Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Utah Supreme Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the challenges brought by Salt Lake City to four provisions of the Utah Inland Port Authority Act, holding that the challenged zoning provisions did not violate the Utah Constitution.The Act requires that Salt Lake City, West Valley City, and Magna adopt specific zoning regulations and permissions favorable to developing an inland port in the area. Salt Lake brought this action alleging that four provisions of the Act violated the Utah Constitution's Uniform Operation of Laws and Ripper clauses. The district court rejected the City's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the zoning provisions were rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose and therefore did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause; and (2) the zoning provisions did not delegate municipal functions in violation of the Ripper Clause. View "Salt Lake City Corp. v. Inland Port Authority" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding that Northern Monticello Alliance (NMA) had a due process right to participate in the hearing leading to the San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission's decision not to revoke a wind farm's conditional use permit (CUP), holding that NMA did not possess such a right.NMA complained to the Planning Commission that the wind farm was not fulfilling the conditions of its CUP. After a hearing at which NMA was not allowed to participate, the Planning Commission voted not to revoke the CUP. The San Juan County Commission ultimately upheld the Planning Commission's decision not to revoke the CUP. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that NMA members had due process rights granted by the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act and the San Juan County Zoning Ordinance and the San Jan County Zoning Ordinance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that NMA did not have a protectable due process interest in the enforcement of the CUP or in participation in the revocation hearing. View "Northern Monticello Alliance v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court declining to enter summary judgment for Appellants on the grounds that the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act requires neighbors objecting to fences that encroach on bridle paths to sue all homeowners whose property is subject to the bridle path easement, rather than just those homeowners who have fences that infringe on the path, holding that no such joinder is required.Appellants brought suit alleging that Appellees - four of approximately one hundred homeowners in Bell Canyon Acres Community - intruded upon bridle paths in the neighborhood for the use of residents, thereby violating the restrictive covenants that apply to the lots in Bell Canyon Acres. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment determining the parties' on the bridle paths and declaring that Appellees were encroaching on the bridle paths. The district court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Utah Code 78B-6-403(1) required that all homeowners in the community whose property was subject to the restrictive covenants and the bridle path easement (the outsiders) were required to be joined. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 403 provided no impediment to the declaratory judgment Appellants sought and that the outsiders did not need to be joined as parties. View "Bell Canyon Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. McLelland" on Justia Law

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In 2010, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned an access point from Bangerter Highway to the West Point Shopping Center. At the time of the condemnation, the shopping center was owned by FPA West Point, LLC. FPA leased buildings in the shopping center to a number of businesses, including K MART Corporation (Kmart). Both FPA and Kmart entered the condemnation proceedings, asserting rights to just compensation. The first appeal (Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA West Point, LLC) addressed valuation methods in the context of a condemnation award determination. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that courts must use the aggregate-of-interests approach (which determines the value of properties with divided ownership interests by assessing the value of each property interest separately) in deciding the amount of a condemnation award. In this appeal the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the district court erred by granting a condemnation award to Kmart, a lessee, even though Kmart’s lease contained a clause terminating its leasehold interest in the event of a condemnation. The Court held that it did: because the termination clause extinguished all of Kmart’s compensable property interests, Kmart was not entitled to compensation. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of a condemnation award to Kmart was reversed. View "UDOT v. Kmart Corp." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a party alleging error by a land use authority is no longer required to establish that the “decision would have been different” but for the error under the standard set forth in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). Instead, a party can establish prejudice by showing a reasonable likelihood that the error changed the land use authority’s decision.Appellants brought this lawsuit challenging the South Salt Lake City Council’s decision to close a portion of Truman and Burton Avenues. The City Council voted to vacate both streets in response to a petition by a car dealership. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the revised and clarified standard set forth in this opinion, Appellants failed to identify any prejudice resulting from any alleged deficiency in the petition. In addition, the petition to vacate was valid under Utah Code 10-2a-609.5, and notice of the City Council meetings was sufficient under Utah Code 10-9a-208. View "Potter v. South Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court reversing the decision of the Moab City Council denying Mary and Jeramey McElhaney’s application for a conditional use permit to operate a bed and breakfast in their residential neighborhood, holding that the district court erred by refusing to send the matter back to the Council for the entry of more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. After determining that the Council had not generated findings sufficient to support its decision, the district court overturned the Council’s decision to deny the McElhaneys’ application. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) on an appeal of a district court’s review of an administrative decision, the court reviews the district court’s decision and not the Council’s; and (2) the district court erred in overturning the Council’s decision without remanding to permit the Council to craft findings of fact and conclusions of law capable of appellate review. View "McElhaney v. City of Moab" on Justia Law

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Gloria and Thomas Shakespeare, GLOCO, LC, and Atlas Tower, LLC (collectively, Shakespeares) applied for permission from the Board of Trustees of the Fort Pierce Industrial Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Association (Association) to construct a cell phone tower on a lot located along River Road in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park (industrial park). The Association denied the application. When the Shakespeares proceeded to construct the cell phone tower, the Association brought suit, alleging that the Shakespeares breached the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of the industrial park. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Board did not have the right to limit the number of cell phone towers in the industrial park. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in strictly construing the CC&Rs in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property rather than applying neutral principles of contract construction; and (2) the Board had sufficient authority under the CC&Rs to deny the Shakespeares’ application. View "Fort Pierce Ind. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v. Shakespeare" on Justia Law

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In 2006, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District (District) filed an action to condemn six waterfront lots owned by Petitioner. When negotiations reached an impasse on the value of the lots, the District instituted the underlying condemnation proceeding. The jury returned a verdict for Petitioner in the amount of $56,000. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Petitioner filed an appeal less than thirty days after the entry of the district court's ruling and order. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal without prejudice based upon lack of jurisdiction, holding that under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) and the Supreme Court's decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., Petitioner's appeal was not ripe because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Rule 7(f)(2), Petitioner's appeal was premature and that the court of appeals therefore correctly dismissed it without prejudice. View "Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned a challenge by a group of citizens (Citizens) to an ordinance passed by the Ground County Council (Council) approving amendments concerning a Planned Unit Development district. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Council and the developer. In the district court, Citizens claimed the Council had acted administratively in adopting the ordinance, and accordingly, the matter should be remanded to the county board of adjustments because Citizens weren't allowed to challenge an administrative decision in a district court until they had exhausted their administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Council acted in its legislative capacity in adopting the ordinance because the ordinance created a new law of general applicability passed after the Council weighed policy considerations and because it had the formal nature of a legislative act; and (2) the ordinance should not be set aside because of illegality because, for each of Citizens' claims, the Council complied with applicable zoning ordinances. View "Suarez v. Grand County" on Justia Law

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This dispute centered around two roads owned by the Maceys, their company Family Link, and the remaining defendants (Defendants). Petitioner Nadine Gillmor previously brought suit against the Maceys seeking to interpret and enforce the terms of a settlement agreement purporting to give the Gillmors a limited private easement over one road and limited access over the other road. The court of appeals held that Gillmor had a limited private easement over the roads but that the easement would not pass on to her children from a prior marriage. Gillmor later brought two claims for access over the roads, asserting that the roads were subject to condemnation for a public access easement and that the roads had been continuously used as public thoroughfares for a period of ten years and were thus dedicated to public use as a "highway by use" under Utah Code 72-5-104. The district court dismissed the complaint based on res judicata and imposed sanctions on Gillmor's attorney for filing a claim without a basis in law. The Supreme Court (1) held that Gillmor's claims were not barred by res judiciata; and (2) vacated the imposition of sanctions. Remanded for adjudication of Gillmor's suit on the merits. View "Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC" on Justia Law