Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the County Council for Anne Arundel County adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of the County. County property owners and community associations (“Respondents”) filed suit challenging the rezoning of multiple parcels of land. Several County property owners and ground leaseholders whose properties had been rezoned to desired classifications (collectively, with the County, “Petitioners”) intervened. Petitioners moved to dismiss Respondents’ suit, claiming that Respondents lacked standing. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, determining that Respondents lacked standing because they failed to meet their burden of proving special aggrievement. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded, concluding that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation, and Respondents satisfied those principles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) plaintiffs wishing to challenge a legislative action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing; and (2) Respondents in this case did not allege facts sufficient to meet the correct standing requirement. View "Anne Arundel County v. Bell" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a decision by the Town of Middlebury Development Review Board (DRB) to approve appellee Jolley Associates, LLC's application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to add a car wash to an existing gas station and convenience store within the Town limits. Appellant MDY Taxes, Inc. operated an H&R Block tax franchise in property rented in a shopping center adjacent to the Jolley lot. Appellant Village Car Wash, Inc. operated a car wash located approximately one-quarter of a mile from the Jolley lot. Appellants did not participate in the DRB proceeding, but sought to challenge the approval of the PUD through an appeal to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that appellants did not have standing, to appeal the DRB decision because they had not participated in the proceedings before the DRB as required by statute, and because they did not meet any of the exceptions to that statutory requirement. On appeal, appellants argued that a procedural defect prevented them from appearing before the DRB, and that it would be manifestly unjust if they are not afforded party status to appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Appeal of MDY Taxes, Inc., & Village Car Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

The Planning Director of the County of Hawaii approved the application of Michael Pruglo to consolidate and resubdivide the pre-existing lots on his forty-nine-acre parcel of land. Mark Kellberg, who owned land adjacent to the subject property, objected to the approval. Kellberg brought suit against the Planning Director and the County of Hawaii seeking to have the subdivision declared void. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) ruled that the Planning Director’s approval of Pruglo’s subdivision was invalid because it increased the number of lots. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding that the ICA erred in ruling on the merits of Kellberg’s claims without addressing whether the owners of the lots within the subject property were required to be joined as parties under Haw. R. Civ. P. 19. Because the lot owners were necessary parties under Rule 19(a), the Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to order the joinder of the lot owners under Rule 19. View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law

Before the enactment of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 14.3.1, developers of eldercare facilities had to obtain several zoning permits or variances. To “expedite the review process for these much-needed Eldercare Facilities,” section 14.3.1 provides that approval of an eldercare facility is warranted if the zoning administrator finds “that the strict application of the land use regulations on the subject property would result in practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations.” The developer sought a permit for a Woodland Hills eldercare facility on a 1-1/2-acre lot zoned for residential uses. The proposed building would face Fallbrook, a major highway. Zoning regulations would limit a structure to 12,600 square feet; the proposed facility would contain 50,289 square feet, with 60 rooms and 76 beds. Most owners of neighboring single family residences strongly opposed the proposal. The city’s report did not consider whether limiting the facility to 16 rooms would pose an unnecessary hardship. The zoning administrator approved the project. The trial court found no substantial evidence supported the finding of “unnecessary hardship.” The court of appeal affirmed. Although the developer argued the unnecessary hardship was based on its purported lost “economy of scale,” no evidence supported that claim. View "Walnut Acres Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Tam’s Burgers, at the Los Angeles intersection of Figueroa and 101st Streets, has a parking lot and drive-through and walk-up windows, adjacent to residential homes. The Police Department (LAPD) initiated a nuisance investigation, based on reported: “pimping-prostitution, narcotics use-sales, loitering, transients and intoxicated groups, drinking in public, graffiti and associated trash and debris that encourage loitering.” LAPD informed the Planning Department that the owner was uncooperative, citing extensive calls for service and crime reports at the location, including two homicides in the last two years and a narcotics arrest involving an employee. A Planning Department investigator visited Tam’s and reported that the site was not maintained. The city determined that the operation constituted a nuisance and imposed conditions that required it to: not allow patrons to “linger over a … soft drink for more than 30 minutes”; not allow prostitutes, pimps, drug users or dealers, or homeless individuals to loiter; not allow alcoholic beverage consumption on the property; paint over graffiti with a matching color within 24 hours; have a licensed, uniformed security guard; install fencing; implement a 24-hour “hot line” for complaints; and limit hours of operation. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence. View "Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

The Shadow Lake Property Owners Association and the Trustees of a family trust sued the City of Greenwood, claiming that two of the City’s ordinances relating to the annexation of property were derived in violation of the open-meetings provision of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The ordinances were adopted by the City and were to be submitted to the City’s voters. The circuit concluded that the City violated the open-meetings provision of the FOIA and ordered that the ordinances not be included on the November 4, 2014 ballot. The Supreme Court dismissed the City’s appeal, holding that the issue of whether the challenged ordinances should have remained on the ballot was moot, and neither of the two exceptions to mootness applied. View "City of Greenwood v. Shadow Lake Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nonprofit charitable organization, solicits donations of clothing and shoes at unattended, outdoor donation bins for distribution in other countries. It locates bins at businesses that are “easily visible and accessible” with the consent of the owner. Its representatives generally collect donations weekly to avoid bin overflow. Bins are labeled so that people can report if they are full. In 2012, the city did not regulate donation bins. Plaintiff placed bins at a former grocery store and at a gas station. The city sent a letter claiming that they had “been found to create a nuisance as people leave boxes and other refuse around the containers,” denied a request for review, and removed the bins. A year later, the city council enacted a “total prohibition,” exempting the already-operational Lions Club Recycling. The ordinance states a purpose of preventing blight, protecting property values and neighborhood integrity, avoiding creation and maintenance of nuisances and ensuring safe and sanitary maintenance of properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction, finding that operation of bins to solicit and collect charitable donations qualified as protected speech and that the content-based ordinance fails strict scrutiny because it implements an overly broad, prophylactic ban on all bins so the city can avoid hypothetical nuisances or other issues that may arise in the future. View "Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Ada, Oklahoma passed Ordinance No. 13-02 to annex certain real property, located in Township 3 North, Range 6 East of the Indian Base and Meridian, Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, into its corporate city limits. Petitioners were residents of Pontotoc County, Oklahoma, who owned property within the annexed territory. They sought to set aside the ordinance, and City denied their request. They then filed their Petition for Declaratory Judgment and in the Alternative, for Detachment of Municipal Territory, seeking a determination that the City lacked jurisdiction to pass the ordinance due to lack of compliance with 11 O.S. 2011 sec. 21-103. The trial court denied Petitioners' request for relief but filed its Order Certifying Interlocutory Order for Immediate Appeal. The question this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City fully complied with the Oklahoma annexation statutes when it annexed that territory near its city limits. The Court held that substantial compliance with the notice requirements was not sufficient under the applicable statutes in this case and reversed. View "In re: Detachment of Municipal Territory from the City of Ada" on Justia Law