Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Defendants constructed an accessory dwelling unit on a property in Fair Oaks without obtaining the required building permit from the County of Sacramento. They initially applied for a permit, but their application was incomplete and they failed to make necessary corrections. Despite receiving multiple notices of violation and stop work orders from the County, defendants completed construction and leased the unit to a tenant without ever obtaining a final permit or a certificate of occupancy, nor did the County inspect the unit for code compliance.After defendants unsuccessfully appealed the first notice of violation to the County Building Board of Appeals and did not challenge subsequent notices, the County filed suit in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. The County alleged that defendants’ conduct violated state and local building codes and constituted a public nuisance per se under local ordinances. Following a court trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the County on both causes of action and issued a permanent injunction, finding that building without a permit was a public nuisance per se as declared by County ordinance.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the County lacked standing, that its nuisance ordinances conflicted with state law, and that the trial court misapplied the law in finding a nuisance per se. The appellate court held that the County had the authority and standing to enforce its building and nuisance codes, that its ordinances did not conflict with state law, and that construction without a permit constitutes a nuisance per se as expressly declared by County ordinance. The judgment was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the County. View "County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

A company sought to operate a red-dirt surface mine on approximately twenty acres in a part of Washington County that was zoned for agricultural and single-family residential uses. The company, operating as Heritage Farms, applied for a conditional use permit, which the Washington County Planning Board considered and ultimately denied. The company then appealed this denial to the Washington County Quorum Court, which upheld the Planning Board’s decision and adopted an ordinance reflecting the denial. The company further appealed to the Washington County Circuit Court. During the circuit court proceedings, several local residents and a neighborhood association were allowed to intervene. The company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the denial was arbitrary and capricious, while the intervenors and county argued that the proper standard of review was arbitrary and capricious because the action was legislative, and that there was a rational basis for the denial.The Washington County Circuit Court found that the quorum court’s denial of the permit was a legislative act and thus applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. The court also held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-17-211 was unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted de novo review of legislative zoning decisions. Applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the circuit court concluded there was a rational basis for the denial and affirmed the quorum court’s action. The Arkansas Court of Appeals then affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the denial of the conditional use permit was a quasi-judicial act, not a legislative one, because it involved applying existing ordinance provisions to the facts of the application rather than creating new law. Therefore, the circuit court should have conducted a de novo review rather than applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MMSC, LLC V. WASHINGTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Two neighboring landowners in Middletown, Delaware, disputed whether a cross-easement existed that would allow one parcel (Reybold’s) to use a highway entrance situated on the other parcel (Summit’s). The properties were originally subdivided from a larger tract owned by Viola Carter. During the subdivision and rezoning process in the 1980s, the developer’s engineer, at the request of government agencies, included a note on the record plan stating that “a cross-easement is hereby established” between the parcels for vehicular and pedestrian access. Carter signed the record plan, certifying her ownership and intent to develop according to the plan. The record plan was recorded, and both properties were subsequently sold to new owners, with deeds referencing the plan.Years later, after Reybold purchased one parcel, it sought to enforce the cross-easement to gain more valuable access to the main road. Summit, the owner of the adjoining shopping center parcel, refused to recognize the easement. Reybold sued Summit in the Court of Chancery. A Magistrate in Chancery found that an express cross-easement had been created and could be enforced by Reybold. However, the Vice Chancellor, on de novo review, disagreed, holding that the record plan note was a “notation” under the County Code, which only the County could enforce, and that there was insufficient evidence of the original owner’s intention to create a private easement.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery. It held that the landowner’s signature and certification on a recorded plan containing a note establishing a cross-easement were sufficient to create an enforceable express easement appurtenant. The Court ruled that Summit, as a subsequent purchaser, is bound by this easement, and entered judgment for Reybold. View "Reybold Venture Group IX, LLC v. Summit Plaza Shopping Center, LLC" on Justia Law

A group comprised of property owners from several Montana cities challenged the constitutionality of several zoning and land use laws enacted in 2023, including statutes requiring municipalities to permit accessory dwelling units and duplexes in single-family zones, and the Montana Land Use Planning Act (MLUPA), which imposed comprehensive planning requirements on larger cities. The group argued that these laws unfairly burdened single-family neighborhoods, undermined the right of citizens to participate in land-use decisions, and violated equal protection by creating arbitrary distinctions between citizens.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court initially granted partial relief to the challengers, enjoining certain statutory provisions it found violated the right to participate, and declared that the new laws could not supersede more restrictive private covenants. The court also held that the housing statutes did not violate equal protection. Parties on both sides appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed these rulings. It first found that the public participation claims were justiciable, as a live controversy remained due to the likelihood of the challenged provisions recurring after temporary legislative amendments expired. The court held that the MLUPA’s public participation procedures did not, on their face, violate the Montana Constitution’s right to participate, as the statutes provided for notice and reasonable opportunity for public input, especially during the development of comprehensive plans, even if not at every stage of the process.The court also affirmed that the statutes did not violate equal protection, because the alleged classes—citizens in cities subject to MLUPA versus those outside, or those with versus without private covenants—were not similarly situated for constitutional purposes. Finally, the court vacated the lower court’s declaratory judgment regarding private covenants, finding it was an improper advisory opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the lower court’s judgment. View "M.A.I.D. v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a vacant parcel in Westerly, Rhode Island, and sought to construct a single-family home. To do so, he needed approval from the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS). He applied for a variance from DEM’s regulations, asserting that his proposed system satisfied the general standard for granting variances. However, DEM denied the variance because the property’s water table was at zero inches from the original ground surface, failing to meet a specific regulatory requirement.After DEM’s denial, the plaintiff did not appeal to DEM’s Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD), arguing that such an appeal would be futile since the AAD purportedly lacked discretion to overturn the denial and could not adjudicate constitutional claims. Instead, he filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, asserting both as-applied and facial challenges to the OWTS regulations under the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The state moved to dismiss, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the lack of constitutional violations. The Superior Court granted the state’s motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the futility exception did not apply.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies for his as-applied challenges and that the futility exception did not apply because the AAD had independent authority to grant variances. For the facial constitutional challenge, the Court determined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed and the matter remanded. View "DiBiccari v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Two applicants submitted materials to operate medical cannabis cultivation facilities in a Maine town in August 2024. Their initial applications did not include necessary documentation showing that their facilities would be located in a “Registered Cannabis Property,” which was required by the town’s licensing ordinance. Town staff reviewed the applications and placed them on the council agenda for a “first reading,” a step not required by ordinance but adopted by custom. On September 4, 2024, before the first reading of the applications, the Town Council amended the zoning ordinance to add a 1,000-foot setback requirement between cannabis facilities and residential properties—a standard the applicants’ locations could not meet. After the amendment, staff told the council the applications were “complete,” and the first reading occurred. The public hearing and further review were scheduled, and the required property registration was later filed. The council ultimately denied the applications for failing to meet the new setback requirement.The applicants sought judicial review in the Cumberland County Superior Court under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B. The Superior Court affirmed the Town Council’s decision, concluding that the applications were not “pending” at the time of the ordinance amendment and thus were subject to the new setback requirement.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the applications were “pending” within the meaning of 1 M.R.S. § 302 at the time the ordinance was amended. The court held that an application is not “pending” until the reviewing authority has conducted a substantive review of whether it meets the approval criteria. Because the Town Council had not begun substantive review before the zoning amendment was enacted, the applications were not pending and were properly denied under the amended ordinance. The judgment was affirmed. View "Shark Tank Strategies, LLC v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

Koch Methanol St. James, LLC sought approval from St. James Parish for a land use permit to upgrade its methanol production facility, including the installation of a connecting pipeline that would traverse a wetlands area. The Parish’s Land Use Plan includes specific provisions for allowable uses in wetlands, stating that such areas should remain unoccupied except for unique situations requiring a location in the water. The Parish Planning Commission interpreted this language as permitting Koch’s project under Tier 2 review, since the pipeline was considered a unique situation due to its necessity in connecting to an existing pipeline already located in the wetlands.After the Planning Commission approved the application, plaintiffs appealed to the Parish Council, which unanimously rejected the appeal. Plaintiffs then sought judicial review in the District Court for St. James Parish. The district court upheld the Council’s decision, finding that the Parish’s interpretation of the Plan was reasonable, the process was not arbitrary or capricious, and that Tier 2 review was appropriate for the project. The court also noted that the procedures followed were adequate and left room for reasonable differences of opinion.On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, reversed the district court’s ruling, applying what it termed “de novo review.” The appellate court determined that the Plan required Tier 3 review for any use in wetlands unless specifically listed as allowable, and concluded that the Parish had failed to follow its own ordinance by applying Tier 2 review. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the appellate court erred by applying a de novo standard rather than the proper arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s ruling and reinstated the district court’s judgment, emphasizing deference to the Parish’s interpretation and decision-making authority in land use matters. View "ALEXANDER VS. ST. JAMES PARISH" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased undeveloped property in Westerly, Rhode Island, in 1999. In 2007, they applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for permission to install an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS), a prerequisite for building a residence on their land. DEM denied their application because the groundwater table on the property was only five inches below the surface, while regulations required a minimum of twelve inches. The plaintiffs did not pursue an administrative appeal at that time.In 2020, more than a decade after the denial, the plaintiffs filed suit in Washington County Superior Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for an alleged regulatory taking under state and federal law. They also asserted that the regulation violated their rights to equal protection and due process. The state moved to dismiss the action, contending it was time-barred, the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and they lacked standing. The Superior Court agreed, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the lower court’s dismissal was proper. The Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, and the continuing violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period because DEM’s denial of the permit was a discrete act, not a continuing violation. The Court further found the plaintiffs lacked standing for prospective relief because they did not allege an actual or imminent injury, as any future application might not necessarily be denied. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Majeika v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

A group of landowners and mutual water companies in Ventura County, California, claimed rights to groundwater from the Las Posas Valley Groundwater Basin, which supplies water for agricultural, commercial, and domestic purposes. The groundwater basin had been subject to restrictions and management by the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (Fox Canyon), especially in light of overdraft conditions and the requirements of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). Disputes arose over groundwater pumping allocations, historical use, and the proper method for determining and allocating water rights among various landowners, mutual water companies, and public agencies.The case was brought as a comprehensive groundwater adjudication in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, proceeding in three phases. First, the court established the initial “Total Safe Yield” of the basin and allocated a portion to certain public water suppliers. In the second phase, the court, after a trial and a settlement agreed to by a large majority of parties, allocated the remaining rights among landowners, prioritizing overlying landowners and finding no surplus for appropriators. The third phase established a “physical solution” for basin management, appointing Fox Canyon as watermaster and integrating the settlement into a final judgment. Several parties, including Mahan Ranch and two mutual water companies, objected to aspects of the allocations and the final judgment, raising issues about the treatment of mutual water companies, the handling of dormant rights, and the legality of the court's actions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court properly allocated water rights based on overlying landowners’ rights, not directly to mutual water companies, and that there was no surplus for appropriators. The court found the physical solution and allocations consistent with California law, the Constitution, and SGMA, and that non-stipulating parties were treated equitably. The judgment was affirmed. View "Las Posas Valley Water v. Ventura County Waterworks" on Justia Law