Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether E. Howard Carson acquired a vested right to develop property in a particular manner based upon alleged assurances made to him by Tom Brown, the Forsyth County Planning Director. Carson was the principal for Red Bull Holdings II, LLC, the property owner in this case. In 2016, Carson met with Brown and discussed Carson’s plans to purchase approximately 17 acres of land and develop that property into 42 separate 9,000- square-foot residential lots. In his role as Planning Director, Brown was allowed to interpret the zoning code; however, he could not unilaterally promise or authorize the issuance of a building permit. The record further showed that Carson knew prior to that meeting that the zoning code allowed for 9,000-square-foot lots. During the meeting, Carson showed Brown a hand-drawn document depicting Carson’s proposed subdivision layout, and asked Brown to confirm whether the current zoning code allowed for his proposed development. Brown made no representations as to future zoning code changes that might impact the property, nor did he guarantee that Carson would be able to build as he proposed. Carson purchased the property and spent money obtaining the various plans and appraisals necessary to begin development. Then, in August 2016, the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners “imposed a moratorium on the acceptance of applications for land disturbance permits” for 9,000 -square-foot residential lots. Based on the record before the Supreme Court, it concluded Carson did not acquire a vested right; therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary was reversed. The case was remanded with direction. View "Brown, et al. v. Carson, et al." on Justia Law

Brenda and Gene Sauvageau petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of supervision directing the district court to stop the Cass County Joint Water Resource District from using quick take eminent domain to acquire their property. The Sauvageaus claimed the District was prohibited from using quick take eminent domain to acquire a permanent right of way easement over their entire property. The Supreme Court concluded the quick take process was not available because the District is taking more than a right of way in the Sauvageaus’ property. The Court granted the Sauvageaus’ petition, directed the district court to vacate its order denying the Sauvageaus’ motion to dismiss the District’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sauvageau, et al. v. Bailey, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Patrick and Pamela Lutz (“Homeowners”) owned a single-family, detached home on a half-acre lot along Kesslersville Road in Plainfield Township, Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The property was located in a farm and forest district under the township’s zoning code. Single-family dwellings were permitted in that district but, per the zoning code, they are subject to setback requirements. Homeowners decided to add onto the back of their home. The design called for an addition to extend to the building envelope in the back: to 50 feet shy of the rear property line, with a raised, covered deck extending 18 feet into the rear setback area. When Homeowners submitted their plan to the township for approval, the zoning officer sent them written notice that the deck would not be allowed because it intruded into 50-foot setback area. He observed Homeowners could seek relief from the zoning hearing board (the “Board”) in the form of a dimensional variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court correctly applied its standard of appellate review relative to the grant of a dimensional zoning variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was evenly divided; by operation of law, the Commonwealth Court’s judgment was thus affirmed. View "Kneebone v. Lutz" on Justia Law

Austin Texas specially regulates signs that advertise things that are not located on the same premises as the sign and signs that direct people to offsite locations (off-premises signs). Its sign code prohibited the construction of new off-premises signs. Grandfathered off-premises signs could remain in their existing locations but could not be altered in ways that increased their nonconformity. On-premises signs were not similarly restricted. Advertisers, denied permits to digitize some billboards, argued that the prohibition against digitizing off-premises signs, but not on-premises signs, violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the code. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the distinction "facially content-based" because an official had to read a sign’s message to determine whether it was off-premises.The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the view that any examination of speech or expression inherently triggers heightened First Amendment concern. Restrictions on speech may require some evaluation of the speech and nonetheless remain content-neutral. The on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral; it does not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment. A sign’s message matters only to the extent that it informs the relative location. The on-/off-premises distinction is more like ordinary time, place, or manner restrictions, which do not trigger strict scrutiny. Content-based regulations are those that discriminate based on the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. The Court remanded, noting that evidence that an impermissible purpose or justification underpins a facially content-neutral restriction may mean that the restriction is nevertheless content-based and, to survive intermediate scrutiny, a restriction on speech or expression must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” View "City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC" on Justia Law

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's dismissal of this appeal from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Bethel denying Plaintiffs' application for a special permit to construct a crematory on their property, holding that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence.Plaintiffs applied for a special permit to construct a crematory on their property. The Commission denied the application. Relying on St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 170 A.3d 73 (Conn. 2017), the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's ensuing appeal, concluding that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not reveal substantial evidence on which the Commission based its decision. View "McLoughlin v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property, hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute of limitations applied. Finding that the appellate court erred in concluding the statute of limitations applied, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lafferty sought to develop 76 homes on a 31.7-acre Garaventa Hills site in Livermore. A 2012 draft environmental impact report recognized that any alterations to existing drainage patterns may affect the quantity, timing, and quality of precipitation needed to maintain a functioning ecosystem. There was considerable opposition to Lafferty’s proposal. Lafferty reduced the number of residential units to 47, eliminated a vehicular bridge over Altamont Creek, and preserved a large rock outcropping. The final environmental impact report (FEIR) was released in 2014. The planning commission recommended that the city reject Lafferty’s second proposal. The city council declined to certify the FEIR. In 2017, Lafferty proposed a smaller-scale project with 44 new residences. According to the reissued FEIR (RFEIR), the project would result in the permanent removal of 31.78 acres of grasslands with an additional 1.18 acres being temporarily disturbed for construction; various mitigation measures were proposed, including the acquisition of an 85-acre compensatory mitigation site. The city certified the RFEIR and approved the Project.Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 2100). The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Opponents raised a challenge to the adequacy of the RFEIR’s analysis of the “no project” alternative that is both preserved for appeal and meritorious. View "Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' petition for review of a decision of the Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County under Wyo. R. App. P. 12 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-3-114, holding that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Appellants with dismissal of their petition for review.The district court dismissed Appellants' petition, determining that Wyo. R. App. P. 2.06 required a transcript to be filed within sixty days of the filing of the petition for review of agency action and that no transcript was filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court misstated and misapplied Rule 2.06; (2) the Board failed to transmit the record as required by Rule 12.07; and (3) because the Board, not Appellants, had the responsibility to transmit the entire record to the district court, the court abused its discretion by dismissing the action. View "Depiero v. Board of County Commissioners, Lincoln County" on Justia Law