Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of its subdivision permit. Intervenor intervened in the appeal to the trial court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-19(a), raising claims related to the environmental impact of the proposed development. After remanding the matter back to the Commission for further fact-finding relating to Intervenor’s claims, the trial court set aside the Commission’s findings and adjudicated the factual issues itself. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Intervenor and forbade Plaintiff’s proposed subdivision from going forward because of its potential environmental impact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Environmental Protection Act does not empower a trial court to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal of a zoning decision involving an intervention under section 22a-19; and (2) the trial court could not have properly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-18(b) through (d) to remand the matter back to the Commission for consideration of Intervenor’s claims or to independently adjudicate the factual issues raised in those claims. View "Hunter Ridge, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

The County of Sarpy Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution amending an overlay district zoning ordinance. The revised ordinance exempted properties platted before the effective date of the original ordinance. The owner of nonexempt property brought a declaratory judgment action against the county claiming that the exemption was unconstitutional. The district court entered judgment in favor of the county. The owner appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the exemption did not constitute special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exemption was not unconstitutional special legislation because it did not create a closed class and its application was not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy" on Justia Law

Anderson’s daughter, C.A., suffers from disabilities that affect her ability to walk and balance independently. A miniature horse enables her to play and get exercise in her backyard without adult assistance. Anderson first acquired a horse in 2010. In 2013, the city passed an ordinance banning horses from residential property and prosecuted Anderson for violating it. Anderson claimed that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, entitle her to keep the horse as C.A.'s service animal. The Hamilton County Municipal Court found Anderson guilty. Anderson sued. The district court granted the city summary judgment, finding Anderson’s claims barred by claim and issue preclusion stemming from her Municipal Court conviction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because fact-finding procedures available in a municipal court criminal proceeding differ substantially from those available in a civil proceeding, Anderson’s conviction has no preclusive effect on this lawsuit. While there is no evidence that the city’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent against C.A. or had a disparate impact on disabled individuals, there are significant factual disputes regarding whether the ADA or FHAA require the city to permit Anderson to keep her miniature horse at her house. View "Anderson v. City of Blue Ash" on Justia Law

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

In 2005, the City of Winona enacted the thirty-percent rule, which limits the number of lots on a block in certain areas of the City that are eligible for certification as rental properties. Appellants brought this action challenging the rental ordinance, claiming that the thirty-percent rule is a zoning law that exceeds the City’s power authorized by Minn. Stat. 462.357 and violates their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutional and that the City had authority to enact it. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellants filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Appellants' claims had become moot because, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the alleged harm to Appellants’ interests had ceased. View "Dean v. City of Winona" on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

Lake and Peninsula Borough voters passed an initiative prohibiting large-scale mining activities that had a "significant adverse impact" on anadromous waters within the Borough. Pebble Limited Partnership and Alaska (first in separate suits, later consolidated) brought suit against the Borough claiming that the initiative was preempted by state law. Two of the initiative sponsors intervened to support the initiative. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Pebble and the State and enjoined the Borough from enforcing the initiative. The sponsors appealed, arguing that the dispute was unripe and that the superior court's preemption analysis was erroneous. But because at least the State has articulated a concrete harm stemming from the initiative's mere enactment, the Supreme Court found the case ripe for adjudication. And because the initiative purported to give the Borough veto power over mining projects on state lands within its borders, it seriously impeded the implementation of the Alaska Land Act, which granted the Department of Natural Resources "charge of all matters affecting exploration, development, and mining" of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Pebble and the State. View "Jacko v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law