Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in North Carolina Supreme Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint in this case involving the removal of a Confederate monument with prejudice, holding that dismissal should have been without prejudice.After the City of Winston Salem decided to remove a Confederate monument from the grounds of the former Forsyth County Courthouse Plaintiff, the United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division, Inc., filed a complaint against the City and County seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from taking affirmative action to remove or relocate the monument prior to full adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiff failed establish standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by dismissing the amended complaint for lack of standing; but (2) erred by dismissing the complaint with, rather than without, prejudice. View "United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Division v. City of Winston-Salem" on Justia Law

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In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals.After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. View "Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court holding that the City of Asheville improperly denied an application for the issuance of a conditional use permit submitted by PHG Asheville, LLC seeking authorization to construct a hotel in downtown Asheville, holding that the City lacked the authority to deny the requested conditional use permit.The trial court determined that PHG was entitled to the issuance of the requested conditional use permit because the City had improperly concluded that PHG failed to present competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that the proposed hotel satisfied the standards of a conditional use permit set out in the City's unified development ordinance. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that PHG presented competent, material, and substantial evidence that the proposed hotel satisfied the relevant conditional use permit standards set out in the City's unified development ordinance. View "PHG Asheville, LLC v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's summary judgment for the Town of Pinebluff, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Session Law 1999-35 required Moore County to approve Pinebluff's expansion request.Session Law 1999-35 amended North Carolina's extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-360, as it pertained to Pinebluff. After Pinebluff annexed land extending beyond the town's corporate boundaries, Pinebluff requested that the Moore County Board of Commissioners adopt a resolution to authorize the expansion of Pinebluff's ETJ two miles beyond the annexed boundary, pursuant to section 160A-360. The Board denied the request. Pinebluff filed a complaint against Moore County seeking a writ of mandamus. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pinebluff and directed Moore County to adopt a resolution authorizing Pinebluff to exercise its ETJ within the proposed area. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between subsections (e) and (f) of section 160A-360, as modified by Session Law 1999-35, and that subsection (e) prohibits Pinebluff from extending its ETJ into the requested areas within an agreement between Pinebluff and Moore County. View "Town of Pinebluff v. Moore County" on Justia Law

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A showing of strict compliance with a corporate entity’s internal bylaws and governance procedures is not necessary for that entity to invoke the jurisdiction of the General Court of Justice.Plaintiffs, non-profit corporations representing homeowners in certain residential communities located in the City of Charlotte, instituted this litigation challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted by the City. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims because they failed to comply with various provisions in their corporate bylaws when they initiated this litigation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, despite Plaintiffs’ failure to comply strictly with their respective bylaws and internal governance procedures in deciding to initiate this suit, they possessed a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy” to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to adjudicate this legal dispute. View "Willowmere Community Ass'n v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

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Landowner sought to develop a townhouse community on residential property and obtained a zoning permit to develop the townhouses. Petitioner appealed the Zoning Officer’s formal determination to the Warren County Board of Adjustment. The Board overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision and revoked the zoning permit issued to Landowner. Landowner and Warren County subsequently entered into a consent order agreeing that the zoning permit would be reinstated. A Zoning Officer then issued a determination that the subject property was not restricted by Warren County Zoning Ordinances. Petitioner appealed the Zoning Officer’s determination. The Zoning Officer, however, did not place Petitioner’s appeal on the Board’s agenda. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in superior court, requesting that the court compel Respondents to place his appeal on the Board’s next available agenda for a hearing. The court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Zoning Officer had a mandatory statutory duty to transmit Petitioner’s appeal to the Board and the Petitioner had a right to have its appeal placed on the Board’s agenda. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a zoning officer may not refuse to transmit an appeal from his own zoning determining to the county board of adjustment for its review. View "Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren County" on Justia Law

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A property owner sought a driveway permit from the State Department of Transportation (DOT) to connect its proposed subdivision's system of roads to a state road by which the property was accessed. Two railroad companies opposed the permit, claiming that the rail traffic at a nearby crossing, located approximately one-quarter of a mile away from the proposed driveway connection, might pose a safety hazard to future residents. Consequently, a DOT engineer denied the permit. On appeal, a DOT division engineer granted the permit request subject to the conditions that the owner make improvements to the railroad crossing and obtain the owning and operating railroads' consent to the improvements. On judicial review, the trial court ruled in favor of DOT, finding the agency acted within the scope of its powers in issuing the driveway permit subject to these conditions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conditions imposed by DOT in this case were not statutorily authorized, and therefore, DOT exceeded its authority when it issued the conditional permit. View "High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO. View "Lanvale Props. v County of Cabarrus" on Justia Law

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This case involved a dispute between the City of Kannapolis (Defendant), which rezoned rural land to promote commercial development, and neighboring landowners (Plaintiffs). At issue was whether Defendant approved a statement of reasonableness as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-383 when adopting the zoning amendment. The trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims and dismissing Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show the city council did not approve a statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the zoning amendment at issue was invalid because Defendant failed to properly approve a statement under section 160A-383, thus rendering the amendment void. Remanded. View "Wally v. City of Kannapolis" on Justia Law

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Morris Communications Corporation d/b/a Fairway Outdoor Advertising (Fairway) sought to re-erect a sign after its lawfully constructed sign was condemned by the DOT. Fairway applied for and received a sign permit for the relocated sign. The permit required that the work commence six months from the date of issuance. After Fairway took down its sign and reinstalled it, the city sent Fairway a notice of violation, asserting that the sign violated the city's outdoor advertising ban and asserting that Fairway's sign permit had expired because work on the project had not commenced prior to the permit's expiration date. Fairway appealed the notice to the board of adjustment (BOA), which affirmed the determination. The court of appeals affirmed. Fairway appealed. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in determining the BOA's interpretation of the sign ordinance was entitled to deference under de novo review. Because the BOA's interpretation of its sign ordinance constituted an error of law, the Court reversed.