Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Hari and Saranya Nagireddy, live next to a property owned by Willow Haven on 106th Street, LLC, which is being developed to house up to ten residents with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia. After Willow Haven obtained a building permit from Carmel, the Nagireddys sued, seeking a declaration that the proposed use would be a public nuisance as it would violate Carmel’s unified development ordinance (UDO). They also obtained a preliminary injunction against further construction.The Hamilton Superior Court denied Willow Haven’s motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the Nagireddys did not need to exhaust administrative remedies before the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and were likely to succeed on their claim. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, with a majority holding that the Nagireddys were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and were likely to succeed on their nuisance claim. A dissenting judge argued that the UDO was ambiguous and should be interpreted to permit Willow Haven’s land use.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the preliminary injunction was improper. The court found that the Nagireddys did not prove they were likely to win their public-nuisance claim, as they did not show that Willow Haven’s proposed land use violated the UDO at this preliminary stage. The court noted that the UDO incorporates state and federal law, which may protect Willow Haven’s land use. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Willow Haven on 106th St, LLC v. Nagireddy" on Justia Law

Rod Dorale built his house with a setback of seven feet three inches from the neighboring property line, violating the McCook County ordinance requiring a nine-foot setback. Greg and Patricia DeCramer, who own the adjacent property, appealed the McCook County Board of Adjustment's decision to grant Dorale a variance for the reduced setback. The DeCramers argued that the Board exceeded its authority by violating the governing statute and county ordinance.The circuit court denied the DeCramers' petition for a writ of certiorari, concluding that the Board had complied with the requirements for granting a variance under SDCL 11-2-53(2). The court noted that the Board determined the variance would not be offensive to the public and that undue hardship existed because Dorale would have to move the house. The court emphasized the limited nature of its review, stating it could not question the Board's decision or examine the facts leading to the variance request.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Board acted illegally and in excess of its authority by granting a variance that did not comply with SDCL 11-2-53(2) or the county ordinance. The Court noted that the Board did not find any special conditions or extraordinary circumstances that justified the variance. The Board's finding that there was "nothing extraordinary in this residential district" precluded it from granting the variance under the terms of the ordinance. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for the entry of an order vacating the variance granted by the Board. View "Decramer v. Dorale" on Justia Law

A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

James M. Day appealed a decision by the Town of Hiram Planning Board, which granted Brian and Sarah Schnell a conditional use permit to construct a microbrewery on a property in the Town’s Residential District. Day argued that the Board erred in its interpretation of the "need" factor required by the Town of Hiram’s Zoning Ordinance, which mandates consideration of the necessity of a particular location for the proposed use.The Superior Court (Oxford County) initially remanded the case to the Planning Board for findings of fact. After the Board reaffirmed its decision with additional findings, Day appealed again. The Superior Court then affirmed the Board’s decision, leading Day to appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly. The Court found that the Board had misinterpreted the "need" factor by focusing on the Schnells' lack of alternative properties rather than the community's need for the proposed microbrewery at that specific location. The Court clarified that the "need" factor should consider the community's need for the proposed use in the proposed location, not the applicant's personal need for that location.The Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Town of Hiram Planning Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Board may reopen the record to allow for additional evidence relevant to the correct interpretation of the "need" factor. View "Day v. Town of Hiram" on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Landowners Nicole Ritchie and Elisabeth McIntee, in collaboration with the Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, replaced an old footbridge on their property in Underhill, Vermont, with a new bridge to provide access to a recreational trail network. The new bridge was larger and more secure than the old one, and a ramp was added to connect it to the existing trail. Neighbors David Demarest and Jeff Moulton contested the improvements, arguing that they violated the town's zoning regulations.The Town of Underhill Developmental Review Board granted a retroactive conditional-use permit and variance for the bridge and ramp. The neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division, which found that the bridge's installation caused minimal land disturbance and was used for recreational purposes by the landowners and the public. The Environmental Division voided the permit, ruling that the bridge was a de minimis recreational use of private property and not subject to zoning regulations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the bridge constituted a de minimis recreational use of private property, as it involved minimal land disturbance, had a small footprint, posed minimal health and safety risks, and was used for recreational purposes. The Court concluded that the bridge was outside the scope of the town's zoning ordinance and did not address the neighbors' other arguments regarding the permit and the Club's standing. View "In re Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, Inc. Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

In August 2021, Sean Halling applied for a variance from the Town of Afton to build an accessory building larger than the 900 square feet allowed by the local development code. The variance was approved by the Town Council in September 2021. In February 2022, the Zoning Administrator approved a modification to increase the building's size without public notice. The appellants, neighbors of Mr. Halling, observed the construction and became concerned about the building's size and potential use. They sent a letter to the Town in October 2022 and filed a declaratory judgment action in December 2022.The District Court of Lincoln County dismissed the appellants' action, concluding they failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the matter was moot due to changes in the local development code allowing buildings of the size in question without a variance. The appellants appealed the decision.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the appellants were required to exhaust administrative remedies specified in the Afton Land Development Code before seeking judicial intervention. The court found that the appellants did not appeal the Zoning Administrator's decision to the Town Council acting as the Board of Adjustment within the required timeframe. The court also concluded that the Town Council was acting in its capacity as the Board of Adjustment when it approved the initial variance, and the appellants failed to appeal that decision within a reasonable time. The court emphasized the importance of following prescribed administrative processes for resolving zoning disputes. View "Sorensen v. Halling" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

The City of Hillsboro, Missouri, enacted ordinances prohibiting new private wells within city limits and requiring residences to connect to the city water system. The Antoinette Ogilvy Trust, owning a 156-acre property within Hillsboro, claimed these ordinances constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trustees, William Becker and Darcy Lynch, argued that the regulations made developing the property financially unfeasible due to the high costs of connecting to the city water system.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the City, rejecting the trustees' claims. The court found that the regulations did not constitute a per se taking, as they did not involve a physical invasion of the property or deprive it of all economic value. The court also determined that the regulations did not fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulatory takings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the regulations did not mandate a permanent physical invasion of the property, as the trustees were not compelled to build structures or dedicate land to the City. The court also found that the property retained substantial value, thus not constituting a taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Additionally, the court declined to consider the trustees' exaction claim, as it was not sufficiently raised in the lower court.Under the Penn Central test, the court concluded that the economic impact on the trustees was not significant enough to constitute a taking, and the regulations did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The character of the governmental action was deemed a legitimate exercise of the City's police powers to prevent water contamination and protect the aquifer. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Becker v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law