Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court finding that a county ordinance did not violate Maryland's uniformity requirement requiring zoning laws to "be uniform for each class or kind of development throughout a district or zone," Md. Code Ann., Land Use 22-201(b)(2)(i), holding that the ordinance should have survived the uniformity challenge.While Prince George's County's zoning ordinance had historically limited development of housing at a private airport to low-density, single-family detached housing, the County Council amended the ordinance's text to allow the development of higher-density housing at the airport in order to incentivize redevelopment. Certain constituents brought suit, arguing that the ordinance violated uniformity because it was tailored so narrowly as to afford favorable development opportunities. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the ordinance discriminated arbitrarily, and therefore, their uniformity challenge failed. View "Prince George's County v. Concerned Citizens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Bradley Weiss and Cathleen Shea appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Sunapee's (Town) motion to dismiss. The trial court determined that, because plaintiffs failed to request a second rehearing from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded: pursuant to RSA 677:3, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the superior court from the ZBA’s April 1 denial by timely moving for rehearing. View "Weiss, et al. v. Town of Sunapee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Constituents' challenge to the amendment to a zoning ordinance limiting development of housing at a private airport in Prince George's County, which allowed the airport to develop higher-density housing, holding that the ordinance survived the challenge.While the County's zoning ordinance had historically limited development of housing at the airport to low-density, single-family detached housing, the County Council amended the text of the ordinance to allow the development of higher-density housing in order to incentivize redevelopment of the airport. Constituents brought the underlying challenge, arguing that the ordinance violated Maryland's uniformity requirement, Md. Code Ann., Land Use 22-201(b)(2)(i). The circuit court denied relief, but the appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ordinance did not discriminate against similarly situated parties and was adopted to further a valid public purpose; and (2) therefore, the ordinance should have survived the uniformity challenge. View "Prince George's County Council v. Concerned Citizens of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) began constructing a diamond interchange and installing a drainage system on property abutting Interstate 70 (“I-70”) in Washington County, Pennsylvania. The property’s owner, Appellant Donald Bindas, petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers, seeking compensation for this encumbrance upon his land. PennDOT asserted that its predecessor, the Department of Highways (“DOH”), had secured a highway easement for the land in question in 1958. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court agreed, dismissing Bindas’ suit. Upon its review of the statutory authority that PennDOT invoked, as well as the record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that DOH’s failure to comply with the requirements of 36 P.S. § 670-210 rendered that easement invalid. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order, and remanded with the instruction that PennDOT’s preliminary objections be overruled. View "Bindas. v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

The County of Santa Barbara (County) appealed from the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive in Montecito. The County filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and trespass against respondents. The trial court issued a preemptory writ that suspends all efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred because Respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim and will not be irreparably harmed by the removal of encroachments installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right of way. The court explained that Respondents will suffer no irreparable harm because a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. View "Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

The Draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared (California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Pub. Resources Code, 21000) for Santa Rita’s West Area Specific Plan did not discuss or analyze any potential off-site impacts flowing from an assumption that contemplated new schools would never be built. The school districts contended that they would never receive sufficient funding for the new facilities, and would have to accommodate new students from Specific Plan developments at existing school sites or by other means. The Project identified locations for new schools and the EIR addressed anticipated off-site impacts of development at those sites. The City imposed developer impact fees for the Project under Education Code 17620, deemed complete mitigation under CEQA. The City maintained that information relayed by the Districts amounted to no more than speculation, not requiring further review. After the City approved the Project, the Districts filed suit.The court of appeal concluded that the Final EIR complied with CEQA and properly assumed that the contemplated new schools would be built as part of the Specific Plan and Project. The City was not required to analyze any potentially significant off-site impacts of ill-defined, generalized, and speculative alternatives to new-school construction offered by the District The Districts’ expressed concerns about a perennial lack of sufficient funding without providing more detailed information or identifying a specific alternative plan to address this possibility—for which they, not the City, would be responsible—amounted to speculation. View "Santa Rita Union School District v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

International sought permission to erect two two-sided billboards in the City of Troy. These billboards were to be 14 by 48 feet in area and 70 feet in height when mounted; they did not conform to height, size, and setback requirements in the Ordinance. After the City denied its permit application and request for a variance, International sued, citing the First Amendment and arguing that the Ordinance’s variance procedure imposed an invalid prior restraint and that its permit exceptions were content-based restrictions on free speech. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the City on International’s prior-restraint claim but remanded for the court to consider whether the Ordinance, with the permit exceptions, survived strict scrutiny.The district court held that the permitting requirements, with the content-based exceptions. did not survive strict scrutiny but that the permit exceptions are severable, leaving intact the Ordinance’s height, size, and setback requirements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International’s proposed billboards do not satisfy those valid, content-neutral standards, View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law