Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2004, the Simstads, developers, began the process of seeking approval from the Lake County Plan Commission for a proposed subdivision, “Deer Ridge South.” In late 2006, the Commission approved the plans. The Simstads believed that approval was delayed, at great cost to them, because of their support in 1996 for commission member Scheub’s opponent in the County Commissioner primary race. They sued Commission members and Lake County, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various Indiana laws. A jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that a defense of claim preclusion, based on earlier state proceedings, had been waived. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a belated answer to the amended complaint or in allowing the defendants to withdraw their deemed admissions. Rejecting an argument that approval was a ministerial act, the court stated that determination of whether a project meets the ordinances, with or without waivers, involves some degree of discretion. The court noted the absence of evidence of animus. View "Simstad v. Scheub" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-petitioner San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) appealed a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenged a decision by defendant and respondent City of San Diego (City) approving a real property lease with defendant and real-party-in-interest BH Partnership (BH). Since 1953, BH and its predecessors have leased from City certain real property in Mission Bay Park on which it operated the Bahia Resort Hotel. In late 2012, the city council approved a 40-year lease agreement that would extend BH's tenancy of that property. However, because that approval did not include a statement of the property's fair market value, approval of the lease agreement was placed on the city council's agenda for its February 26, 2013, meeting for reconsideration. BH hired appraiser Bruce Goodwin to establish the property's fair market value. SDOG contended City erred by approving the lease because the evidence was insufficient to support its finding the appraisal of the property was performed by an independent appraiser. Because there was substantial evidence to support the city council's finding Goodwin was an independent fee appraiser within the meaning of San Diego Municipal Code section 22.0901, the Court of Appeal concluded SDOG did not carry its burden to show the city council abused its discretion by approving the lease between City and BH. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Town of Granville adopted an ordinance limiting new mobile homes and house trailers to existing mobile home parks. Patrick Russell and Sylvia Smith (together, Mr. Russell) requested a variance to the ordinance. The Town declined to grant the variance. Mr. Russell sought relief in the circuit court, claiming that West Virginia law prohibited the Town from regulating the placement of mobile homes and house trailers. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that the ordinance was valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Town had authority under W. Va. Code 8-12-5(30) to adopt an ordinance restricting the placement of new mobile homes and house trailers to existing mobile home parks; and (2) therefore, the Town’s ordinance was valid and and enforceable. View "Russell v. Town of Granville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a dimensional variance by the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Jamestown. After the Board denied the variance, Plaintiffs appealed. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision and granted Plaintiffs’ variance application. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for an award of reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act. The trial justice denied Plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the Board was not an “agency” within the purview of the Act and that the hearing before the Board was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as the term is defined in the Act. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment below, holding that the Board is an agency and that the hearing on Plaintiffs’ variance application was an adjudicatory proceeding on the Act. Remanded for written findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining prerequisites for relief. View "Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Agnes and Anne Purdy dispute the State’s claim of ownership to rights-of-way for four public trails that cross the Purdys' land, seeking to stop members of the public from trespassing on their property by using the trails. The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question under the Alaska Native Allotment Act, 43 U.S.C. 270–1 et seq. The State filed suit against the Purdys and the United States, contending that the Purdys' allotments are subject to rights-of-way. The State further alleges that, by virtue of public use, it acquired ownership of the rights-of-way under an unusual federal statute known as R.S. 2477. The district court dismissed the quiet title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entered partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The remainder of the action has been stayed pending resolution of this appeal. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the State’s quiet title claim is barred because the United States is a necessary party to that claim but has not waived its immunity from suit pursuant to the Indian lands exception of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the State’s claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as the quiet title claim. Although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s condemnation claim, that claim may not proceed as pleaded. The court remanded as to this claim so that the State may be given an opportunity to amend the claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "State of Alaska Dept. of Nat. Res. v. United States" on Justia Law

Lamar filed suit challenging the City's denial of 45 applications to convert existing offsite signs - billboards with commercial messages in locations other than at a property owner's business - to digital signs. Lamar alleged that the sign ban violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution and the trial court agreed, granting a writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that the sign ban was a content-based regulation that could not withstand strict scrutiny analysis. After addressing preliminary issues, this court concluded on the merits that the city's offsite sign ban is not content-based, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny under high court or California Supreme Court precedent. Consistent with the many authorities finding no constitutional infirmity under the First Amendment in the distinction between offsite and onsite signs, the court reached a like conclusion under the free speech clause of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order denying plaintiff‟s petition for a writ of mandate. View "Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

The Association has successfully applied to the District’s Historic Preservation Review Board to have the former Spingarn Senior High School designated a historic landmark. Next to Spingarn is Langston Terrace, a 13-acre public housing complex built in the 1930s as segregated housing for African Americans. The Association now challenges the District's development of a streetcar program and Car Barn that would be centered in this neighborhood. The district court rejected the Association's claims in dismissals for failure to state a claim and summary judgment. The City Council passed the “Wire Acts” to allow the construction of aerial wires to supply streetcars with power: Transportation Infrastructure Emergency Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-486; Transportation Infrastructure Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-583; Transportation Infrastructure Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-684 (codified at D.C. Code 9-1171(a)). Determining that the Association has standing, the court concluded that taking into account the Home Rule Act's, District. D.C. Code 1-201.02(a), 1-206.02(a), stated purpose, the Wire Acts do not violate an 1888 statute barring the District from authorizing telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or other wires, D.C. Code 34-1901.01. The court upheld that district court's dismissal of the Association's environmental impact statement (EIS) claim. The court rejected the Association's Equal Protection claim, concluding that the project and the associated site selection appear to have been facially neutral and to serve legitimate government purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Several individuals (collectively, “the Wimers”) filed a complaint against their neighbors (collectively, “the Cooks”) seeking an injunction prohibiting the Cooks from carrying out their plan of placing multiple single-family housing structures on a twenty-acre parcel of land, alleging that the Cooks’ plan for the property violated the neighborhood’s covenants. The Cooks counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against all of the landowners in the area seeking a declaration that the covenants had been abandoned due to various covenant violations. The district court determined that the covenants had not been abandoned and that the Cooks’ plan to develop the land did not violate the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that the covenants were not abandoned; and (2) erred in concluding that the Cooks’ plan did not violate the covenants, as the covenants prohibit multiple single-family dwellings on a parcel. View "Wimer v. Cook" on Justia Law

Study of the I-69 extension between Evansville and Indianapolis began in 1944. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Act designated a new route from Indianapolis to Memphis,, via Evansville as a “high priority corridor” for development. As the project progressed, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) divided the project into two “tiers” for environmental analysis. After the plans were finalized, construction work on the six sections of Tier 2 began; 90 percent of the work on the extension is complete. The FHWA and Indiana Department of Transportation issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Tier 2, Section 4, in 2010. A Final Environmental Impact Statement and a Record of Decision issued in 2011. The agencies selected the final route and construction plan for Section 4 after reviewing 48 options and produced a record reflecting consideration of impact on historic sites, geological formations, and air-quality, among other factors. Pursuant to its obligations under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service engaged in consultation and issued a Biological Opinion regarding the possible impact of tree-clearing on the endangered Indiana bat. Opponents filed suit. After a lengthy period of inactivity by Plaintiffs, including several missed case management deadlines, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the approvals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx" on Justia Law