtain governmental approvals for the lease to become effective. As the plaintiffs had not obtained these approvals, the lease had not yet come into effect. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision but modified the judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Treme v. St. John the Baptist" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by BMG Monroe I, LLC. BMG, a developer, had sued the Village of Monroe, New York, alleging that the Village's denial of its applications for building permits on five lots violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause due to a discriminatory animus towards the Hasidic Jewish community. The Village denied the applications due to non-compliance with the architectural criteria established in the Smith Farm Project's approval conditions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the claims were unripe because BMG had not exhausted its administrative remedies. In order to satisfy the finality requirement under ripeness doctrine, BMG needed to appeal the adverse planning-board decision to a zoning board of appeals and submit at least one meaningful application for a variance. BMG could not claim that further actions were futile based on the Village's indication that it would likely not be receptive to a variance request that had yet to be made. View "BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, One Love Housing, LLC, a company that operates a residential sober living home in Anoka, Minnesota, sued the City of Anoka for refusing to grant a waiver from the city's zoning regulations. The regulations permit only a single family or a group of not more than four unrelated persons to reside together in the area where the sober home is located. One Love wanted to accommodate seven unrelated recovering addicts in the home. One Love and two residents of the home alleged that the city violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act by refusing to grant this waiver.The district court granted One Love summary judgment on its claim that the city failed to reasonably accommodate the sober home's request. The court ordered the city to grant the waiver for One Love to house seven unrelated individuals recovering from substance abuse. The city appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred by considering evidence that was not presented to the city council when it denied One Love's request for a waiver. The appellate court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to One Love because there was a genuine dispute over whether the requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary. The court stated that the financial viability of One Love's sober home is relevant only if One Love can prove that the service it offers provides a therapeutic benefit that is necessary for people recovering from alcohol or drug abuse to successfully live in a residential neighborhood without relapsing. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of disputed fact on these issues. The court also declined to rule on One Love's disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, leaving those for the district court to address on remand. View "One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, MN" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around two developers, SAS Associates 1, LLC and Military 1121, LLC, who filed a complaint against the City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, alleging that their equal protection rights were violated when their rezoning applications were denied by the council. The developers owned several parcels of land in Chesapeake and sought to combine them to create a 90-acre development involving housing units, commercial space, and a conservation district. Their plans required rezoning, which was denied by the Council citing community opposition and the ability to develop under existing zoning classifications. The developers filed a complaint alleging that their application was denied even though similar applications from other developers were approved, and the council's reasons for denial were irrational and arbitrary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the developers' claim. The Court of Appeals found that the developers failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus. Furthermore, the court highlighted that zoning decisions are primarily the responsibility of local governments and that the Developers did not provide any valid comparators to support their claim of discriminatory treatment. The court noted the lack of any evidence to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the City Council members and ruled that the Developers' disagreement with the Council's decision does not render the Council's judgment call pretextual. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. View "SAS Associates v. City Council of Chesapeake" on Justia Law