Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

These proceedings involved a development project spearheaded by K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC (Appellee). Appellee obtained all of the necessary permits and approvals from state and local agencies, except one. At issue in these proceedings was Appellee’s application for a State wetlands license. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Public Works seeking an order compelling the Board to vote promptly on Appellee’s long-outstanding application for the wetlands permit following delays resulting from a perceived appearance of impropriety. The circuit court granted the requested relief and ordered the Board to vote promptly on the application. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court’s order was improper for want of a prior final administrative decision and because mandamus was unavailable under the circumstances. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a change of water rights filed by applicants East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District and Colorado Water Network, Inc. (collectively, East Cherry Creek). East Cherry Creek submitted an application for change of water right involving shares it owned in the Greeley Irrigation Company (GIC) for use in its system. The Poudre Prairie Decree employed a ditch-wide analysis for calculating the amount of historical consumptive use ascribable to each GIC share. Subsequent decrees relied on the ditch-wide historical consumptive use determination made in the Poudre Decree. In making its application, East Cherry Creek asserted its ability to use the same Poudre pro-rata allocation of consumptive use water to its shares as occurred for previously changed shares in the ditch system. East Cherry Creek sought an order from the water court entering the court's denial of its Rule 56(h) motion as a final judgment, and the State and Division Engineers opposed the motion. The order was made final, and East Cherry Creek appealed denial of its Rule 54(b) motion to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court agreed with the Engineers that the water court's order did not constitute a final judgment on any claim for relief in the underlying change case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's certification order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Cherry Creek Valley v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

This water case involving neighboring property owners in Saguache County presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: may the land owner whose property is burdened by an easement across his or her property for a water ditch obtain a junior conditional water right at the headgate of that ditch for non-consumptive hydropower use of water that the neighbor is diverting from the stream under a senior water right for irrigation use through that headgate? Applying the no material injury, water availability, and maximum beneficial use principles of Colorado water law, in conjunction the decision in "Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co.," (36P.3d 1229 (2001)), the District Court for Water Division No. 3 issued a declaratory judgment and a conditional water right decree in the amount of 0.41 cubic feet per second ("cfs") with a 2010 priority for hydropower use to Charles and Barbara Tidd for diversion from Garner Creek at the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. The Plaintiffs–Appellants, David L. Frees, George A. Frees, Delmer E. Frees, and Shirley A. Frees, asserted that the water court lacked authority to decree this water right over their objection. After review, the Supreme Court deferred to the water court's findings of fact and upheld its conclusions of law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the water court did not err in issuing a conditional decree for a non-consumptive hydropower use water right with a 2010 priority for 0.41 cfs diverted from Garner Creek through the headgate of Garner Creek Ditch No. 1. View "Frees v. Tidd" on Justia Law

World Outreach, a religious organization, purchased a YMCA building in a poor area of Chicago, planning to rent rooms to needy persons. The YMCA had a license for that use, even after the area was rezoned as a community shopping district. The city refused to grant World Outreach a license, ostensibly because it did not have a Special Use Permit (SUP). After the area was reclassified as a Limited Manufacturing/Business Park District, the city sued in state court, contending that the use was illegal. The city later abandoned the suit. World Outreach sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The city relented and granted the licenses. According to World Outreach the city continued harassing it. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city on all but one claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment in favor of World Outreach, regarding the attorneys’ fees for having to defend itself against a frivolous suit, reversed partial summary judgment to the city, and remanded. The frivolous suit cannot be thought to have imposed a merely insubstantial burden on the organization, but the organization presented weak evidence concerning damages for the two years during which it was denied a license. View "World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lost Tree entered into an option to purchase 2,750 acres on the mid-Atlantic coast of Florida, including a barrier island, a peninsula bordering the Indian River, and islands in the Indian River. From 1969 to 1974, Lost Tree purchased most of the land, including Plat 57, 4.99 acres on the Island of John’s Island and Gem Island, consisting of submerged lands and wetlands. Lost Tree developed 1,300 acres into a gated community, but had no plans of developing Plat 57 until 2002, when it learned that a developer applied for a wetlands fill permit for land south of Plat 57 and proposed improvements to a mosquito control impoundment on McCuller’s Point. Because Lost Tree owned land on McCuller’s Point, approval required its consent. Lost Tree sought permitting credits in exchange for the proposed improvements. To take advantage of those credits, Lost Tree obtained zoning and other local and state permits to develop Plat 57. The Army Corps of Engineers denied an application under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344 for a section 404 fill permit, finding that Lost Tree could have pursued less environmentally damaging alternatives and had adequately realized its development purpose. On remand, the trial court found that the denial diminished Plat 57’s value by 99.4% and constituted a per se taking and awarded Lost Tree $4,217,887.93. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that a “Lucas” taking occurred because the denial eliminated all value stemming from Plat 57’s possible economic uses. View "Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Oneida Seven Generations Corporation proposed a renewable energy facility and sought a conditional use permit to install the facility in the City of Green Bay. The City voted to approve the conditional use permit but later voted to rescind the permit on the grounds that it was obtained through misrepresentation. The circuit court affirmed the City’s decision to rescind. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City’s decision that the permit was obtained through misrepresentation was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the City could not reasonably conclude that the statements by Oneida Seven’s representative regarding the facility’s operations were misrepresentations. View "Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay" on Justia Law

Prior to this action, PCF Acquisitionco, LLC owned a former gas station at the corner of 4th and Folsom Streets in San Francisco. The site was marked as the future site of the Central Subway's Moscone station. Following several years of negotiations and the exchange of proposed valuations for the property, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury determined the total compensation to be awarded for the property was approximately $7.3 million, which reflected a fair market value minus costs for environmental remediation. PCF then moved to recover its litigation expenses. The City opposed the motion on the grounds that its final offer was reasonable and, alternatively, that PCF's claimed litigation expenses were excessive. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether the City's final pre-trial settlement offer, made 20 days before trial and contingent on obtaining approvals from other governmental entities, could have been reasonable under Code of Civil Procedure 1250.410, and thus bar PCF (who rejected the offer) from later recovering litigation costs. PCF argued that such a contingent offer was unreasonable as a matter of law because it was conditioned on the approval of three different governmental bodies, thus providing no assurance that OCF's acceptance would result in a pre-trial settlement. The Court of Appeal agreed: the City's contingent settlement offer did not serve section 1250.410's aims of encouraging the pre-trial settlement of eminent domain actions and making property owners whole, and thus was not reasonable within the statute's meaning. The Court therefore reversed the order denying PCF's motion for litigation expenses and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of San Francisco v. PCF Acquisitionco, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves the authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to issue nationwide permits under section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act. These permits authorized activities involving discharge of dredged or fill material in U.S. waters and wetlands. TransCanada Corporation proposed to rely on the nationwide permit to build an oil pipeline, the Gulf Coast Pipeline, running approximately 485 miles and cross over 2,000 waterways. The Corps issued letters verifying that Nationwide Permit 12 would cover the proposed construction. Shortly thereafter, TransCanada began constructing the pipeline, which was completed. Three environmental groups (Sierra Club, Inc.; Clean Energy Future Oklahoma; and East Texas Sub Regional Planning Commission) challenged the validity of the nationwide permit and verification letters. The district court rejected these challenges and entered judgment for the defendants. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Sierra Club v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Balboa Park, a large urban park created on pueblo lands almost 150 years ago, included as its central core the buildings and plazas designed and constructed for the 1915 Panama-California Exposition, and the adjoining buildings and improvements subsequently constructed for the 1935 California Pacific International Exposition (the Complex). A Bridge and the Complex were declared a National Historic Landmark and a National Historic Landmark District nearly 40 years ago. Proposed alterations to the Bridge, an integral element of a revitalization project, spearheaded by the Committee but opposed by the Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO), was the focal point of the appeal brought before the Court of Appeal. The Project sought to eliminate vehicles from the plazas within the Complex, and to return the plazas to purely pedestrian zones, simultaneously preserving (for the convenience of those vehicles coming to Balboa Park from the west) the ability of those vehicles to access the southeastern area of the Park across the Bridge. The solution proffered by the Project to this dilemma was to construct a proposed "Centennial Bridge," which would be joined to the Bridge toward the eastern edge of the Bridge to create a detour around the southwestern corner of the Complex. The City of San Diego, after a thorough review of the project, approved it. SOHO filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging, among other things, that City erroneously approved the required site development permit because there was no substantial evidence to support the finding the Project would not adversely affect the applicable land use plan, or to support the supplemental finding that there would be no reasonable beneficial use of the property were the Project denied. The trial court agreed there was no substantial evidence to support the supplemental finding there would be no reasonable beneficial use of the property were the Project denied, and therefore granted SOHO's petition. Committee appealed that ruling, and finding that the grant of the writ was made in error, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "Save Our Heritage Org. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kingston Place, LLC appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to respondent New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) on petitioner's claims that the DOT's long delay in taking a portion of the subject property by eminent domain created a cloud on petitioner's title violated RSA 498-A:4, III(a) (2010) and RSA 230:17 (2009), and constituted a taking by inverse condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kingston Place, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law