Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Divide County, North Dakota appealed judgments dismissing its complaints against Stateline Services, Inc., Power Energy Logistics, LLC, and five individuals (collectively, “Defendants”), which alleged they operated overweight vehicles on restricted roads. In 2019, Divide County imposed certain weight restrictions on county and township roads due to wet conditions. Truck drivers for Stateline Services and Power Energy Logistics were pulled over on township roads and cited for operating overweight vehicles. The County filed this civil action against the Defendants for statutory damages under N.D.C.C. 39-12- 17. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaints, concluding the County failed to provide sufficient public notice of the weight restrictions through a uniform county permit system, and failed to erect and maintain signs at each end of the highway. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Divide County v. Stateline Service, et al." on Justia Law

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Chenard appealed a superior court ruling that he operated or maintained a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114. Plaintiff Town of Lincoln (town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant owned the property at issue, consisting of four lots located in the town's "General Use" zoning district, which allowed junk yards only by special exception. The properties contained “large amounts of personal belongings” stored “both outdoors and in a number of sheds, which are generally in a dilapidated condition.” During its view of the properties, the court observed “old or used scrap metal including numerous machine or automotive parts, tires, wheels, cables and wiring, woodstoves, snowplows, construction debris, steel drums, plastic barrels, and other detritus.” In addition, the court observed “several automobiles that did not appear to be in working order, as well as old snowmobiles, lawnmowers, and ATVs, an old boat, and two semi-trailers.” All of the materials stored on defendant’s properties belonged to him and were stored there for his personal use. Defendant did not have a license to operate a junk yard business, nor did he have a special exception from the town. The superior court ultimately ordered defendant to end his violation of RSA 236:114 and abate the nuisance by a certain date and, if he failed to do so, authorized the town to impose a civil penalty of up to $50 per day for every day the nuisance continued and until such time as the nuisance was abated to the town’s satisfaction. The trial court denied the town’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court did not err in finding that provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 applied to defendant’s properties, and that defendant was operating or maintaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114, and that the town was not entitled to attorney's fees, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Lincoln v. Joseph Chenard" on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Berlin (City) appealed a New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) order determining that the City over-assessed respondent Public Service Company of New Hampshire d/b/a Eversource Energy (PSNH), for tax year 2017. The City challenged the BTLA’s decision to apply the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) 2017 median equalization ratio to determine the proportionality of the City’s assessment of PSNH’s J. Brodie Smith hydroelectric facility (Smith Hydro). It argued the 2016 median equalization ratio — the most recent DRA ratio available at the time the City prepared the 2017 tax assessment — should have applied. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, it reversed and remanded. View "Appeal of City of Berlin" on Justia Law

In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Under the “compliance rule,” ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard. ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard.Kenjoh sued, asserting that the compliance rule was an unconstitutional prior restraint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. While the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the statute, which changes how the regulation applies. Before the amendment, a person needed a permit from ODOT to erect a billboard that was “designed, intended, or used to advertise.” Now, a person needs a permit if he will be paid for placing a message on the billboard, regardless of the message. The court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to an ODOT supervisor on a claim for damages despite the amendment, based on the law as it existed at the time of the official action. View "Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

As a vacation destination, the City of Palm Springs (City) has expressly allowed the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling, subject to various conditions designed to protect the interests of neighboring residents (as well as the City’s own interest in collecting transient occupancy taxes, a/k/a hotel taxes). In 2017, the City amended its short term rental ordinances, making specific findings that the amended ordinances were consistent with the City's Zoning Code. Meanwhile, Protect Our Neighborhoods (Protect), a membership organization opposed to short-term rentals, filed this action claiming among other things, that the 2017 version of the short-term rental ordinance (Ordinance) violated the City’s Zoning Code. The trial court disagreed and upheld the Ordinance. Protect appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Main St Properties LLC's (MSP) complaint seeking to enjoin a zoning ordinance adopted by the city council for the City of Bellevue, holding that the court erred in dismissing MSP's complaint.After MSP received a notice of zoning violation MSP appealed to the board of adjustment, which upheld the zoning violation. While MSP's appeal was pending, the city council approved an ordinance to rezone MSP's property. MSP then filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because MSP failed to file a petition in error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that the complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Main St Properties LLC v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law