Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Randy and Helen Strode owned real property in the City of Ashland, Saunders County. Since the time of the purchase, the Strodes operated a business for the manufacture of agricultural fencing and the storage of salvage on the property. In 2003, the district court held that Randy’s use of the property to store salvage was in violation of the zoning ordinance but found that the manufacture of agricultural fencing was permitted. In 2013, the Strodes filed suit against the City and the County for inverse condemnation based on the zoning ordinance and the load limit regulation of a bridge used by the Strodes for transporting commercial goods. The district court concluded (1) Randy’s zoning takings claim was barred by claim preclusion because the matter was litigated in the 2003 case, (2) determined that Helen’s regulatory taking lain was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware of the effect of the zoning ordinance after 2003; (3) found that the regulation of the bridge structure was not a regulatory taking, and (4) the City and County were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of the City and the County. View "Strode v. City of Ashland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the drilling of certain oil and gas wells in the Mancos Shale formation of the San Juan Basin in New Mexico. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy three of the four elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) the balance of harms weighed against Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs failed to show that the public interest favored an injunction. Finding no reversible error in the district court's denial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Dine Citizens v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Petitioners American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign, The Cloud Foundation, Return to Freedom, Carol Walker, and Kimerlee Curyl filed this action against Sally Jewell, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and Neil Kornze, the acting director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), seeking review of BLM’s decision to remove wild horses in certain areas of public land located in southwestern Wyoming within an area known as the “Checkerboard.” The Checkerboard was comprised of over one million acres of generally high desert land, and “derives its name from the pattern of alternating sections of private and public land which it comprises.” Under a 2013 consent decree, BLM agreed to remove all wild horses located on private lands in the Checkerboard. BLM maintained that “due to the unique pattern of land ownership” within the Checkerboard, “and as recognized in the Consent Decree, it is practically infeasible for the BLM to meet its obligations under Section 4 of the [Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act ("the Act")] while removing wild horses solely from the private lands sections of the [C]heckerboard.” Petitioners alleged, in pertinent part, that the removal violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The district court rejected these claims. Petitioners appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding it was "improper" for BLM to construe the unambiguous terms “privately owned land” and “private lands,” as used in Section 4 of the Act, to include the public land sections of the Checkerboard. And, in turn, with respect to the FLMPA claims, it was improper for BLM to conduct what it described as a Section 4 gather on the public land sections of the Checkerboard. "By doing so, BLM violated the duties that Section 3 clearly imposes on it with respect to wild horses found on the public land sections of the Checkerboard." The Court reversed the district court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "American Wild Horse v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The Outdoor Advertising Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, 5200 et seq., regulates advertising displays adjacent to interstate or primary highways in California. Plaintiffs obtained an outdoor advertising permit from Caltrans and began leasing out a billboard for general commercial advertising. The primary issue on appeal is whether section 5270 precludes application of county or city billboard ordinances with respect to a billboard that was placed in an area that was unincorporated at the time of its placement. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that in light of the entire statutory scheme, section 5270 does not preempt county- or city-enacted limitations on billboards in unincorporated areas that are stricter than the limitations set forth in the Act. The court also concluded that the trial court correctly found the billboard at issue was illegal because it was not lawfully erected in 1987 under the Los Angeles County Code, and therefore is prohibited under the Santa Clarita Municipal Code; plaintiffs failed to raise a disputed issue of fact regarding estoppel or laches; and the award of attorney fees was allowed under the statutes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the City. View "D'Egidio v. City of Santa Clarita" on Justia Law

Appellants Natural Resources Board and Applicant Two Rivers-Ottauquechee (TRO) Regional Commission appealed the Environmental Division’s award of an Act 250 permit to Applicant B&M Realty, LLC, to construct a large mixed-use business park near the Interstate 89 Exit 1 interchange in the Town of Hartford. The trial court concluded that the project satisfied Act 250, including the requirement that it conform with the 2007 TRO Regional Plan. The Natural Resources Board and the TRO Regional Commission argued on appeal that the project was inconsistent with mandatory and unambiguous provisions in the regional plan. Applicant cross-appealed, arguing that the 2007 Regional Plan did not apply, and that the Supreme Court need not consider the plan because the proposed development will not have substantial regional impact. The Supreme Court concluded that the 2007 Regional Plan applied and that the trial court’s conclusion that the project will have substantial regional impact is supported by the evidence, but held that the project was inconsistent with several provisions in the regional plan. The Court accordingly reversed. View "In re B&M Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Claimant Richard Borja, was employed by St. Bernard Parish Government (“St. Bernard”) as a firefighter. In March of 2004, claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging that he had injured his right knee and right thumb in an accident in 2002, and he also alleged he had an occupational disease. He described his injuries on the 2004 disputed claim for compensation as a “torqued knee” and “Heart and Lung,” indirectly referencing the Fireman’s Heart and Lung Act. After the accident, the claimant began receiving maximum workers’ compensation benefits, which continued until St. Bernard terminated them one year later. In the meantime, claimant had taken disability retirement in January 2003. The disputed claim form was filed within one year of the termination of the benefits. St. Bernard ultimately admitted that claimant had sustained an injury to his right knee, but disputed any thumb injury as well as any heart and lung claims as being related to his employment, stating that it did not know about the injuries, or that alternatively, they were prescribed. While St. Bernard conceded the claimant had been receiving the maximum benefits from the date of the accident until January 2003, it also maintained that because the claimant voluntarily retired in that month, he had removed himself from the workforce and was no longer entitled to future workers’ compensation benefits. Throughout the 2004 litigation, claimant had consistently argued that his heart and lung conditions were related to his employment. The dispute eventually went to mediation, which resulted in a compromise that claimant would receive back compensation payments in two lump sums, bringing him current to 2008, and that he would receive weekly indemnity benefits which were the maximum claimant could receive at that time. By October 2008, claimant moved dismiss the 2004 litigation noting “that this matter has been settled in full.” By 2013, St. Bernard, identifying the claimant’s benefits as Supplemental Earnings Benefits (“SEBs”), gave notice that it would terminate SEBs effective August 27, 2013, on the basis that he would have received the full 520 weeks of payments. In November 2013, claimant filed another disputed claim for compensation citing “knees, heart and lung” as his injuries. Specifically, he described his 2002 injury to the knee. St. Bernard filed exceptions of prescription and res judicata. A workers’ compensation judge granted the exception of res judicata for the knee injury, and granted the exception of prescription as to the claim under the “Heart and Lung Statute.” On appeal, a majority of the court of appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. After its review, the Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the claimant’s request for medical benefits under the heart and lung statute had prescribed because claimant timely filed his 2013 disputed claim asserting permanent and total disability as a result of his heart and lung condition. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment affirming the workers’ compensation judge’s rulings sustaining the exception of prescription and the exception of res judicata. View "Borja v. Fara St. Bernard Parish Gov't" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

Appellants owned property adjacent to Whitefish Lake, which the City of Whitefish has annexed. In 2005, Appellants petitioned the City for annexation of the property, and their petition was granted. In 2010, Appellants petitioned to have their property de-annexed. The City Council denied the petition. Appellants commenced a declaratory action in the district court challenging the decision. The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of lack of service and on the ground that the statute of limitations for Appellants’ claims would bar any re-filed action. In 2014, Appellants filed another petition for de-annexation of their property. The City Council denied Appellants’ second petition for de-annexation, and Appellants filed a second declaratory action challenging the denial of their second petition. The district court entered summary judgment for the City, concluding that Appellants’ action was barred by claim preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment on the basis of claim preclusion. View "Schweitzer v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law