Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

In the case involving Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron, and Springville Investors, LLC, versus Multnomah County, the Metro Regional Government, and members of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, the plaintiffs challenged the designation of their land in Multnomah County, Oregon, as "rural reserves" under the Oregon Land Reserves Statute. They claimed that the statute and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and that the defendants’ rural reserve designations violated their federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the designation, concluding that the requirements for Burford abstention (a doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding a case in deference to state courts) were met for each of the as-applied claims. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs had abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. View "BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY" on Justia Law

Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.   The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law

Several organizations sought to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management challenging the grant of two rights-of-way. The district court denied intervention, and the proposed intervenors filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the district court held that the decision to grant the rights-of-way was arbitrary and capricious, vacated it, and remanded the matter to the agency.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court’s ruling mooted the intervention dispute. Generally, if the underlying litigation is complete, an appeal of a denial of intervention is moot and must be dismissed. The panel held that an intervention dispute would remain alive if this court could grant effectual relief or if there were some other way for the proposed intervenors to obtain their desired relief. Here, the district court’s proceedings are complete. No party has filed an appeal of the district court’s merits order, and under Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004), the court would not have jurisdiction over such an appeal brought by Appellants even if they were granted intervention. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. BLM, ET AL" on Justia Law

The United States initiated an eminent domain action to acquire land in Montecito, California, to build the Ortega Reservoir. Plaintiff’s property is located directly north of the Ortega Reservoir, and the maintenance road at issue (the Access Road) runs along the southern edge of Kimball-Griffith’s property, just within the boundaries of the federal reservoir land. The federal Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) granted an easement over the Access Road to the County of Santa Barbara, and the County installed locked gates across the road, blocking public entry. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting the right to use the Access Road based on its purported ownership. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claim against the BOR and its officials must be construed pursuant to the Quiet Title Act (QTA). The district court dismissed the remaining claims as time-barred and because Plaintiff failed to allege a property interest in the Access Road.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that in light of Wilkins, it need not decide whether the statute of limitations applied. The panel held that it could affirm on any ground supported by the record. The panel held that Plaintiff did not allege that, at the time of condemnation, the Access Road existed as a “public street.” As a result, Plaintiff cannot rely on the theory that the adjacent landowners acquired a private easement. Second, the panel held that Plaintiff had not alleged facts suggesting that the adjacent landowners acquired an easement over the Access Road as a third party by any other means or operation of law. View "KIMBALL-GRIFFITH, L.P V. BRENDA BURMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the Upper Skagit tribe) claimed that the usual and accustomed fishing areas of the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe (the Sauk tribe) under a 1974 decision do not include the Skagit River, and therefore that decision did not authorize the Sauk tribe to open salmon fisheries on that river. The dispute, in this case, relates to the meaning of Finding of Fact 131 in Final Decision I, which defines the Sauk tribe’s U&As   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Upper Skagit tribe. The court concluded that the district court intended to omit the Skagit River from the Sauk tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing areas. The panel agreed with the Upper Skagit tribe’s contention that Finding of Fact 131 clearly and unambiguously established Judge Boldt’s intent not to include the Skagit River in the Sauk tribe’s U&As. The panel held that if Judge Boldt intended to include the Skagit River in the U&As of the Sauk tribe, he would have used that specific term, as he did elsewhere. The panel held that the Lane Report, on which Judge Boldt heavily relied, reinforced its conclusion. The panel held that none of the statements undermined its conclusion that Judge Boldt’s intent was clear or showed that he intended to include the Skagit River in the U&As contrary to the plain text of Finding of Fact 131. View "UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE, ET AL V. SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service, together with the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, managed the rapidly changing fire conditions and actively communicated with the public about the Lolo Peak Fire. After the fire, various affected landowners sued the federal government. They claim that the Forest Service is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failing to comply with its duty to consult with them about fire-suppression activities on and near their properties. Specifically, they argued that the Forest Service was required to consult with landowners through individualized—rather than public—communication channels. The district court granted summary judgment for the Forest Service, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the property owners’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel applied the requisite two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applied. First, the panel examined whether there was a federal statute, regulation, or policy that prescribed the Forest Service’s course of action regarding the agency’s communications with the landowners during the Lolo Peak fire in the Bitterroot Mountains in Montana in July 2017. The panel held that the Forest Service’s specific communications with the landowners exceeded the incident decision’s instruction and involved an element of judgment or choice sufficient to satisfy the first step of the discretionary function exception. The panel held that the Forest Service’s decisions about notifying the landowners about fire-suppression activities likely to occur on and near their properties were susceptible to a policy analysis. View "MICHELLE SCHURG, ET AL V. USA" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game brought this action against the Board and several federal officials, alleging that the changes violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the district court issued its decision, the Kake Hunt ended, and the district court deemed the challenge to it moot. And while this appeal was pending, the partial Unit 13 closure expired.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision in an action challenging the Federal Subsistence Board’s approval in 2020 of two short-term changes to hunting practices on federal public lands in Alaska, specifically (1) the Board’s opening of an emergency hunt for Intervenor, the Organized Village of Kake; and (2) the Board’s partial temporary closure of public lands in game management Unit 13 to nonsubsistence users.   The panel first held that Alaska’s claim that the Board violated ANILCA by opening the 60-day emergency Kake hunt without statutory authority was not moot because it fit within the mootness exception of being capable of repetition yet evading review. Alaska’s claim that ANICLA did not authorize the federal government to open emergency hunting seasons raised a question of first impression in this circuit and required resolution of complicated issues of statutory interpretation. Noting that the district court had not reached the merits, the panel remanded this claim to the district court. With regard to Alaska’s partial Unit 13 closure claim, the panel vacated the part of the district court’s order that addressed the claim. View "STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Bureau of Indian Affair's (BIA) motion for summary judgment and ejectment order in an action brought by a group of recreational vehicle owners seeking to retain their rights to remain on a lakeside RV park located on American Indian land held in trust by the Bureau.The panel concluded that the Moses Allotment Number 8 (MA-8) land remains held in trust by the United States, and the BIA, as holder of legal title to the land, had and has standing to bring its claim for trespass and ejectment. In this case, of the three transactions and trust extensions in MA-8's history that Mill Bay and Wapato Heritage challenge, none were legally deficient. The panel rejected Mill Bay's argument that the IAs and the BIA are precluded under res judicata from ejecting Mill Bay, and rejected Mill Bay's interpretation of Paragraph 8 of the Master Lease: Paragraph 8 does not apply when the Lease expires by the passage of time, as happened here. Finally, the panel concluded that United States v. City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 2003), which holds that the United States is not subject to equitable estoppel when it acts in its sovereign capacity as trustee for Indian land, is not distinguishable and that Mill Bay is barred from asserting its defense of equitable estoppel against the BIA. View "Grondal v. United States" on Justia Law