Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Beginning in 2005, petitioner San Joaquin Regional Transit District (District) began discussing with real parties in interest DSS-2731 Myrtle LLC and Sardee Industries, Inc. (collectively, "Sardee") the possible acquisition through negotiated purchase or eminent domain of a two-acre parcel in Stockton on which Sardee operated a manufacturing facility. Correspondence regarding appraisal of the property and Sardee’s rights in eminent domain took place in 2008, but efforts to negotiate a purchase ultimately failed, leading to the filing of an eminent domain complaint in 2010. In April 2011 a stipulated order of possession gave legal possession of the parcel to District with a right of Sardee to occupy a portion of the property as it explored options for a new facility, to wind down its operations and move elsewhere. Sardee undertook to move its Stockton operations to its facility in Lisle, Illinois, which it upgraded to handle ongoing work from its Stockton plant. Under the stipulated order Sardee could occupy the property without charge until March 2012 and until June 30, 2012, by payment of rent. By March 2012 most of its equipment and operations had been relocated; in April 2012 the District abandoned its condemnation action. Following dismissal of the action, Sardee sought damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 1268.620, which permitted an award of damages “after the defendant moves from property in compliance with an order or agreement for possession or in reasonable contemplation of its taking.” District argued the costs involved in closing down Sardee’s Stockton facility and moving all but the items remaining for shipment in March could not be recovered. The trial court disagreed with this all-or-nothing interpretation of the statutory language and concluded Sardee should have been permitted to present its damage claim to a jury, whereupon District filed its petition for writ of mandate, prohibition or other appropriate relief, and sought a stay of the damages trial. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that Sardee had moved from the property, supporting application of section 1268.620. The District's petition was denied. View "San Joaquin Regional Transit Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure to serve the Ohio Attorney General a declaratory judgment claim alleging an ordinance is unconstitutional at the inception of the action does not divest the trial court of its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2721.12.The City of Cincinnati filed an action for injunctive relief against Fourth National Realty, LLC alleging that Fourth National had installed an outdoor advertising sign without obtaining the necessary permit and variance. Fourth National filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the City's outdoor advertising ordnances violated its constitutional right to free speech but did not serve its counterclaim until two years into the litigation. On remand, the City argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Fourth National had not served the attorney general with notice of the pending constitutional claim at the inception of Fourth National's case. The trial court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2721.12(A) does not require service on the attorney general at the inception of the action. View "City of Cincinnati v. Fourth National Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Generally, the California Coastal Act required a Coastal Development Permit (CDP) for any development in the coastal zone. This case involved a CDP issued by the Coastal Commission in 2015 for the reinforcement of an existing seawall, which had been installed years earlier at the base of a 1950’s era Laguna Beach home. Significantly, a condition of the CDP provided it would expire and the seawall would have to be removed if the home were “redeveloped in a manner that constitutes new development.” The homeowners reinforced the seawall, but they also remodeled the home without consulting the California Coastal Commission. The Coastal Commission found that the homeowners had violated the CDP by redeveloping the residence in a manner that constitutes new development. The Commission issued a cease and desist order requiring the removal of the seawall and further imposed a $1 million administrative penalty for the violation. The homeowners challenged those orders in court by filing a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate as to the cease and desist order (affirming the Coastal Commission’s ruling); the court granted the petition as to the penalty (reversing the Commission’s ruling). The homeowners filed an appeal as to the cease and desist order. The Commission filed a cross-appeal as to the penalty. The City of Laguna Beach (the City) filed an amicus brief in support of the homeowners. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion as to Coastal Commission’s penalty order. The homeowners have shown no basis for this court to absolve them of the properly imposed $1 million administrative penalty. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s ruling as to the cease and desist order and reversed the court’s ruling as to the administrative penalty. View "11 Lagunita, LLC v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals.After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter. View "Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board" on Justia Law

Mississippi Sand Solutions (Solutions) appealed a judgment by the Warren County Special Court of Eminent Domain denying its petition to establish a private right-of-way across lands owned by the defendants (the Fishers). Because the Mississippi Supreme Court fount the special court did not err by applying collateral estoppel to claims relating to access to Solutions’ property, judgment was affirmed. "When a party has been given voluntary access to its property over the land of another and that party continues to have access for the purposes of ingress and egress, that party cannot assert a claim under Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 for a private road through the land of their obliging neighbor. Even without applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Solutions, by its own arguments and testimony of its own witnesses, demonstrated it could not make a prima facie case under this statute." View "Mississippi Sand Solutions, LLC v. Otis, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Allen appealed his conviction for depredation of government property. arguing his conviction violated both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and separation of powers principles. Allen also appealed the district court’s restitution order of $20,300, claiming the order included restitution for uncharged conduct, and that the district court erred in applying the procedural framework of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) by placing the burden on him to disprove the amount of loss contained in the presentence report and by ordering a restitution amount unsupported by evidence. After the parties completed briefing on this case, the government filed a notice of concession, acknowledging that the restitution order was erroneous and suggesting remand for resentencing on restitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court to recalculate restitution. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a highway right-of-way proposed and approved in 1908 by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (the Board), then purportedly abandoned in 1910. This appeal arose from a decision of the East Side Highway District, the Board’s successor-in-interest, in which it declined to validate this highway right-of-way. In 2017, Gloria Palmer, Trustee of the Palmer Family Trust (the Trust) requested that the District validate the right-of-way. This was opposed by Rande and Debra Warner, and Steffen and Allison Teichmann, over whose land the purported right-of-way traversed. The Warners sought to have the right-of-way abandoned. The Highway District initiated road validation proceedings, after which it declined to validate "Leonard Road No. 2." After this decision, the Highway District granted a motion for reconsideration and reopened the public hearing. After hearing additional evidence and public comments, the Highway District again declined to validate the purported right-of-way. The Trust petitioned the district court for judicial review. The district court affirmed the Highway District’s decision. The Trust again appealed. Finding no reversible error or abuse of discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Palmer v. ESHD" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an application for a conditional water storage right filed by United Water and Sanitation District, a special water district formed in Elbert County, Colorado, acting through the United Water Acquisition Project Water Activity Enterprise (“United”). United sought to secure various water rights in Weld County. United’s original applications were consolidated in a set of four cases. In response to a motion for determination of questions of law from opposer Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company (“FRICO”) in the consolidated cases, the District Court for Water Division 1 (“water court”) concluded that United’s applications failed to demonstrate non-speculative intent to appropriate water. In response to this ruling, United withdrew its applications in the consolidated cases and, a week later, filed a new application in Case No. 16CW3053 for a conditional water storage right that was the subject of this appeal. Pertinent here, United sought to appropriate water for use in a proposed residential development in another county. In support of its new application for a conditional storage right, United offered a new, purportedly binding contract with the landowners of the proposed development. United also claimed for the first time that its status as a special district qualified it for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. FRICO opposed United's application, and the water court determined United's new application likewise failed to demonstrated non-speculative intent to appropriate water. The water court found that United was acting as a water broker to sell to third parties for their use, and not as a governmental agency seeking to procure water to serve its own municipal customers. Consequently, the water court held, United did not qualify for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. United appealed. But concurring with the water court's judgment, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: United was ineligible for the governmental planning exception to the anti-speculation doctrine. View "United Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit concerning flood damage to their Maine Township property after heavy rains in September 2008, alleging that public entities breached duties owed to them with respect to a stormwater drainage system located near their properties. Plaintiffs claimed that certain actions by the defendants increased water flow to the area and that there has been major flooding in the past. After a 2002 event, the Illinois Department of Natural Resources discovered “numerous bottlenecks and obstructions to flow as the causes of the invasive flooding” in the community. The trial court dismissed, finding that the defendants owed no duty to plaintiffs under the public duty rule and plaintiffs had not alleged any special duty. In the meantime, the Illinois Supreme Court (Coleman) abolished the public duty rule, which provided that a local governmental entity does not owe any duty to individual members of the public to provide adequate governmental services. The trial court found that the new law set forth in Coleman should not be retroactively applied.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Coleman clearly established a new principle of law, overturning decades of existing precedent. Given these circumstances and the two rationales for abolishing the public duty rule, the new law announced in Coleman would not be thwarted by its prospective application. Prospective application avoids substantial inequitable results for defendants who have relied upon the public duty rule throughout the long course of this litigation. View "Tzakis v. Maine Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiff County of Monterey (County) appealed when the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The County was the successor agency for its former redevelopment agency ("RDA"), and challenged decisions by the Department of Finance (Department) relating to a development known as the East Garrison Project, which was part of the Fort Ord Redevelopment Project located on a closed military base in Monterey. The County claimed the trial court erroneously determined that a written agreement entered into between its former RDA and a private developer (real party in interest, UCP East Garrison, LLC) was not an enforceable obligation within the meaning of the dissolution law because the former RDA did not have the authority to approve the agreement on the date the governor signed the 2011 dissolution legislation. The County further contended the trial court erred in determining the County failed to show the Department abused its discretion in disapproving two separate requests for funding related to administration of the East Garrison Project. The County claimed these administrative costs were expended to complete an enforceable obligation within the meaning of the dissolution law, and therefore the Department should have approved its requests for payment of such costs. Finally, the County argued the Department’s application of the dissolution law improperly impaired UCP’s contractual rights. The Court of Appeal rejected each of the County's contentions and affirmed judgment. View "County of Monterey v. Bosler" on Justia Law