Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners (Board) manages state trust lands for the benefit of public schools. In Teton County, the Board issued temporary use permits to Basecamp Hospitality, LLC and Wilson Investments, LLC for commercial activities on state trust lands. Teton County challenged these permits, arguing they should be subject to local land use regulations. The district court dismissed Teton County's challenge, stating the county lacked standing for judicial review. Subsequently, Teton County issued abatement notices to the permit holders, which led the Board to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming sovereign immunity from local regulations.The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Teton County) filed a petition for review, which was dismissed by the Ninth Judicial District Court. The Board then filed for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Teton County's enforcement actions. Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands (CRUSL), formed by local property owners, sought to intervene, claiming their interests were directly impacted by the use of the state trust lands.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. CRUSL argued it had a significant protectable interest due to the proximity of its members' properties to the state trust lands. However, the court found CRUSL's interests were contingent on the outcome of the sovereign immunity issue and thus not significant protectable interests. Additionally, the court held that Teton County adequately represented CRUSL's interests, as both sought to enforce local regulations on state trust lands. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of CRUSL's motion to intervene as a matter of right under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). View "Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands v. State" on Justia Law

A landowner, Main St Properties LLC (MSP), entered into a conditional zoning agreement with the City of Bellevue, Nebraska, in 2012. The agreement allowed the City to rezone MSP’s property if MSP violated the agreement by parking U-Haul vehicles north of the building. The City issued multiple violation notices to MSP over the years, citing breaches of the agreement.MSP did not appeal the first three violation notices but did appeal a fourth notice issued in June 2020. While this appeal was pending, the City rezoned MSP’s property back to its original classification, citing the multiple violations as the basis for this action.MSP filed two lawsuits against the City: one seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and the other challenging the rezoning through a petition in error. The district court granted summary judgment for the City in both cases, finding that the City acted within its rights under the agreement and that the rezoning was not arbitrary or unreasonable.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It determined that the City’s action to rezone the property was legislative, not judicial, and thus not subject to a petition in error. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal related to the petition in error and vacated that judgment. However, the court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in the declaratory and injunctive relief case, holding that the City properly exercised its rights under the agreement after MSP committed multiple violations. The court also found that the stay provision in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-909 did not apply to the City’s legislative action and that there were no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. View "Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves the Old Creek Ranch Winery, owned by Holguin Family Ventures, LLC, and leased by OCRW, Inc. The Ventura County Board of Supervisors found that the appellants violated the Ventura County Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance by expanding the winery and wine-tasting area without a conditional use permit (CUP) and changing the principal use of the ranch from crop production to a wine tasting/event venue. The Board also denied their request for zoning clearance for a paved parking lot and electric vehicle charging stations.The trial court upheld the Board's decision, applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The court found that the appellants had converted the property’s principal use from crop and wine production to a commercial wine bar and event space. The court also denied appellants' motion to amend their complaint to add a new cause of action for declaratory relief and dismissed their remaining cause of action for inverse condemnation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint, concluding that the proposed new cause of action was unnecessary and that the delay in filing the motion was unjustified. Additionally, the court ruled that the Outdoor Events Ordinance did not apply to the winery, as it was separately regulated under the Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance.The main holding is that the substantial evidence standard of review was correctly applied, and substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of zoning violations and the denial of the zoning clearance for the parking lot and charging stations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Holguin Family Ventures v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

A group of Bozeman residents challenged a zoning provision within the City’s Unified Development Code (UDC), claiming they were not given sufficient notice regarding the City’s consideration of an amendment. The amendment, part of a general replacement of the UDC adopted in 2018, reclassified Greek housing into a new “group living” category, allowing fraternities and sororities in certain residential zones. The residents, who began experiencing disturbances from a nearby fraternity house in early 2022, filed a complaint against the City in October 2022, asserting that the notice provided for the zoning change was insufficient.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County granted summary judgment in favor of the residents, declaring the Greek housing reclassification void ab initio due to insufficient notice. The court reasoned that the City’s notice did not adequately inform the public about the specific change and its impact on the community. The court also held that the residents’ claims were not time-barred under § 2-3-114(1), MCA, because the provision was void from the beginning, and thus the statute of limitations did not apply.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that § 2-3-114(1), MCA, which requires challenges to agency decisions to be filed within 30 days of when the person learns or reasonably should have learned of the decision, applied to this case. The Court concluded that the residents’ action was untimely because they filed their complaint more than 30 days after they became aware of the zoning change in April 2022. The Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the City. View "Johnson v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

In late 2019, Verizon Wireless identified a coverage gap in Berlin Township, Ohio, and partnered with TowerCo to construct a cell tower to address this issue. TowerCo secured a lease with the local school district to build the tower on school property. Initially, TowerCo notified local residents as required by zoning regulations but later claimed immunity from these regulations under Ohio's "Brownfield immunity" doctrine, arguing that the project served a public purpose. Despite this claim, the Township insisted on compliance with local zoning laws, leading to a dispute.The Township filed a complaint in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to halt the tower's construction. TowerCo counterclaimed under the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and removed the case to federal court. After negotiations failed, TowerCo filed a separate federal lawsuit asserting TCA violations and sought a preliminary injunction to continue construction. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Township's actions likely violated the TCA by effectively prohibiting wireless services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the Township's filing of a state court lawsuit did not constitute a "final action" under the TCA, which is necessary to trigger the Act's remedies. Additionally, TowerCo failed to file its federal TCA claims within the 30-day statutory deadline after the Township's state court filing. The court concluded that TowerCo's claims were not ripe and were time-barred, and thus, TowerCo could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees" on Justia Law