Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Several organizations sought to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management challenging the grant of two rights-of-way. The district court denied intervention, and the proposed intervenors filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the district court held that the decision to grant the rights-of-way was arbitrary and capricious, vacated it, and remanded the matter to the agency.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court’s ruling mooted the intervention dispute. Generally, if the underlying litigation is complete, an appeal of a denial of intervention is moot and must be dismissed. The panel held that an intervention dispute would remain alive if this court could grant effectual relief or if there were some other way for the proposed intervenors to obtain their desired relief. Here, the district court’s proceedings are complete. No party has filed an appeal of the district court’s merits order, and under Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004), the court would not have jurisdiction over such an appeal brought by Appellants even if they were granted intervention. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. BLM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Appellants Pike Off OTA, Inc., Amy Cerato, Mike Leary, Vince Dougherty, Terrie Club, Mike Club, Twyla Smith, Cali Coward, Karen Powell, Mike Powell, Cedric Leblanc, Darla Leblanc, Claudette Wispe, Mark Dooling, Nate Piel, Kara Piel, Nikki Whitson, John Whitson, Robert Wallace, Chelsea Wallace, Robin Stead, Anna Olson, Tassie Hirschfeld, Ice Blast LLC, and Janette Ward (collectively Appellants) brought claims challenging the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority's (OTA) authority to construct three proposed turnpikes: the Tri-City Connector, the East-West Connector, and the South Extension. The OTA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that Appellants' claims were within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court granted the OTA's motion to dismiss, and Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court concurred it had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority is authorized to construct the proposed turnpikes in the bond validation matter. The Court further ruled that appellants failed to establish that they had a clear legal right to the injunctive and/or mandamus relief sought. View "Pike Off OTA v. Okla. Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Richard and Sanaz Anthony appealed a superior court order affirming a decision of the Town of Plaistow’s (Town) Planning Board granting site plan approval for the development and consolidation of two lots by the intervenor, Milton Real Properties of Massachusetts, LLC. Plaintiffs argued the superior court erred by: (1) ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address plaintiffs’ argument that the proposed use was not permitted in the zoning district; (2) finding that the planning board made a sufficient regional impact determination pursuant to RSA 36:56 (2019); and (3) ruling that the planning board’s decision granting site plan approval was otherwise lawful and reasonable. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ zoning argument, in concluding that the planning board acted reasonably when it implicitly found that the project would not have a regional impact, and in finding that the planning board’s decision was otherwise lawful and reasonable. View "Anthony, et al. v. Town of Plaistow" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants City of Huntington Beach (Huntington) and the City Council of Huntington Beach (City Council; collectively, the City) appealed the grant of attorney fees in favor of plaintiff and respondent The Kennedy Commission (Kennedy) for litigation pertaining to the City’s housing element plan under California’s Housing Element Law. Prior to 2015, the City had adopted its 2013-2021 housing element (Housing Element), which identified sufficient sites to accommodate the City’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) of lower-income housing mandated by California. This Housing Element was consistent with the general plan of the City. A majority of the units for low-income housing were set aside in an area known as the Beach Edinger Corridors Specific Plan (BECSP). The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) approved the Housing Element. In 2015, after complaints from residents about the density in the BECSP, the City passed an amendment that significantly reduced the number of housing units that could be developed in the BECSP (Amended BECSP), thereby effectively eliminating sites for low-income housing in Huntington. Kennedy advised the City that the Amended BECSP did not meet Huntington’s requirement for their RHNA and it violated state law. Kennedy then petitioned for alternative writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Amended BECSP was inconsistent with the Housing Element in violation of Government Code sections 65454, 65580, 65583, 65587 and 65860. Kennedy argued that the Amended BESCSP was void as it was not consistent with the Housing Element. The Petition included five other causes of action, including, in the second cause of action, that the City must implement the Housing Element. The trial court applied Government Code section 65454 and declared the Amended BECSP was void because it conflicted with the general plan. The trial court refused to order that the City had to implement the Housing Element as it was written. Kennedy voluntarily dismissed all the other causes of action without prejudice. The trial court also awarded Kennedy attorney fees as the prevailing party. Finding no reversible error in the attorney fee award, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law