Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

William Rakowski appealed after a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fargo. Rakowski owned rental houses in Fargo. In November 2011, Fargo inspected one of the houses and found the garage was deteriorating, the siding on the house was deteriorating, two egress window wells were collapsing and one window was broken. Fargo notified Rakowski of the need for repairs and re-inspection. The house was re-inspected a month later, and three once a month, three months after that. Fargo charged Rakowski a single $100 fee for a January 2012 re-inspection, which Rakowski did not pay. Fargo brought a small claims action to collect the fee, Rakowski removed the claim to district court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fargo and Rakowski appeals. Rakowski argued the district court erred because Fargo did not have authority to assess a re-inspection fee, Fargo was required to have a search warrant before re-inspecting the house, the re-inspection fee constituted an illegal bill of attainder, Fargo's claim was barred by double jeopardy and res judicata and he was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Fargo v. Rakowski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff CBDA Development, LLC (CBDA) appealed a superior court order affirming a decision of the Planning Board (Board) of defendant, Town of Thornton not to consider CBDA’s second site plan application for a proposed recreational campground. The Board decided that it could not consider CBDA’s second application because it did not materially differ in nature and degree from CBDA’s initial application. CBDA argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) upheld the Board’s decision to apply the "Fisher v. City of Dover" doctrine to applications before a planning board; and (2) found that the Board reasonably concluded that CBDA’s second application did not materially differ from its first application. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBDA Development, LLC v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law

The County filed suit against defendants seeking to enjoin the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary in an unincorporated area of Kern County. Defendants appealed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction. The court interpreted the phrase “entirely repeal the ordinance,” pursuant to Elections Code section 9144, to mean that a board of supervisors must (1) revoke the protested ordinance in all its parts and (2) not take additional action that has the practical effect of implementing the essential feature of the protested ordinance. Applying this interpretation, the court concluded that the board of supervisors did more than entirely repeal the protested ordinance banning dispensaries when it revoked that ordinance and took the additional action of repealing the 2009 ordinance, which authorized dispensaries. The practical effect of repealing the 2009 ordinance was to prohibit dispensaries, which was essentially the same as the ban of dispensaries protested by voters. Therefore, the court concluded that the County violated section 9145 by repealing the 2009 ordinance and, as a result, the court regarded the 2009 ordinance as remaining in full force and effect. Accordingly, defendants' dispensary, which is located in a commercial zone, remains an authorized use and the County cannot establish a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim that defendants were operating an unauthorized dispensary. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc." on Justia Law

Developers filed suit against the City, contending that the City’s refusal to rezone land to permit higher-density development violated, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Developers maintain that the City’s refusal stemmed from intentional discrimination against Hispanics and created a disparate impact. The court held that Developers presented plausible claims for relief for disparate treatment under the FHA and under the Equal Protection Clause where the City Council denied Developers’ request for rezoning despite the advice of its own experts to the contrary and in the context of what a reasonable jury could interpret as racially charged opposition by Yuma residents. Further, this was the only request for rezoning that the City had denied in the last three years. Because the complaint passes the plausibility bar given these circumstances, the court reversed and remanded. The court also reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, rejecting the district court’s view that other similarly-priced and similarly modeled housing available elsewhere necessarily precluded a finding that there was a disparate impact. The court vacated the denial of the second summary judgment as moot and remanded for the district court to address the motion in the first instance. View "Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma" on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Garden City appealed from a final judgment finding it liable for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1981; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the 2012 grant of summary judgment by the same district court in favor of Nassau County. The court held that plaintiffs have Article III standing and plaintiffs' claims are also not moot; the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Garden City’s decision to abandon R‐M zoning in favor of R‐T zoning was made with discriminatory intent, and that defendants failed to demonstrate they would have made the same decision absent discriminatory considerations; the court affirmed the judgment insofar as it found plaintiffs had established liability under 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) of the FHA based on a theory of disparate treatment; the court held that 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c) abrogated the court's prior precedent as to the burden‐shifting framework of proving a disparate impact claim; the court vacated the judgment insofar as it found liability under a disparate impact theory, and remanded for further proceedings; the court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage because plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County had legal responsibility for Garden City’s adoption of R‐T zoning; the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage; and the court remanded with respect to plaintiffs' claims under Section 804(a) and Title VI relating to Nassau County’s “steering” of affordable housing. View "MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau" on Justia Law

Garden City appealed from a final judgment finding it liable for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1981; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the 2012 grant of summary judgment by the same district court in favor of Nassau County. The court held that plaintiffs have Article III standing and plaintiffs' claims are also not moot; the district court did not commit clear error in finding that Garden City’s decision to abandon R‐M zoning in favor of R‐T zoning was made with discriminatory intent, and that defendants failed to demonstrate they would have made the same decision absent discriminatory considerations; the court affirmed the judgment insofar as it found plaintiffs had established liability under 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) of the FHA based on a theory of disparate treatment; the court held that 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c) abrogated the court's prior precedent as to the burden‐shifting framework of proving a disparate impact claim; the court vacated the judgment insofar as it found liability under a disparate impact theory, and remanded for further proceedings; the court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage because plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County had legal responsibility for Garden City’s adoption of R‐T zoning; the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims against Nassau County at the summary judgment stage; and the court remanded with respect to plaintiffs' claims under Section 804(a) and Title VI relating to Nassau County’s “steering” of affordable housing. View "MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Nassau" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was an action for declaratory relief related to planning and zoning in Canyon County. Appellant Coalition for Agriculture’s Future sued respondents Canyon County and the Canyon County Board of Commissioners (collectively “Canyon County”) under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking to invalidate Canyon County’s 2011 comprehensive plan and amendments thereto for noncompliance with Idaho’s Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA). The district court granted Canyon County’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing. The Coalition appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Coalition for Agricultures's Future v. Canyon County" on Justia Law