Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a change-of-water-rights application filed by East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District and the Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted its application involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its water system. The "Poudre Prairie Decree" used a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre Prairie pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. The water court denied East Cherry Creek's C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion. East Cherry Creek then sought an order entering the denial as a final judgment. The State and Division Engineers opposed the motion, but was overruled. East Cherry Creek then appealed its Rule 56(h) motion denial (raising three issues), and the Engineers cross-appealed (raising two issues). The Supreme Court agreed with the Engineers: that the trial court did not enter a final judgment on any claim for relief in this litigation. The water court's certification order was reversed, the appeal dismissed, and the case remanded for further proceedings at the water court. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas sued TCI West End, Inc. for civil penalties under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 54.017, as authorized by section 54.012, asserting that TCI violated a city ordinance by demolishing a building located in a historic overlay district. Following a jury verdict in the City’s favor, the trial court awarded the City $750,000 in civil penalties. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) sections 54.012 and 54.017 apply only to health and safety ordinances, not general zoning ordinances regulating the use of land; and (2) in the alternative, there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that TCI had actual notice of the ordinance provision before demolishing the building. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment concluding that Chapter 54 did not authorize the City’s enforcement action against TCI, holding that the court of appeals’ holding was incompatible with the statute’s plain language. View "City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc." on Justia Law

Santa Clara County adopted a mitigated negative declaration and granted a use permit allowing Wozniak to host up to 28 weddings and other events annually, with up to 100 attendees, on 14.46 acres on Highway 35 in the Santa Cruz Mountains. The property houses vineyards for the Redwood Ridge Estates Winery, llama and alpaca grazing land, barns, and a residence where Wozniak lives. It is adjacent to the Bear Creek Redwoods Open Space Preserve, which currently is open to the public by permit only. The remainder of the surrounding area is characterized by single-family residences on heavily wooded lots that are over two acres in size. Before obtaining the permit, Wozniak had hosted unpermitted events. Neighbors had complained. An association of neighboring owners successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate on the ground that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000, in adopting the mitigated negative declaration instead of requiring an environmental impact report. The court of appeal affirmed, noting evidence of likely significant traffic and noise impacts. View "Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. Cnty. of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Donald Paradis applied for and obtained a building permit to construct a two-car garage on property in the Town of Peru. After Paradis constructed the garage, the Town sent Paradis a notice of violation, stating that the garage violated multiple ordinance provisions. The Board of Appeals concluded that the appeal was properly denied. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Paradis’s appeal, which deprived the courts of jurisdiction to consider it, as the notice of violation was not an appealable decision. Remanded. View "Paradis v. Town of Peru" on Justia Law

Wayne Perkins applied to the Ogunquit Planning Board seeking site plan review and design review approval to convert his garage into a lobster pound. The Board approved Perkins’s application without requiring Perkins to comply with certain mandatory provisions in the Ogunquit Zoning Ordinance and without making necessary factual findings. The Hartwells, abutting landowners, sought judicial review. The superior court vacated the Board’s approval of Perkins’s site plan review application. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not have the power to waive any of the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance in this case; and (2) there were inadequate factual findings from the Board regarding Perkins’s use of the property, and therefore, the cause must be remanded for further factual findings regarding the lobster pound’s proper use classification. View "Hartwell v. Town of Ogunquit" on Justia Law

The Town of Starks Planning Board approved an application for site plan approval to build and operate a cellular telephone tower in Starks. Harry and Cindy Brown appealed the decision. The Town of Starks Board of Appeals (SBA) denied the Browns’ appeal after determining that it was limited to reviewing the Planning Board’s decision in an appellate capacity. The Browns appealed the SBA’s decision to the superior court, arguing for the first time that the SBA should have reviewed the Planning Board’s decision de novo. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Browns failed to challenge the SBA’s standard of review determination at the municipal level, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "Brown v. Town of Starks" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Basehor initiated a unilateral annexation of Cedar Lake Estates (Estates), a platted subdivision adjoining the City. Trustees of the Stueckemann Living Trust and the Cedar Lake Association (collectively, the Stueckemanns), sued the City seeking to invalidate the annexation on multiple grounds. The district court rejected all of the Stueckemanns’ contentions and upheld the City’s annexation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court and court of appeals did not err by concluding that (1) the City’s plan adequately described the land subject to the annexation; (2) the City’s service plan for police protection and for street and infrastructure maintenance was adequate; and (3) the City’s annexation was reasonable. View "Stueckemann v. City of Basehor" on Justia Law

After the Lowndes County Board of Supervisors voted to abandon a railroad crossing, the county put up a barricade. Residents affected by the barricade filed two separate motions for reconsideration, and the Board held a second meeting in which it affirmed the abandonment but ordered the barricade removed. The residents filed a bill of exceptions which reversed the Board’s decision to abandon the crossing. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding it had no jurisdiction to hear the bill of exceptions. After review, the Supreme Court found that, although the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to review the Board’s second decision, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board’s original decision. So the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court were reversed, and the case remanded for the circuit court to consider only whether the Board’s second order complied with the statutory procedure for abandoning a road. View "Lowndes County v. McClanahan" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Anne Arundel County v. Bell, Respondents challenged the adoption by the County Council for Anne Arundel County of a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of the County, but a different portion of the County than was involved in Bell. In Bell, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of property owner standing is not the appropriate test for a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning action, but rather, plaintiffs wishing to challenge a legislative action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing. The plaintiffs in this case (“Respondents”), several non-profit community associations and individual property owners, filed suit challenging the ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the two complaints filed by Respondents, concluding that Respondents lacked standing. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation, and Respondents satisfied those principles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the holding in Bell answered the first two questions presented in this appeal; and (2) Respondents in this case did not sufficiently allege a basis for their standing to challenge the adoption of the ordinance. View "Anne Arundel County v. Harwood Civic Ass'n" on Justia Law