Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A group of residents sought to challenge a Tooele County zoning ordinance that changed the designation of a parcel of land in Erda from agricultural to planned-community zoning, enabling its development. The residents, acting as referendum sponsors, attempted to gather enough signatures to place the ordinance on the ballot for possible repeal, aiming to preserve the land’s agricultural status. Their efforts were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related executive orders, which they argued hindered their ability to collect signatures. Despite requesting permission to use electronic signatures, their request was denied, and they ultimately failed to meet the required signature threshold as determined by the County Clerk.The sponsors then filed suit in the Third District Court, Tooele County, against both the County and the Governor, challenging the signature threshold and the denial of electronic signatures. During the litigation, the area containing the property was incorporated as the City of Erda, transferring land-use authority from the County to the new city. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, finding the Clerk had correctly applied the signature threshold, and granted judgment on the pleadings to the Governor, rejecting the constitutional claims. The sponsors appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and determined that it was moot. The court held that, because the property is now within the City of Erda and subject to its zoning authority, a referendum repealing the Tooele County ordinance would have no legal effect on the property’s current zoning. The court found that it could not provide meaningful relief to the sponsors, as Erda has enacted its own zoning ordinances for the property. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Haney v. Tooele County" on Justia Law

Chosen Consulting, LLC, doing business as Chosen Healthcare, and other related entities (collectively "Chosen") filed a lawsuit against the Town Council of Highland, Indiana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the Town of Highland, Indiana (collectively "the Town"). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to provide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the Town. The district court held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was not ripe for adjudication because Chosen had not obtained a final decision from the local zoning authorities. The court indicated that Chosen needed to pursue its request for zoning approval through the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) and, if necessary, appeal any final decision entered by the BZA to the state courts before seeking an injunction in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Chosen's claim for injunctive relief was not ripe because Chosen had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. The court emphasized that Chosen needed to follow the local zoning procedures, including applying for a use variance or seeking a declaratory judgment in state court, to obtain a final decision from the Town. Until Chosen completed these steps, the dispute was not ripe for federal court review. View "Chosen Consulting, LLC v Town Council of Highland" on Justia Law

Cable Matters Inc. sought a use variance from the zoning board of appeals of Northborough to build a 20,000 square foot warehouse in an industrial zoning district. The property is also within the town's groundwater protection overlay district, which does not permit warehouses. The zoning board granted the variance, and the planning board later issued a special permit with conditions, including restrictions on storage, lighting, landscaping, delivery hours, and driveway use.The plaintiffs, who live across the street from the proposed warehouse, appealed the zoning board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing they were aggrieved by the potential noise, light, vibration, odors, and loss of open space. The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment for Cable Matters, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing as they failed to show they were aggrieved by the zoning board's decision. The judge found that the plaintiffs' claims were speculative and not supported by credible evidence.The plaintiffs appealed to the Appeals Court, which vacated the judgment, instructing the judge to consider potential future uses of the warehouse. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court judge correctly assessed the plaintiffs' standing based on Cable Matters's proposed use. The court held that potential future uses unsupported by the record should not be considered in determining standing. The court affirmed the Superior Court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. View "Stone v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Northborough" on Justia Law

A plaintiff sought to build a single-family home on his residential parcel in El Dorado County, California. The county required him to pay a $23,420 traffic impact mitigation (TIM) fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. The plaintiff paid the fee under protest and subsequently filed a lawsuit challenging the fee as an unlawful taking of property under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.The Superior Court of El Dorado County dismissed the plaintiff’s federal takings claim without leave to amend and denied his petition for a writ of mandate. The plaintiff appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on established California law that the Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to legislatively imposed impact fees. The California Supreme Court denied review.The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and administrative land-use exactions. The Supreme Court vacated the California Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.On remand, the California Court of Appeal applied the Nollan/Dolan test to the TIM fee. The court concluded that the fee had an essential nexus to the county’s legitimate interest in reducing traffic congestion from new development. Additionally, the court found that the fee was roughly proportional to the traffic impacts attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development. The court held that the TIM fee did not constitute an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment and affirmed the judgment. View "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado" on Justia Law

Zoey Watch Hill, LLC applied for a dimensional variance to expand a nonconforming structure on its property in Westerly, Rhode Island. The property, a small, irregularly shaped lot with a house built in 1938, did not meet current zoning requirements. Zoey proposed lifting the house to create additional living space and sought variances for all setbacks. The Westerly Zoning Board of Review approved the application, finding that the unique characteristics of the lot and the inadequacy of the existing house created a hardship justifying the variance.The Watch Hill Fire District (WHFD) appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, arguing that Zoey failed to demonstrate that there was no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial use of the property. The Superior Court affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct standard of "more than a mere inconvenience" and that substantial evidence supported the board's findings. The court also found that the proposed project was the least relief necessary and that Zoey's hardship was not self-created or primarily for financial gain.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case on a writ of certiorari. The Court held that the Superior Court and the zoning board applied the correct standard for granting a dimensional variance. The Court clarified that the "more than a mere inconvenience" standard was appropriate and that the "no other reasonable alternative" language from a definitional statute did not alter this standard. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the zoning board's decision to grant the dimensional variance to Zoey. View "Watch Hill Fire District v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

The Nordstroms applied for a dimensional variance to the Westerly Zoning Board of Review to demolish their existing house and build a new three-story house on their property, which is a preexisting nonconforming lot. The property did not meet the minimum lot size and frontage requirements of the Medium-Density Residential 30 (MDR-30) district. The board approved the application, granting variances for side yard setbacks, despite objections from neighboring landowners.The Superior Court consolidated appeals from RH McLeod Family LLC and 4 Spray Rock, LLC, who argued that the board did not follow the correct legal standard and violated the zoning ordinance. The trial justice affirmed the board's decision, concluding that the board applied the correct legal standard and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The trial justice also determined that the zoning ordinance allowed the Nordstroms to obtain a dimensional variance to build a new nonconforming structure after demolishing the existing one.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the trial justice's interpretation of the zoning ordinance. The Court held that the plain language of § 260-32(C)(2) of the Westerly Zoning Ordinance prohibits the rebuilding or replacement of a demolished nonconforming structure unless it conforms to the dimensional requirements of the ordinance. The Court concluded that the ordinance does not allow for the possibility of obtaining a dimensional variance in such cases. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "RH McLeod Family LLC v. Westerly Zoning Board of Review" on Justia Law

Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson Island, Maryland, sought to build an assisted living facility for elderly people with disabilities. The Gibson Island Corporation, a homeowners association, opposed the project, citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting business use of homes without approval. Lussi requested an exemption as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Maryland law, but the Corporation imposed four conditions, which Lussi found unreasonable. Negotiations failed, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the Corporation, finding that Lussi could not show the requested accommodation was necessary for providing equal housing opportunities. The court also dismissed Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims, concluding there was no evidence of adverse actions or discriminatory intent by the Corporation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the necessity element by focusing on the removal of the Corporation's conditions rather than the requested exemption itself. The appellate court held that the exemption was necessary to provide equal housing opportunities for disabled individuals on Gibson Island. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Corporation's conditions, which should be resolved by a jury.Additionally, the appellate court determined that Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims presented jury questions. The court noted evidence suggesting the Corporation's stated reasons for opposing the project might be pretextual and that community hostility towards disabled residents could imply discriminatory intent.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the South Dakota Department of Corrections' (DOC) decision to purchase state-owned agricultural land in Lincoln County for a new men's state prison, authorized by House Bill 1017 (HB 1017). The plaintiffs, a group of private individuals and a non-profit corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Dakota, the DOC, and the DOC Secretary, arguing that the State must comply with local zoning regulations, which do not permit a prison in an agricultural district without a conditional use permit or rezoning.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The court found that only two plaintiffs had standing based on alleged property value decreases. However, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity and preemption, determining that the DOC's actions were discretionary and that state law preempted local zoning regulations.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable claim of right to enforce the local zoning ordinance against the State. The court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and that the plaintiffs failed to identify any statutory or other legal authority granting them a private right to enforce the zoning ordinance. Consequently, the case was deemed non-justiciable, and the court did not address the merits of the sovereign immunity and preemption claims. View "Jensen v. Dept Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Residents of South Seaside Park filed a petition to deannex their community from Berkeley Township and annex it to the Borough of Seaside Park. South Seaside Park is geographically isolated from the mainland section of Berkeley Township, requiring residents to drive 13-16 miles through seven other municipalities to reach the mainland. The community has limited municipal facilities and relies more on Seaside Park for services. The petitioners argued that deannexation would benefit them economically and socially, while not significantly harming Berkeley Township.The Township Council referred the petition to the Planning Board, which conducted 38 hearings over four years. The Planning Board's professional planner, who was supposed to be impartial, instead assisted the Township in opposing the deannexation. Additionally, some Planning Board members made public comments against the petition. The Planning Board ultimately recommended denying the petition, and the Township Council followed this recommendation.Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Council's decision. The trial court found that the Planning Board's process was biased and that the Township's denial of the petition was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court also found that the denial was detrimental to the economic and social well-being of South Seaside Park residents and that deannexation would not significantly harm Berkeley Township. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Planning Board failed to conduct an impartial review and that plaintiffs met their burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. The Court affirmed the trial court's order for deannexation, allowing South Seaside Park to seek annexation by Seaside Park. View "Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township" on Justia Law

In this case, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, engaged in a 2009 comprehensive rezoning process known as a sectional map amendment for subregions 5 and 6. Several property owners, including Christmas Farm and MCQ Auto Servicenter, were affected by this rezoning. Christmas Farm sought a more intensive zoning classification but failed to file the required ethics affidavit. MCQ’s property was downzoned, but MCQ successfully petitioned for a revisory petition, resulting in the restoration of its original zoning classification.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed the zoning decisions multiple times, resulting in several remands to the District Council. The courts found that the District Council failed to comply with procedural requirements, including the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The most recent remand occurred in 2019, where the District Council adopted sectional map amendments without holding a public hearing or notifying the affected property owners.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether a 2021 countywide rezoning constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners' assertions of error from the 2019 proceeding. The Court also examined whether the District Council erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether it complied with the Appellate Court’s prior remand order.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2021 countywide rezoning was not a comprehensive rezoning or a substantive change in the law that rendered the property owners' assertions moot. The rezoning was a technical mapping exercise intended to align zoning classifications with the new zoning ordinance. The Court also held that the District Council failed to comply with state and local laws requiring notice and a public hearing and did not follow the Appellate Court’s remand instructions. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "County Council of Prince George's County. v. Robin Dale Land LLC" on Justia Law