Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Flathead Properties, L.L.C. (Appellant) owned a tract of land along Flathead Lake that became an island during certain months due to rising water levels. In 2011, Appellant received a permit from the Flathead County Planning and Zoning Office to build a bridge connecting the island to the peninsula. The Community Association for North Shore Conservation (C.A.N.S.C.) challenged the permit, arguing it violated the Montana Lakeshore Protection Act. The District Court voided the permit and ordered the bridge's removal, a decision upheld by the Montana Supreme Court.Following the Supreme Court's decision, Appellant filed a claim for inverse condemnation against Flathead County, arguing that the court-ordered removal of the bridge constituted a taking of its vested property interest, requiring compensation. The County filed a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that since the permit was void ab initio, Appellant never had a vested property interest. The District Court granted the motion, agreeing with the County's reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Appellant's complaint contained sufficient facts to support a claim for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, a regulatory takings claim. The Court noted that Appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest in the bridge once it was built and that the County's actions in issuing and then voiding the permit could be seen as a taking requiring just compensation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Flathead Properties L.L.C. v. Flathead Cty" on Justia Law

15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

The City of Fargo, a home rule municipality, adopted zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition as home occupations and in non-farm commercial use zoned districts. In 2023, the North Dakota legislature passed House Bill 1340, amending N.D.C.C. §§ 40-05.1-06 and 62.1-01-03 to limit the authority of political subdivisions, including home rule cities, regarding firearms and ammunition. Fargo filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 1340 and seeking a declaration that the amended statutes did not void its ordinances.The District Court of Cass County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that H.B. 1340 did not violate the North Dakota Constitution and expressly preempted and voided Fargo’s zoning ordinances. Fargo appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that H.B. 1340 was a valid exercise of the legislature’s constitutional authority to define the powers of home rule cities. The court concluded that the amended statutes were constitutional as applied to Fargo’s home rule charter and ordinances. The court also determined that H.B. 1340 preempted and rendered void Fargo’s zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition, as the legislature had expressly limited the authority of political subdivisions in this area. View "City of Fargo v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

A developer, Schooldev East, LLC, proposed to build a charter school in the Town of Wake Forest and applied for major subdivision and site plan permits. The proposed site was a 35-acre parcel within a larger tract of land. The developer's plans included constructing a multi-use path to provide pedestrian and bicycle access to nearby areas. The Town's planning board and board of commissioners (BOC) held hearings and ultimately denied the applications, citing non-compliance with the Town's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) requirements for pedestrian and bicycle connectivity to surrounding residential areas.The Superior Court of Wake County affirmed the BOC's decision, concluding that the developer failed to demonstrate compliance with the UDO and that the Town's requirements were not preempted by state law. The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, also affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, agreeing that the developer did not meet its burden of production to show entitlement to the permits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and determined that the UDO provision in question was unclear regarding whether it required connectivity to all surrounding residential areas. The Court held that any ambiguity in land use ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. The Court concluded that the developer had presented competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the UDO by proposing a multi-use path that provided access to a public park and a future residential subdivision. As no evidence was presented in opposition, the BOC had no basis to deny the applications. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the Town to approve the developer's applications. View "Schooldev East, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest" on Justia Law

Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the permit for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and suggested relocating the Coastal Trail inland as a feasible alternative to armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the term "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act referred to structures existing at the time of the seawall application, thus entitling the condominiums and sewer line to protection. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail instead of constructing the seawall.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in the context of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Consequently, the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, were not entitled to shoreline armoring. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on this point.However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Commission's revised staff report lacked a detailed factual basis and explanation for rejecting the original staff recommendation, which found no viable location for rerouting the trail while maintaining its aesthetic and recreational value. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners (Board) manages state trust lands for the benefit of public schools. In Teton County, the Board issued temporary use permits to Basecamp Hospitality, LLC and Wilson Investments, LLC for commercial activities on state trust lands. Teton County challenged these permits, arguing they should be subject to local land use regulations. The district court dismissed Teton County's challenge, stating the county lacked standing for judicial review. Subsequently, Teton County issued abatement notices to the permit holders, which led the Board to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming sovereign immunity from local regulations.The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Teton County) filed a petition for review, which was dismissed by the Ninth Judicial District Court. The Board then filed for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Teton County's enforcement actions. Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands (CRUSL), formed by local property owners, sought to intervene, claiming their interests were directly impacted by the use of the state trust lands.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. CRUSL argued it had a significant protectable interest due to the proximity of its members' properties to the state trust lands. However, the court found CRUSL's interests were contingent on the outcome of the sovereign immunity issue and thus not significant protectable interests. Additionally, the court held that Teton County adequately represented CRUSL's interests, as both sought to enforce local regulations on state trust lands. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of CRUSL's motion to intervene as a matter of right under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). View "Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands v. State" on Justia Law

Dawna Pederzani operated the Vermont English Bulldog Rescue from her home in Williston, Vermont, providing temporary foster care to rescued dogs. Her home is located in a residential zoning district governed by the Williston Development Bylaw. In September 2022, she received a notice of zoning violation for operating the rescue without a permit. She applied for an "after-the-fact" zoning permit as a "home business," which was denied by the Development Review Board. She then filed a new application in January 2023, which was initially approved by the zoning administrator but later reversed by the Board upon appeal by her neighbors.The Environmental Division granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbors, affirming the denial of the home-business permit. The court held that the bylaw's home-business provision prohibited any outdoor use for the business in the residential zoning district. It rejected Pederzani's argument that her operation qualified as a "kennel," which the bylaw allows in residential districts, reasoning that the kennel provision was limited by the outdoor restriction for home businesses.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and reversed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the rescue operation qualifies as a kennel under the bylaw, which allows kennels as home businesses in residential districts. The Court found that the kennel provision, which contemplates some outdoor use, should be read as an exception to the general home-business provision that prohibits outdoor workspaces. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Pederzani Administrative Appeal" on Justia Law