Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The case concerns an agreement between the City of Fairfield and the Solano Irrigation District, initiated at the request of Solano County, to treat raw water for a new mixed-use development in Middle Green Valley, an unincorporated area outside Fairfield’s city limits. Under the agreement, the City would treat water supplied by the District and return it as potable water, while the District would handle distribution, operations, maintenance, and billing. The development, approved by the County, includes residential units and preserves a significant portion of land for agriculture and open space. The City asserted that providing such water treatment services outside its boundaries was consistent with its practices and rights.After the City Council approved the agreement, the Solano County Orderly Growth Committee filed a petition in the Solano County Superior Court, arguing that the agreement violated the City’s 2002 General Plan and California’s Planning and Zoning Law by providing municipal services for development outside the city’s urban limit line. The Superior Court granted the petition, finding the agreement inconsistent with the General Plan and invalidating it.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether state law required the agreement to be consistent with the City’s General Plan and, if so, whether the City’s determination of consistency was reasonable. The appellate court held that California law does not require such agreements to be consistent with a city’s general plan unless specifically mandated by statute, which was not the case here. Even assuming a consistency requirement, the court found the City’s determination that the agreement was consistent with its General Plan to be reasonable. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, thereby upholding the agreement. View "Solano County Orderly Growth Committee v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

Aaron Powers owned a lot within a subdivision governed by covenants, codes, and restrictions (CC&Rs), as well as an adjacent parcel he intended to develop. The adjacent parcel lacked access to a public or private road, so Powers sought to construct a road across a sixty-foot strip of his lot to provide access. After the homeowners association (HOA) denied permission, Powers obtained a boundary line adjustment and amended plat from Teton County, effectively moving the strip into the adjacent parcel. Carl Jordan, a subdivision homeowner and HOA board member, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the road’s construction, arguing that the CC&Rs still applied to the strip and prohibited the road.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Teton County, granted summary judgment for Jordan, declaring that the CC&Rs continued to apply to the strip, that Powers violated the CC&Rs by splitting the lot, and that the CC&Rs categorically prohibited construction of the road. The court issued a permanent injunction against Powers and awarded attorney fees and costs to Jordan. Powers moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the CC&Rs continued to apply to the sixty-foot strip despite the boundary adjustment and that Powers was required to obtain approval from the HOA’s Design Committee before constructing the road, which he had not done. However, the Court reversed the lower court’s declaration that the CC&Rs categorically prohibited road construction and that the boundary adjustment constituted a prohibited lot split, finding those issues either unsupported or moot. The permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs were vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Jordan v. Powers" on Justia Law

A group of seven property owners and part-time residents in Northeast Harbor challenged the approval of a six-unit subdivision proposed by Mount Desert 365 (MD 365) on a 0.9-acre parcel. The subdivision, called Heel Way, was designed to provide workforce housing and consisted of two double-dwelling-unit buildings and two single-dwelling-unit buildings on a commonly owned lot. The Town of Mount Desert Planning Board held nine meetings, considered input from the developer, residents, and the public, and ultimately approved the application in October 2023, issuing a written decision in December 2023.The residents sought judicial review in the Maine Superior Court, which transferred the case to the Business and Consumer Docket. In June 2024, the Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, and the residents appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly, applying de novo review to the ordinance interpretation. The Court held that the Planning Board correctly determined that the subdivision did not create separate lots and thus did not need to meet access-road requirements. The Planning Board also did not abuse its discretion in waiving the performance bond in favor of a conditional agreement. The Court affirmed the Planning Board’s calculation of density requirements, finding no error in its methodology.However, the Court found that the Planning Board erred by declining to calculate the open-space requirements under the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the Business and Consumer Docket with instructions to remand to the Planning Board for further consideration of the open-space calculation. View "Cannon v. Town of Mount Desert" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations, including landowners and agricultural groups, challenged North Dakota statutes governing the underground storage of carbon dioxide and oil or gas, as well as laws permitting pre-condemnation surveys on private property. The plaintiffs own or represent owners of “pore space” in underground geological formations, which is used for carbon dioxide sequestration projects overseen by the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC). The plaintiffs argued that the statutes authorizing amalgamation of pore space and pre-condemnation surveys violate constitutional protections against uncompensated takings and due process, and that certain statutory provisions constitute an improper delegation of legislative power.The District Court of Bottineau County granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that most of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a six-year statute of limitations, as the claims were facial challenges to statutes enacted more than six years prior. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the oil and gas storage law was not viable as a facial challenge because it depended on future actions and factual circumstances. The court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the provision allowing the NDIC to grant exceptions (N.D.C.C. § 38-22-03(7)) and the oil and gas storage amalgamation law (N.D.C.C. ch. 38-25), as they had not shown actual or threatened injury. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the carbon dioxide storage amalgamation provisions (N.D.C.C. ch. 38-22). The court ruled that the district court erred in dismissing these claims as time-barred, as the claims accrued when the NDIC acted under the statutes, not when the statutes were enacted. The court affirmed dismissal of the pre-condemnation survey law claims, but on the basis of binding precedent, not the statute of limitations. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northwest Landowners Association v. State" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a cul-de-sac constructed by the plaintiff in Laconia in the late 1980s. The plaintiff indicated on a 1987 subdivision plan that the cul-de-sac would be built and deeded to the City, and lots were sold based on that plan. However, the cul-de-sac was never formally deeded to the City, though the City maintained it until 2019, and it has been used by the public and public services since its construction. In 2019, the plaintiff sought to remove the cul-de-sac and replace it with a hammerhead turnaround, but the planning board denied this request.After the planning board’s denial, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the cul-de-sac had never been accepted by the City and remained private property. Subsequently, intervenors petitioned the City Council to lay out the cul-de-sac as a public highway under New Hampshire law. The City Council approved the layout, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether there was “occasion” to lay out the road as a public highway. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the intervenors, finding that the plaintiff had dedicated the cul-de-sac for public use and that the public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s private interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court held that the plaintiff’s dedication of the cul-de-sac created a public easement and vested the public with a right to accept the road, limiting the plaintiff’s rights to use the property in ways that would interfere with public use. The Court also found that the public interest in the cul-de-sac outweighed both the plaintiff’s private interest and the burden on the City, thus satisfying the statutory “occasion” requirement for laying out a public highway. The judgment in favor of the intervenors was affirmed. View "Taylor Community v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

A property owner purchased land in a rural area adjacent to a growing town. After a private developer acquired and sought to develop neighboring tracts, the developer needed sewer access for a new subdivision. The developer attempted to purchase an easement across the property owner’s land, but the owner refused. The developer then persuaded the town to use its eminent domain power to take a sewer easement across the owner’s property, agreeing to cover the town’s costs. The town initiated condemnation proceedings and, before the legal challenge was resolved, installed a sewer line under the property.The Superior Court of Wake County held a hearing and found that the town’s taking was for a private, not public, purpose, rendering the condemnation null and void. The town’s appeal was dismissed as untimely by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, making the trial court’s judgment final. Subsequently, the property owner sought to enforce the judgment and have the sewer line removed, while the town filed a separate action seeking a declaration that it had acquired the easement by inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the owner’s request for injunctive relief and granted the town’s motion for relief from judgment, reasoning that the owner’s only remedy was compensation. The Court of Appeals vacated and reversed in part, holding that injunctive relief might be available but affirmed the denial of immediate removal of the sewer line.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a municipality’s exercise of eminent domain is found to be for a private purpose, title and possession revest in the original landowner. The court further held that the trial court has inherent authority to order a mandatory injunction to restore the property, subject to equitable considerations. The court vacated the town’s separate action as barred by the prior pending action doctrine and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the continuing trespass. View "Town of Apex v. Rubin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Costco sought to operate a gas station adjacent to its retail store in Colchester, Vermont, near a busy highway interchange. The company obtained both municipal and Act 250 permits, which included conditions requiring traffic mitigation measures—specifically, improvements at a nearby intersection (the MVD Improvements) or, alternatively, implementation of modified traffic signal timings if a larger state highway project (the DDI Project) was not yet under construction. Two neighboring businesses, who also operated gas stations nearby, actively participated in the permitting process and subsequent litigation, arguing that Costco’s gas station would exacerbate traffic congestion and that Costco should not be allowed to operate the station at full-time hours until the DDI Project was complete.After initial permits were issued, the neighbors appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld the permits with the mitigation conditions. The neighbors then appealed the Act 250 permit to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the sufficiency of the mitigation measures. As the DDI Project faced delays, Costco sought and received permit amendments allowing limited-hours operation of the gas station, subject to the same traffic mitigation conditions. The neighbors continued to challenge these amendments and argued that the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) should have been joined as a co-applicant, and that Costco needed further permit amendments to operate at full-time hours.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to consider whether Costco could operate the gas station at full-time hours. The Court concluded that Costco was not required to seek further amendments to its Act 250 or municipal permits before commencing full-time operation, as the permit conditions were satisfied either by the commencement of the DDI Project or by implementation of the signal timing modifications. The Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision and found the neighbors’ remaining arguments moot. View "In re Costco Wholesale Administrative Decision" on Justia Law