Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs owned five lots in the City of Hackensack on which stood two dilapidated buildings abutted by two poorly maintained and decrepit parking lots. Hackensack designated eleven out of twenty lots in a two-block area as in need of redevelopment, including plaintiffs' five lots. In doing so, the Planning Board made specific findings that those lots met the statutory definitions of blight in N.J.S.A.40A:12A-5(a), (b), and (d). The Hackensack Mayor and Council passed a resolution that adopted the Planning Board s findings. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging Hackensack's classification of their lots as blighted, arguing that a finding of blight did not meet the constitutional definition of blight enunciated in "Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro," (191 N.J. 344 (2007)). On that basis, plaintiffs sought to strike down the Mayor and Council's resolution classifying plaintiffs properties as part of an area in need of redevelopment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that "Gallenthin" established a heightened constitutional standard for blight applicable to every subsection of the Redevelopment Law. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Division over-read the scope of Gallenthin, which only addressed a specific constitutional defect in subsection (e) of N.J.S.A.40A:12A-5. Applying the required deferential standard of review to the municipal decision-making in this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that substantial evidence supported Hackensack's designation of plaintiffs properties as in need of redevelopment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. View "62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of the City of Hackensack" on Justia Law

Oak Shores is a 660-unit single-family residential common interest development, governed by the Oak Shores Community Association (Association). Only 125 to 150, of the homes are occupied by full-time residents. Approximately 66 absentee homeowners rent their homes to short-term vacation renters. Absentee owners sued, challenging: a rule stating the minimum rental period is seven days; an annual fee of $325 imposed on owners who rent their homes; a rule limiting the number of automobiles, boats and other watercraft that 3 renters are allowed to bring into Oak Shores; a mandatory garbage collection fee; boat and watercraft fees; building permit fees; and property transfer fees. The trial court upheld the rules and fee and awarded the association statutory attorney fees and costs. Except for clarifying the award of fees, the court of appeal affirmed. Homeowners associations may adopt reasonable rules and impose fees on its members relating to short term rentals of condominium units. View "Watts v. Oak Shores Cmty. Ass'n" on Justia Law

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a decision of the Superior Court, Environmental Division in three consolidated dockets, "all of which carved a very long and circuitous path through the lower tribunals" before presented for the Supreme Court's review. At issue was the proposal of Lathrop Limited Partnership ("Lathrop") to establish a sand and gravel extraction operation on a parcel of land in Bristol. Neighbors of the project appealed the environmental court's decision to approve Lathrop's conditional use and Act 250 permit applications, and raised six claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in holding that sand and gravel extraction was permitted as a conditional use in the Town's Rural Agricultural (RA-2) and Mixed Use (MIX) zoning districts; (2) the trial court erred in holding that the operation would not create a pit within the meaning of section 526(2) of the Town's zoning bylaws; (3) erred in concluding that the court could review Lathrop's 2012 permit application de novo, without regard to the 2004 permit, and that the successive-application doctrine did not apply; (4) the court erred in relying on one-hour average noise levels and ignoring uncontested evidence of large increases in the number of high-decibel noise events in determining impact of traffic on neighbors; (5) erred in admitting and relying on acoustical-modeling software for predicting noise levels emitted by the project; and (6) erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction to review Lathrop's amended Act 250 permit application without a remand. The Supreme Court affirmed the environmental court's holdings that sand and gravel extraction was permitted as a conditional use in the RA-2 and MIX districts and that the acoustical-modeling testimony was admissible. The Supreme Court reversed holdings with respect to the creation of a pit under section 526(2), the successive-application doctrine, the impact of traffic noise on neighbors, and its jurisdiction to review Lathrop's amended Act 250 permit application. View "In re Application of Lathrop Limited Partnership I, II and III" on Justia Law

In January 1994, Respondent purchased two parcels of property located on Folly Island, South Carolina: 806 East Cooper Avenue, and Tract D. These lots were previously a contiguous tract of high ground property in which the Tract D portion abutted the ocean, and the Cooper Avenue portion abutted the roadway. However, at some point prior to Respondent's property purchase, two man-made canals were constructed, after which Tract D became completely surrounded by coastal tidelands and waters. In 2009, Respondent filed a permit application with the Department of Health and Environmental Control requesting permission to construct a vehicular bridge from 806 East Cooper Avenue to Tract D. DHEC denied the application because Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) prohibited the agency from issuing a bridge construction permit to a "coastal island" less than two acres in size, and the parties agreed that if Tract D was a "coastal island," it did not meet the regulation's minimum size requirement. Respondent requested a contested case hearing before the ALC. At the hearing, the parties focused on whether Tract D met the definition of a "coastal island." Ultimately, the ALC found Tract D "geologically, geographically and by legal description, is on and within the boundaries of Folly Island," and it constituted a "coastal island" separate and apart from Folly Island. The ALC upheld DHEC's denial of Respondent's bridge permit application. Respondent appealed to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals reversed the ALC's decision. Specifically, the court of appeals found that because DHEC "failed to challenge" the ALC's finding that Tract D was part of Folly Island, that finding became the law of the case. The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals misapprehended the law of the case doctrine. Specifically, the court of appeals erred in applying the doctrine so as to bar the prevailing party below from raising an additional sustaining ground. Therefore, rather than find the argument procedurally barred, the court of appeals should have considered whether Tract D was a "coastal island" as defined in the regulations. Accordingly, the specific regulatory exemption for Folly Island controls over the more general regulatory definition of "coastal island." As a result, Tract D could not be considered a "coastal island," and the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) does not bar Respondent's bridge construction permit application. In conjunction with Regulation 30-12(F) and the ALC's finding that "[t]he proposed bridge was the least environmentally damaging alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would have de minimus environmental impact," the Supreme Court found that DHEC and the ALC erred in denying Respondent's permit application. Therefore, the Court affirmed the result reached by the court of appeals, albeit through different reasoning. View "Dreher v. So. Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Control" on Justia Law

RDNT, LLC, which provided assisted living and skilled nursing services, owned a campus consisting of two buildings. RDNT submitted an application to the City of Bloomington for a conditional use permit, seeking to expand its services by adding a third building to the campus. The City Council denied RDNT’s application, giving four reasons for its decision. The district court reversed the denial of RDNT’s application, holding that the City misapplied certain standards, misrepresented the impact of certain studies, and ignored certain evidence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City appropriately exercised its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City’s decision was not unreasonable arbitrary or capricious, as the City based its decision on a legally and factually sufficient ground, and the City properly considered RDNT’s proposed traffic-mitigating conditions. View "RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Wayne and Michelle McClellan applied for a conditional use permit to build a disc-golf course in the City of Saco on property abutting a campground owned by Fred Fitanides. The Saco Planning Board voted to grant conditional approval for the project and issued the conditional use permits. The Saco Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the Planning Board issued the permits in compliance with the City of Saco Zoning Ordinance; and (2) Fitanides was not prejudiced by any procedural irregularities in the administrative process. View "Fitanides v. City of Saco" on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

During a regular meeting, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Monroe convened for an executive session to discuss “legal matters regarding general enforcement” before reconvening and extending a zoning permit previously issued to Handsome, Inc. Handsome and its principal officers filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC), claiming that the zoning commission’s executive session violated Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (the Act). The FOIC determined that the executive session was unlawful under the Act. The trial court reversed, determining that the zoning commission’s executive session was permissible under the pending claims or pending litigation exception of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the zoning commission’s executive session was not justified under the Act’s pending claims or pending litigation exception. View "Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a superior court's validation of roughly $200 million in municipal bonds (the "2014 NSP Bonds") that were to be issued by the Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("Invest Atlanta"). Invest Atlanta and the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority (collectively, the "New Stadium Entities") proposed to have the 2014 NSP Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and operating a new stadium facility in downtown Atlanta for the Atlanta Falcons professional football team. Additional funding for the NSP would have been provided by the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company, LLC ("StadCo"), a company associated with the Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC, as well as through the sale of personal seat licenses. On February 4, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Bond Validation in the superior court to authorize the issuance of the 2014 NSP Bonds. Several individuals moved to intervene in the proceedings to file objections to the bond validation, and the trial court allowed them to do so. Among other things, the intervenors contended that OCGA 48-13-51 (a) (5) (B) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court ultimately entered a Validation Order and Final Judgment validating the 2014 NSP Bonds and overruling all objections. One of the intervenors appealed that ruling. However, finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Authority" on Justia Law