Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Aksal Group, LLC filed an application with the Minot City Planning Department in July 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve a preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition, a new three-lot subdivision. The Kyle’s Addition plat, recorded in 1995, included a single block with a 24-foot public access easement. RMM Properties, which owns adjacent property, objected, arguing that Aksal Group needed their consent to vacate the public alley and that half of the alley would revert to them as the adjacent property owner.The Minot Planning Commission approved Aksal Group’s application under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16, and the Minot City Council subsequently passed a resolution in September 2023 to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. RMM Properties appealed this decision to the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, which affirmed Minot’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 was the appropriate statute governing Aksal Group’s application. The court found that Minot’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. The court also determined that the Kyle’s Addition plat dedicated a public access easement, not a fee title, and that the procedures under N.D.C.C. § 40-50.1-16 were correctly applied. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, upholding Minot’s decision to vacate the Kyle’s Addition plat and approve the preliminary plat for the Citizens Alley Addition. View "RMM Properties v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

A vintner challenged the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is largely rural, with a small portion used for agriculture, including vineyards. The County had previously regulated vineyards through a 2015 ordinance requiring conditional use permits and development standards. In 2016, the County initiated a comprehensive update to the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which required an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The draft EIR proposed continued regulation of vineyards but did not include a ban. After public comments, the final EIR maintained this approach. However, the County Board of Supervisors ultimately decided to ban new vineyards entirely when they approved the project in 2021. The vintner argued that this change rendered the EIR's project description unstable and required recirculation for further public comment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the vintner's petition for a writ of mandate, finding no CEQA violation. The vintner appealed, arguing that the vineyard ban fundamentally altered the project and violated Government Code section 65857 by not referring the modification back to the planning commission.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project, thus not destabilizing the project description in the EIR. The court also found that the vintner failed to demonstrate prejudice from the County's procedural error under Government Code section 65857, as there was no evidence that a different outcome was probable if the planning commission had reconsidered the ban. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

High Maine, LLC, challenged the Town of Kittery's issuance of a marijuana retail store license and approval of a change of use and modified site plan for GTF Kittery 8, LLC, to operate a marijuana retail store in the Town’s C-2 zone. High Maine argued that the Town's actions violated local and state regulations, particularly concerning the proximity of the proposed store to a nursery school.The Superior Court (York County) dismissed High Maine's complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that High Maine, as a pre-applicant on the waiting list for a marijuana retail store license, did not suffer a particularized injury. The court concluded that High Maine's status as a prospective license-holder was unchanged by the Town's decisions, and thus, it was not directly affected.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that High Maine had alleged a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The court noted that High Maine's opportunity to obtain the single license available in the C-2 zone was directly and negatively affected by the alleged defects in the licensing process. The court found that High Maine's complaint suggested that GTF Kittery 8 obtained an unfair advantage in the lottery by submitting multiple applications for the same building, which was within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that High Maine's allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to demonstrate its standing to challenge the Town's actions. View "High Maine, LLC v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is a significant ecological and scenic resource, with most of its land designated as open space. In 2016, the County began updating the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which included regulations for vineyards. Initially, the draft environmental impact report proposed stringent regulations but did not ban new vineyards. However, after public comments, the County Board of Supervisors decided to impose a total ban on new vineyards.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition for a writ of mandate filed by John Gooden and the Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. The petitioners argued that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by not recirculating the environmental impact report after the vineyard ban was added and that the County failed to follow Government Code section 65857 by not referring the ban back to the Department of Regional Planning.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the addition of the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project described in the environmental impact report, thus not rendering the project description unstable. The court also found that the petitioners had waived any claim for recirculation. Additionally, the court assumed a procedural error under Government Code section 65857 but concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that this error was prejudicial or that a different outcome was probable if the error had not occurred. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to subdivide a 161.6-acre property in Westminster, Vermont, to create two residential lots with frontage on Old Codding Road, a private road discontinued in 1893. The Westminster Development Review Board (DRB) granted the subdivision permit, finding that the applicant had made a "threshold showing" of the right to use Old Codding Road. Neighbors appealed, arguing that the applicant did not have a legal right-of-way over the road.The Environmental Division affirmed the DRB's decision, concluding that the applicant had made the necessary threshold showing of a right to use the road based on historical use by the applicant's predecessors and other neighbors without deeded rights-of-way. The court declined to fully evaluate whether the road was formally laid out before its discontinuance, citing a lack of jurisdiction to determine private property rights.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Environmental Division erred in requiring only a threshold showing and in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of an easement or right-of-way. The Supreme Court held that the Environmental Division has jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant has a permanent easement or right-of-way, as required by the Vermont Planning and Development Act and the Westminster Zoning Bylaws. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the permit applicant to establish the necessary easement or right-of-way.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division's decision and remanded the case for a determination of whether the applicant has an easement or right-of-way over Old Codding Road. The Environmental Division must now fully evaluate the evidence regarding the road's layout and the applicant's claimed right-of-way. View "In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Monadnock Rod and Gun Club, reoriented its outdoor shooting range from an east-west to a south-north direction without obtaining site plan approval from the Town of Peterborough. This reorientation encroached on a neighboring property. Subsequently, the Town amended its zoning ordinance to require shooting ranges to be enclosed, indoor facilities. The primary issues are whether the Club’s shooting range was a lawful nonconforming use when the Town amended its zoning ordinance and whether state law prohibits the enforcement of the amended ordinance.The Superior Court found that the Club had trespassed onto the neighboring property and awarded damages to the property owners. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Town for zoning ordinance violations related to the south-north range. The Club applied for site plan review for an expanded east-west range, but the Town’s code enforcement officer determined that neither the east-west nor the south-north ranges were grandfathered as nonconforming uses. The Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) affirmed this decision and denied the Club’s application for a special exception. The planning board subsequently denied the Club’s site plan application. The Superior Court affirmed these decisions and denied the Club’s motion for reconsideration.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Club’s south-north range was not a lawful nonconforming use because it was constructed without site plan approval. Therefore, it could not qualify as a lawful nonconforming use when the zoning ordinance was amended. The court also upheld the ZBA’s denial of the special exception application, concluding that the ZBA correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant a special exception for an illegal nonconforming use. Additionally, the court found that the Town’s zoning ordinance was not preempted by state law and that the Club’s constitutional arguments were not preserved for review. View "Monadnock Rod and Gun Club v. Town of Peterborough" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the County of Los Angeles's approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. The project included a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map. The organization alleged that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to adequately analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts and by not providing proper procedural notices. They also claimed violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and local zoning laws.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the developer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the organization's claims were barred by the 90-day limitations period under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA. The court ruled that the organization failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map, which was required for any action challenging a subdivision decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 of the SMA did not bar the organization's CEQA claims to the extent they alleged procedural violations and failures to analyze and disclose environmental impacts, as these claims were unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that the CEQA claims challenging the adequacy of mitigation measures imposed as conditions of the project's approval were barred by the SMA's 90-day limitations period. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the CEQA cause of action and grant it concerning the SMA and zoning law violations. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Roger K. Moreau sought to operate an automotive repair shop on his lot in the Town of Parsonsfield, which is accessed via Reed Lane, a private road. The lot, created from a larger parcel, lacks frontage on a public road. Reed Lane, dating back to 1991, is a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way with a fifteen-foot-wide gravel road. Moreau had been operating the repair shop without a permit since 2015-2018. Nelligan, who owns adjacent property, opposed the business.The Town of Parsonsfield Planning Board initially denied Moreau's application for a site plan review permit but later approved it after Moreau acquired additional property. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) vacated this approval, stating the lot remained nonconforming. Moreau submitted a third application, which the Planning Board approved, but the ZBA again vacated the decision, citing the insufficient width of Reed Lane for commercial use. Moreau appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the ZBA's decision, finding the Planning Board's approval valid.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the commercial road standards in the Town’s Land Use and Development Ordinance required a sixty-foot-wide right-of-way for a business, which Reed Lane did not meet. The court concluded that Moreau's commercial use of the lot was not grandfathered and must comply with current ordinance standards. Consequently, the court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of Nelligan and the Town of Parsonsfield, affirming the ZBA's decision. View "Moreau v. Town of Parsonsfield" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law