Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Dynamic Development, LLC (Dynamic) sought to build a new retail store (Project) in Joshua Tree. Residents of Joshua Tree vociferously opposed the Project. They argued that it would clash with the town’s artistic, independent, and rural character; they also argued that it would cause various adverse environmental impacts, including urban decay. Nevertheless, the County of San Bernardino (County) found that an environmental impact report (EIR) was not required and approved the Project. The Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance (Alliance) then filed this mandate proceeding challenging the County’s approval of the Project. The trial court agreed there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the Project could cause urban decay; it therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its approval of the Project. Dynamic appealed. The Alliance cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by rejecting its other contentions. After review, the Court of Appeal held that the Alliance failed to establish any grounds for a writ of mandate. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed. View "Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. Alliance v. Co. of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Appellant, a farmer, owned Dunaway Farm and Rehfeld Farm, both of which were located within the jurisdiction of the Lower Elkhorn Natural Resources District. Beginning in 2010, Appellant used the well on Rehfeld Farm to irrigate Dunaway Farm, which was previously not irrigated. In 2013, the District ordered Appellant to cease and desist irrigating Dunaway Farm because the District’s rules prohibited use of ground water for new irrigated acres within the District’s management area without a variance. Appellant appealed using the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and also filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of several of the District’s rules related to irrigation. The district court affirmed the District’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) on the APA appeal, there were no errors in the district court’s judicial review of the District’s order; and (2) because the District’s rules are constitutional, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to Appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment. View "Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn Natural Res. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of property owners, sought compensation from the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, alleging flooding on their properties caused by the District’s diversion of stormwater into nearby creeks. The District cited a 1948 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Pratt, as holding that a temporary flooding cannot constitute a taking under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss and certified a question based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 holding that temporary flooding can constitute a taking under the federal constitution, Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States. The appellate court held that Arkansas Game overruled Pratt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois takings clause provides greater protection for property owners than its federal counterpart, in providing a remedy for property that is damaged, but, what constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses. The holding in Arkansas Game is relevant to the determination of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking under the Illinois Constitution. That holding, however, does not conflict with Pratt. Pratt did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, but only that the flooding, in that case, did not amount to a taking. Similarly, the facts alleged by plaintiffs are not sufficient to allege a taking. The complaint does not allege that the flooding “radically interfered” with use and enjoyment of the properties. The parties did not address whether the properties were "damaged." View "Hampton v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenged the constitutionality of five city ordinances that regulate mobile billboards. One of the ordinances limits the type of sign that may be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the other ordinances prohibit non-motorized, “mobile billboard advertising displays” within city limits. Unlike the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the mobile billboard ordinances in this case do not single out a specific subject matter for differential treatment, nor is any kind of mobile billboard exempted from regulation based on its content. The court explained that an officer seeking to enforce the non-motorized billboard ordinances must decide only whether an offending vehicle constitutes a prohibited “advertising display” because its primary purpose is to display messages, as opposed to transporting passengers or carrying cargo. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral. The court also concluded that none of the ordinances are substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the cities' goals of eliminating visual blight and promoting the safe and convenient flow of traffic. Furthermore, the mobile billboard ordinances leave open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising. Because the mobile billboard ordinances are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the government's significant aesthetic and safety interests, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lone Star Sec. & Video v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Association filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the approval of a shopping center project that would be adjacent to an established residential neighborhood. The trial court denied the writ petition and entered judgment in favor of the City. The court upheld the City's determination that the project was consistent with the Neighborhood Plan Prototype policies of the General Plan. The court concluded that when the rezoning policy is construed in light of the other provisions of the General Plan, the meaning of what is adequate mitigation under the circumstances must make allowances for the fact that mitigation is not required where it is infeasible. Therefore, the Association has failed to demonstrate that the City erred by simply adopting findings that did not require infeasible mitigation. Under the exhaustion doctrine, the court concluded that the Association's claims regarding other General Plan policies were not preserved and the court declined to consider them. The court also concluded that the City complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. Finally, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the City’s CEQA findings regarding urban decay and the statement of overriding considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of mandate. View "Naraghi Lakes Neighborhood Pres. Ass'n v. City of Modesto" on Justia Law

The 2008 Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act (SB 375), was enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Earlier measures empowered the Air Resources Board to enact statewide mandates to reduce emissions. SB 375 empowers the Board to set targets for regional planning agencies to reduce emissions from automobiles and light trucks and requires each regional agency, after extensive planning, to develop a “sustainable community strategy” to meet those targets using regional land use and transportation policies. In 2010, the Board issued targets for the Bay Area region, calling for the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Association of Bay Area Governments to develop strategies that would result in per capita percentage reductions in emissions of 7 percent by 2020 and 15 percent by 2035, as compared to emissions in 2005. These reductions were to be in addition to those expected from pre-existing statewide mandates. The Agencies updated the regional transportation plan and prepared their first sustainable communities strategy, “Plan Bay Area” and approved a final environmental impact report. The Board accepted the Agencies’ determination that Plan Bay Area would meet its emission reduction targets. Citizens offered an alternative plan that counted on reductions expected from pre-existing statewide mandates and challenged the environmental impact report and the Plan aa “draconian.” The trial court, concluding that reliance on pre-existing statewide mandates to meet the regional targets would constitute improper double counting not permitted by SB 375, denied Citizens’ petition. The court of appeal affirmed. Citizens’ approach was contradicted by SB 375’s emphasis on regional innovations and legislative declarations and findings. View "Bay Area Citizens v. Ass'n Bay Area Gov'ts" on Justia Law

A county Board of Adjustment granted Developer a conditional use permit for a concentrated animal feeding operation. Petitioners challenged the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction to grant the permit because the county had failed to validly enact the ordinance authorizing the Board to issue permits. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. In so doing, the court refused to consider whether the county validly enacted the ordinance, deciding that such review would be outside the scope of Petitioners’ writ challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners had standing to appeal the Board’s decision; and (2) the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the validity of the ordinances enacted by the county, as review in this case was not beyond the scope of the writ. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Brookings County Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Jesse Lipschuetz lived next door to Open Door Ministries. Lipschuetz filed claims against the City of Denver and Open Door looking to revoke a rooming and boarding permit the City granted to Open Door. The trial court concluded the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed revocation until Open Door's cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on those cross-claims. On appeal, Lipscheutz argued Open Door's cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they "could lie in tort." Therefore, Lipscheutz argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning, and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to Open Door's request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Because Open Door had not suffered an injury before it filed its cross-claims, the Act did not bar those claims seeking prospective relief from future injury. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over those cross-claims. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law

The court of appeal previously remanded the suit, concerning the rights to groundwater contained in the Santa Maria Valley Groundwater Basin. The parties are landowners who extract groundwater for agricultural use and public water producers that pump groundwater for municipal and industrial use. The court of appeal directed the trial court to quiet title to the landlowners’ overlying rights to native groundwater by declaring that these rights have priority over all appropriators, less the amount that the public producers are entitled to pursuant to their prescriptive rights. The trial court amended its judgment to hold that the city had established a total prescriptive right of 5100 acre feet per year and Golden State Water Company had established a total prescriptive right of 1900 acre feet per year, both perfected against the Basin aquifer as a whole, so only a proportionate amount of the prescriptive right could be exercised against the landowners’ overlying rights. The court did not quantify the proportionate prescriptive rights nor reconsider its prevailing party determination or allocation of costs. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court properly quieted title and did not err when it declined to reconsider the prevailing party determination. View "City of Santa Maria v. Adam" on Justia Law

Five days after Stewart obtained a building permit to construct a crematorium on a site in East Oakland, the City Council passed an emergency ordinance requiring a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate new crematoria. The Planning Commission denied Stewart's administrative appeal that the emergency ordinance applied to its proposed crematorium. Stewart then filed suit against the City, alleging administrative-mandamus claims. The trial court granted one of Stewart’s claims petitioning for writ of administrative mandamus, ruling that Stewart had a vested right in the building permit based on a preexisting local ordinance and that the emergency ordinance was not sufficiently necessary to the public welfare to justify an impairment of that right. The court rejected the City's argument that Stewart had no vested right; that even if Stewart had a vested right, it was not impaired; and that even if Stewart had a vested right that was impaired, the impairment was supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a danger or nuisance to the public that justified the City’s application of the emergency ordinance to Stewart’s project and affirmed the judgment. View "Stewart Enter. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law