Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case involves the proposed development of the Betabel Project by the McDowell Trust, which includes a large commercial roadside attraction in San Benito County. The County's Board of Supervisors certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and approved a conditional use permit for the project. The Center for Biological Diversity and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band opposed the project, arguing that the EIR violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and that the project approval violated state planning and zoning laws. They filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the project approval.The San Benito County Planning Commission initially approved the project and filed a Notice of Determination (NOD) on October 14, 2022. The Center and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band appealed this decision to the County Board of Supervisors, which denied the appeals and filed a second NOD on November 10, 2022. The trial court sustained the McDowell Trust's demurrer, agreeing that the CEQA causes of action were time-barred because the petitions were filed more than 30 days after the first NOD.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that the 30-day limitations period for filing a CEQA challenge began with the second NOD filed on November 10, 2022, following the final decision by the Board of Supervisors. The court emphasized that the Planning Commission's decision was not final due to the timely appeals. Therefore, the writ petitions filed on December 9, 2022, were within the 30-day period. The appellate court reversed the judgments of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrer. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Word Seed Church, now known as Grace Fellowship Covenant Church, sought to establish a permanent location in the Village of Hazel Crest but faced difficulties due to the village's zoning ordinance. The church claimed that the ordinance discriminated against religious assemblies by not listing churches as a permitted use in any zoning district and requiring a special use permit for churches in certain residential districts. The church argued that this process was burdensome and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the church's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the church had standing but was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the village, concluding that the church did not have a property interest in Hazel Crest and had not shown that comparable secular organizations were treated more favorably. The court also rejected the church's vagueness challenge to the zoning ordinance. The church did not appeal the summary judgment but instead filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the district court had evaluated the wrong version of the zoning ordinance. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision. The court noted that the church's argument regarding the zoning ordinance amendments was not raised during the summary judgment proceedings and that the church had waived any challenge to the B-2 district, which was affected by the 2008 amendment. The appellate court concluded that the church's difficulties in finding a property were due to the lack of suitable parcels, not the zoning ordinance. View "Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

In late 2019, Verizon Wireless identified a coverage gap in Berlin Township, Ohio, and partnered with TowerCo to construct a cell tower to address this issue. TowerCo secured a lease with the local school district to build the tower on school property. Initially, TowerCo notified local residents as required by zoning regulations but later claimed immunity from these regulations under Ohio's "Brownfield immunity" doctrine, arguing that the project served a public purpose. Despite this claim, the Township insisted on compliance with local zoning laws, leading to a dispute.The Township filed a complaint in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to halt the tower's construction. TowerCo counterclaimed under the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and removed the case to federal court. After negotiations failed, TowerCo filed a separate federal lawsuit asserting TCA violations and sought a preliminary injunction to continue construction. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Township's actions likely violated the TCA by effectively prohibiting wireless services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the Township's filing of a state court lawsuit did not constitute a "final action" under the TCA, which is necessary to trigger the Act's remedies. Additionally, TowerCo failed to file its federal TCA claims within the 30-day statutory deadline after the Township's state court filing. The court concluded that TowerCo's claims were not ripe and were time-barred, and thus, TowerCo could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law

Citizens of a town submitted a document they claimed was a petition for a referendum to reverse a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures but did not mention the ordinance number or request a referendum. The town's Board of Commissioners reviewed the document and determined it did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum. The citizens then refiled the document with a cover page referencing the ordinance and requesting a referendum, but the signature pages remained unchanged.The Circuit Court for Harford County ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid because they did not first verify the signatures and did not act by ordinance or resolution. The court ordered the town to verify the signatures and proceed with the referendum process if the signatures were valid.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined the document did not meet the charter's requirements. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to verify signatures before determining the petition's validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by a verbal motion, which was memorialized in the meeting minutes, and did not need to adopt an ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion, affirming that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied for a zoning clearance from the City of Oakland to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The facility, measuring approximately 14,000 square feet, was classified as "Light Manufacturing" under the Oakland Municipal Code (OMC) because it involved food production exceeding 10,000 square feet. The City’s Planning Department issued the zoning clearance and a subsequent building permit for renovations. In April 2021, local neighborhood associations learned of the project and requested the City reconsider the zoning classification, arguing it was essentially a fast-food restaurant, which was not permitted in the zone. The Planning Department denied the request, maintaining the classification was correct.The neighborhood associations filed a formal complaint requesting a revocation review process, which the Planning Department also denied, stating the classification was consistent with similar uses and that there was no substantial evidence of a nuisance. An independent hearing officer affirmed this decision, noting that the Enforcement Regulations under chapter 17.152 were not intended to revisit zoning determinations. The hearing officer also found the classification as "Light Manufacturing" to be supported by sufficient evidence. The associations then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Alameda County Superior Court, which was denied. The court held that chapter 17.152 did not provide a legal basis to challenge the prior zoning determination.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 of the OMC does not authorize challenges to zoning determinations, which are governed by chapter 17.132. The court found that the neighborhood associations' appeal was time-barred under the specific procedures outlined in chapter 17.132, which requires appeals to be filed within ten days of the Planning Department's decision. The court concluded that the Enforcement Regulations could not be used to challenge the initial zoning classification. View "San Pablo Ave Golden Gate Improvement Assn v. City Council Oakland" on Justia Law

American Warrior, Inc. owned an oil and gas lease on a 177-acre tract in Finney County, Kansas. In 2020, Huber Sand, Inc. acquired surface rights to the same tract and applied for a conditional use permit to operate a sand and gravel quarry. The Finney County Board of Zoning Appeals approved the permit with conditions after public meetings and consideration of community feedback.The Finney District Court upheld the permit's issuance, ruling that the County properly delegated the authority to issue conditional use permits to the Zoning Board. American Warrior appealed, arguing that the local procedure conflicted with state law, specifically K.S.A. 12-757, which outlines procedures for amending zoning regulations. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the County's procedure conflicted with state law, relying on precedents from Crumbaker v. Hunt Midwest Mining, Inc. and Manly v. City of Shawnee.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Finney County's zoning regulations did not conflict with state law. The Court found that K.S.A. 12-757 applies only to amendments of zoning regulations and not to the issuance of conditional use permits. The Court also determined that the County's regulations, which allow the Zoning Board to issue conditional use permits, were valid under K.S.A. 12-755 and K.S.A. 12-759. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the validity of the conditional use permit issued to Huber Sand, Inc. View "American Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

A developer proposed constructing a 12-unit residential condominium in downtown Lafayette, California, on a parcel mostly occupied by a vacant, dilapidated convalescent hospital. The City of Lafayette determined the project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, classifying it as infill development. Nahid Nassiri, who owns an adjacent office building, challenged this decision, arguing the site had value as habitat for rare species and that the project would significantly affect air quality.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted Nassiri's petition, finding insufficient evidence to support the City's determination that the site had no value as habitat for rare species. However, the court rejected Nassiri's other claims regarding general plan consistency, air quality effects, and mitigation measures. The developer and the City filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the project site, as defined by recent case law, did not include the area with potential habitat. The trial court granted the motion, leading to the denial of Nassiri's petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the City's determination that the project site had no value as habitat for rare species, specifically the oak titmouse and Nuttall’s woodpecker. The court also upheld the City's finding that the project would not significantly affect air quality, dismissing Nassiri's reliance on a health risk assessment that did not accurately reflect the project's construction characteristics. Lastly, the court declined to address the "unusual circumstances" exception to the CEQA exemption, as Nassiri did not properly raise this issue in the trial court. The judgment was affirmed. View "Nassiri v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

AUUE, Inc. applied for a zoning permit to develop a medical center, including a hospital, medical clinic, and professional offices, on five parcels of land in Jefferson Hills Borough. The Borough's Zoning Officer issued a use permit, recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the Office Park District (O-P District), but conditioned the permit on AUUE obtaining further approvals before any development could commence. Residents of Jefferson Hills appealed, arguing that the application violated several provisions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance.The Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) overturned the Zoning Officer’s decision, concluding that the proposed medical center was not permitted by right in the O-P District and that the Zoning Officer exceeded his authority by issuing a permit without ensuring full compliance with the Ordinance. The ZHB identified several violations in the application, including improper use of accessory parking lots and lack of direct access to a collector or arterial road.The Commonwealth Court reversed the ZHB’s decision, holding that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit recognizing the proposed use as allowed by right in the O-P District. The court found that the ZHB should have limited its review to whether the proposed use was permitted by right, rather than considering overall compliance with the Ordinance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the Zoning Officer had the authority to issue a use permit for the limited purpose of recognizing that the proposed use was allowed by right in the O-P District. The ZHB was required to limit its review to this issue and was not permitted to overturn the Zoning Officer’s decision based on other potential violations of the Ordinance. View "AUUE, Inc. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills" on Justia Law