Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The State of Wyoming, Board of Land Commissioners (State Board), granted Temporary Use Permits (TUPs) to permittees for the use of state land in Teton County. The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (County Board) issued abatement notices to the permittees, asserting violations of county land use regulations. The State Board sought a declaration that it and its permittees were not subject to these regulations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Board, and the County Board appealed.The district court found that the State Board and its permittees were not subject to Teton County's land use and development regulations. The County Board argued that Wyoming statutes required compliance with local zoning laws for state lands under long-term leases and TUPs. The State Board countered that sovereign immunity protected it from such regulations and that the statutes did not apply to TUPs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP are not subject to county land use and development regulations. The court reasoned that while Wyoming statutes require compliance with local zoning laws for long-term leases of state lands, they do not impose the same requirement for TUPs. The court emphasized that the legislature's omission of TUPs from the statutory requirement for compliance with local zoning laws was intentional. Therefore, the County Board lacked the authority to enforce its land use regulations against the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP. View "Teton County Board of County Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Mississippi Apartment Association (MAA) and other property owners challenging an ordinance adopted by the Jackson City Council. The ordinance imposed registration and inspection requirements on rental housing units in Jackson. MAA appealed the city council's decision in the Hinds County Circuit Court but did not request a stay of the ordinance's implementation. Subsequently, MAA filed a separate action in the Hinds County Chancery Court seeking injunctions against the ordinance's enforcement, arguing that the planning department's interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance were unlawful.The Hinds County Chancery Court dismissed MAA's claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The chancery court found that the circuit court also had pendent jurisdiction over MAA's equitable claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision and pendent jurisdiction over related claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement. The court emphasized that allowing a separate action in the chancery court could lead to contradictory rulings and confusion. The court also noted that MAA had an adequate remedy at law in the circuit court and could have requested a stay of the ordinance's implementation under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62. View "Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

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Jewels Helping Hands and Ben Stuckart challenged a proposed initiative by Spokane resident Brian Hansen, which aimed to expand the criminalization of camping within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, and childcare facilities. The initiative was a response to increased crime rates near a homeless encampment called Camp Hope. Spokane had previously adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating public camping, which included provisions to comply with the Ninth Circuit's Martin v. City of Boise decision, barring criminalization of camping when no shelter space was available.The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing but found their claims without merit, allowing the initiative to proceed to the ballot. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initiative was within the scope of the local initiative power, not a zoning ordinance, did not conflict with state law, and was legislative rather than administrative.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that the initiative was impermissibly administrative because it modified the details of Spokane's preexisting comprehensive policy on public camping. The court emphasized that local initiatives must be legislative in nature, creating new policies rather than administering existing ones. The court reversed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the initiative exceeded the scope of the local initiative power. View "Jewels Helping Hands v. Hansen" on Justia Law

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Three organizations, Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and RISE St. James, sued St. James Parish, the Parish Council, and the Parish Planning Commission, alleging violations of their constitutional and statutory civil rights. They claimed that the Parish discriminated against them by directing hazardous industrial development towards majority-Black districts and Black churches, where their members and congregants live. They also argued that the Parish's actions desecrated and restricted access to cemeteries of their enslaved ancestors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed all claims. It held that the plaintiffs lacked standing for some claims and that other claims were time-barred, as they were based on the Parish's 2014 Land Use Plan. The court also dismissed claims related to religious injuries, stating that the injuries were not traceable to the Parish's actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the claims as time-barred, noting that the plaintiffs alleged ongoing discriminatory practices, not just a single incident. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue for property injuries and health-related injuries. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Louisiana Constitution, as their alleged injuries were traceable to the Parish's conduct.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged ongoing discriminatory practices and injuries that were fairly traceable to the Parish's actions. View "Inclusive Louisiana v. St. James Parish" on Justia Law

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A county board of supervisors approved a nonprofit entity’s application to rezone a parcel of land in rural Polk County. Another nonprofit entity and several nearby landowners filed a lawsuit challenging the rezoning decision. The plaintiffs argued that the rezoning violated the county’s comprehensive land use plan, zoning ordinances, and constituted illegal spot zoning. The board of supervisors moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming the plaintiffs lacked standing and were subject to heightened pleading requirements under Iowa’s Municipal Tort Claims Act.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing and were subject to the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. The court found that the individual plaintiffs did not adequately allege their proximity to the rezoned property or their personal concerns, and that the nonprofit organization did not sufficiently allege that its members had a specific and personal interest in the rezoning. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs could not amend their petition due to the Act’s requirements.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the heightened pleading requirements and penalties under Iowa Code § 670.4A(3) did not apply because the plaintiffs were not seeking monetary damages. The court found that the individual plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged standing based on their proximity to the rezoned property and the nature of the proposed changes. However, the court concluded that the nonprofit organization had not established standing but should be allowed to amend its petition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

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Sara Pearl Fahrmann filed a complaint against the City of Orange Beach and D.R. Horton, Inc., alleging that the City failed to ensure that Horton's construction of the Cypress Village subdivision complied with the City's zoning ordinance and the approved Planned Unit Development (PUD). Fahrmann claimed that this failure led to inadequate parking, which obstructed emergency services and delayed treatment for her husband, resulting in his death. She asserted wrongful-death claims based on wantonness and negligence.The Baldwin Circuit Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from Fahrmann's claims. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the City was immune from Fahrmann's wrongful-death claim alleging wantonness under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, which limits municipal liability to injuries caused by neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness, and does not include wanton conduct. The Court also held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity from the negligence claim, as the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinance did not create a legal duty to individual plaintiffs. The Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Orange Beach" on Justia Law

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A property owner applied for a conditional use permit to build a commercial hog facility on its land in rural Cherry County, Nebraska. The facility was intended to provide manure for fertilizing the owner's crops. Neighboring landowners objected to the issuance of the permit, arguing that the owner, not being the operator of the facility, could not establish compliance with zoning regulations regarding odor mitigation and water contamination.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners issued the permit, and the neighboring landowners appealed to the district court, seeking a trial de novo. The district court held a trial and determined that the owner's application complied with the relevant zoning regulations, affirming the issuance of the permit. The neighboring landowners then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, while the Board cross-appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the neighboring landowners' appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal, as the relevant statutes did not limit the right to appeal to applicants only. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the property owner demonstrated compliance with the zoning regulations. The court held that the property owner, not the operator, was responsible for showing compliance with the regulations and that the odor and water contamination mitigation plans submitted by the owner were sufficient. The court affirmed the district court's decision to uphold the issuance of the conditional use permit. View "Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs." on Justia Law

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The case involves BAK Realty, LLC, and Crossing Over, Inc., which operate a sober house in a three-family dwelling in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. The sober house, located in a residential B (RB) district, houses thirteen unrelated individuals recovering from addiction. The City of Fitchburg's zoning ordinances classify the sober house as a boarding house, a use not permitted in the RB district. The plaintiffs argue that the city's zoning ordinances violate the anti-disability discrimination provision of the Zoning Act, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, fourth par., which they interpret as requiring the city to treat the sober house residents as a "family" under local zoning laws.The Superior Court judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, annulling the decision of the Fitchburg Zoning Board of Appeals (board). The judge concluded that G. L. c. 40A, § 3, required the city to treat the sober house residents the same as a family or any similar-sized group of unrelated persons, whichever is more favorable. The judge ruled that the city's zoning ordinances could not be enforced against the sober house residents.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court's interpretation. The court held that G. L. c. 40A, § 3, fourth par., does not preempt municipalities from defining "family" for zoning purposes. The statute requires that disabled persons in congregate living arrangements be treated the same as either families or similar-sized groups of unrelated persons, but not necessarily both. The court found that the residents of the sober house did not meet the local definition of "family" and were treated the same as any similar group of thirteen unrelated people living together. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the board's decision that the sober house was operating as a boarding house, a use not permitted in the RB district. View "BAK Realty, LLC v. City of Fitchburg" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation and its founder, applied for a special use permit to conduct church activities on agricultural land they purchased in Maui. The Maui Planning Commission denied their application, citing concerns about traffic, safety, and environmental impacts. Plaintiffs continued using the land for non-agricultural purposes without permits, leading to fines. They applied again, addressing some concerns, but the Commission denied the second application as well.The plaintiffs sued the County of Maui and the Commission, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and other constitutional claims. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment to the County on most claims, except for the RLUIPA equal-terms claim, which went to trial. An advisory jury found for the County, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the district court severed an unconstitutional provision from the zoning law and proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. The jury found for the County on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed again, arguing that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA should have been decided by the court, not the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the substantial-burden inquiry under RLUIPA is a question of law for the court to decide. Although the district court erred in submitting this question to the jury, the error was deemed harmless because the jury's verdict was consistent with the required legal outcome. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the County of Maui. View "SPIRIT OF ALOHA TEMPLE V. COUNTY OF MAUI" on Justia Law

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Casey Hoff applied for a building permit from the City of Burlington to add an addition to his home, which is located within the city's floodplain. Hoff, an experienced contractor, provided appraisals and plans to the city officials, who approved the permit based on the information provided. However, after Hoff began construction, it was later determined that the remodel constituted a "substantial improvement" under the city's floodplain ordinances, requiring additional compliance measures. The city subsequently refused to issue a certificate of occupancy, leading Hoff to sue the city.The District Court of Ward County held a bench trial and denied Hoff's claims for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunction, and inverse condemnation. The court found that Hoff did not comply with the city's floodplain ordinances and that the remodel was a substantial improvement. The court also granted summary judgment dismissing Hoff's negligence claim, concluding that the city was immune under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Hoff did not establish a clear legal right to a certificate of occupancy, as he did not comply with the city's ordinances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Hoff's declaratory judgment and injunction claims. Additionally, the court concluded that Hoff failed to establish a "special relationship" with the city, which is necessary to overcome the city's immunity from negligence claims. The court also rejected Hoff's inverse condemnation claim, finding no total regulatory taking occurred. View "Hoff v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law