Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over the conditional rezoning of a property in Mayfield Township, Michigan. The property, owned by A2B Properties, LLC, had been the site of the Lapeer International Dragway since 1968. In 2018, A2B purchased the dragway, expanded the facilities, and increased its hours of operation. In 2021, A2B filed a conditional-rezoning agreement with the township, seeking to have the property rezoned from Residential Agricultural District (R-1) to General Commercial District (C-2), with limitations on when the dragway could operate. The township board approved the conditional-rezoning agreement and rezoned the property as requested. However, Ronald and Susan Jostock, who live near the dragway, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief that the conditional rezoning was erroneous and injunctive relief to enjoin the conditional rezoning.In the lower courts, the Lapeer Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs, noting that the rezoning was conditioned on A2B operating the dragway in a specified manner. However, because operation of a dragway is not a permitted use in the C-2 district, A2B had erroneously bound itself to perform conditions it could not lawfully perform in that district. On that basis, the trial court held that the conditional rezoning was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, reasoning that the conditional-rezoning agreement was void because use as a dragway was not an approved use for that area under the township’s zoning ordinance.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a conditional rezoning is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if the proposed use is not a permitted use—either by right or after special approval—within the proposed zoning district. The court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning district. View "Jostock v. Mayfield Township" on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied to the City of Oakland's Planning Department for a zoning clearance to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The proposed facility was described as a compartmentalized commercial kitchen for take-out services only, measuring roughly 14,000 square feet. The facility is located in a Housing and Business Mix-1 Commercial Zone (HBX-1 zone), which permits certain industrial activities classified as "Light Manufacturing." The Planning Department issued CloudKitchens a zoning clearance and later a building permit allowing renovations.In April 2021, the San Pablo Avenue Golden Gate Improvement Association, Inc., and Oakland Neighborhoods For Equity (Neighbors) learned of CloudKitchens's plans. They sent a letter to the City Administrator requesting that the City reconsider its approval of CloudKitchens as qualifying for HBX-1 classification. The City's Zoning Manager responded, maintaining that the decision was proper. In July, Neighbors filed a formal complaint requesting the Planning Department initiate a revocation review process. They alleged that CloudKitchens will become a nuisance due to increased traffic, air pollution, and noise, and that the commercialized kitchen is essentially a Fast-Food Restaurant not permitted in an HBX-1 zone. The Planning Department denied the request.Neighbors then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed, holding that chapter 17.152 “does not create a legal basis to challenge a prior zoning determination made by the City.” Neighbors appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 does not provide a legal basis to challenge the Planning Department’s interpretations and determinations of the zoning regulations, including use classifications and zoning clearances. The court also noted that the Enforcement Regulations still permit Neighbors to seek a revocation hearing for any nonconforming uses (or nuisances) if they arise. However, the Enforcement Regulations do not allow members of the public to challenge use classifications or zoning determinations outside the procedures prescribed in chapter 17.132. View "San Pablo Ave. Golden Gate Improvement Assn. v. City Council of Oakland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Association (Casa Blanca) and its dispute with the County of Santa Barbara (County) and the California Coastal Commission (Commission). Over 30 years ago, the County approved the development of a 12-lot oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria, managed by Casa Blanca. One of the conditions for approval was the construction of a public beach access walkway. The County accepted the offer to dedicate the walkway in 2011. In 2017, the County and Commission alleged that Casa Blanca had missed the deadline to construct the walkway. Casa Blanca submitted construction plans but was told it needed a coastal development permit from the Commission. The Commission deemed the application incomplete, leading to a series of unsuccessful attempts to complete the application.The trial court found that Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca's. The court found that the offer to dedicate had been timely accepted by the County. As for the second cause of action seeking a determination regarding the deadline for Casa Blanca to construct the walkway, the court found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the County and Commission.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Casa Blanca's action was not ripe because it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court also disagreed with Casa Blanca's argument that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. The court concluded that a party may not evade the exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. View "Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Assn v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Honoipu Hideaway, LLC's (Honoipu) appeal of the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) order denying its petition for a declaratory order to change the boundary location between the conservation and agricultural districts on a district boundary map. The appeal was initially filed with the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. However, following a decision in another case, In re Kanahele, it was determined that appeals of LUC declaratory orders should have been filed with the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in the first instance. This led to a question of whether the circuit court had the authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had initially accepted the appeal. However, following the decision in In re Kanahele, it was determined that the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i was the correct court for such appeals. This led to a dispute between Honoipu and the LUC, with Honoipu arguing for the transfer of the case to the Supreme Court, and the LUC arguing for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit had both inherent and statutory authority to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The court reasoned that the power to "do such other acts and take such other steps as may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given to them by law or for the promotion of justice" gave the circuit court the power to correct a jurisdictional mistake that was no party’s or court’s fault. The court also noted that transferring the case would further the judiciary’s policy of permitting litigants to appeal and hear the case on its merits. View "Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership, a company that constructs, manages, designs, and repairs billboards, clashed with Beaufort County over the county's billboard policy. The county sought to phase out billboards within its borders by prohibiting the construction of new billboards and restricting structural repairs of old ones. Adams was issued a criminal citation for performing structural repairs on two old billboards without seeking authorization. Additionally, Adams filed eleven applications requesting permits to construct new commercial billboards with digital displays, each of which was denied. Adams sought to challenge Beaufort County’s local ordinance regulating billboards, along with several other local sign regulations.The district court dismissed all of Adams’s claims with prejudice. The claims related to the criminal citation were dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, and those related to the permit denials were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Adams appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with each of the district court’s dismissal determinations. However, it noted that the claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction should have been dismissed without prejudice. The court remanded those claims with the instruction that their dismissal be amended to dismissal without prejudice. The court also found that Adams did not have standing to challenge certain provisions of the county's sign ordinance, as it had not demonstrated that it had been adversely affected by those provisions. The court concluded that the case belongs in state court due to the state's interest in land-use planning and development, the ongoing state court proceedings, and the jurisdictional hurdles faced by Adams. View "Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. Beaufort County" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, maintained landscaping and hedges on their property in violation of certain provisions of the LAMC. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations based on section 36900, subdivision (a) of the California Government Code, which states that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action. The Schwartzes relied on a prior court decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which interpreted this provision as allowing any private citizen to sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances.The trial court overruled the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on the alleged LAMC violations. The court applied the Riley decision and concluded that the Schwartzes could assert private causes of action for violations of the LAMC. The Cohens petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Riley decision was wrongly decided and that section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four agreed with the Cohens. The court found that the language of section 36900, subdivision (a) is ambiguous and that its legislative history shows that the Legislature did not intend to afford members of the public the right to bring suit to redress violations of local ordinances. The court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the portion of its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to these causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend. The court also overruled the Riley decision to the extent that it recognized a private right of action under section 36900, subdivision (a). View "Cohen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Sojenhomer LLC and the Village of Egg Harbor over the Village's decision to condemn a small portion of Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The Village aimed to improve safety at a dangerous intersection by constructing a sidewalk along County Highway G. Sojenhomer, however, contested the condemnation, arguing that Wisconsin statutes prohibit property acquisition by condemnation to establish or extend a "pedestrian way," which it claimed included sidewalks.The Door County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Village, holding that sidewalks are not pedestrian ways and thus the Village had the authority to condemn the property for sidewalk construction. Sojenhomer appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that sidewalks are indeed pedestrian ways as defined by Wisconsin statutes. The court reasoned that sidewalks fall within the broad definition of a pedestrian way as "a walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel."The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The court held that when read in context, the definition of pedestrian way does not include sidewalks. The court noted that the statutory language, history, and broader context indicate that sidewalks and pedestrian ways are distinct, non-overlapping categories. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutes did not prohibit the Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor" on Justia Law

The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The proposed hospital was alleged to exceed local building height and bulk restrictions. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of property owners residing near the proposed hospital, sued to halt the construction, claiming it was a “threatened nuisance per se.” The Regents argued that as a state entity, they were immune from complying with local building and zoning regulations when engaging in a governmental activity such as constructing university buildings.The trial court disagreed with the Regents, concluding that their immunity depended on whether the proposed construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court concluded that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. The court held that the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue, and the demurrer should have been sustained. The court issued the writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the Regents’ demurrer and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer. View "The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law