Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Petitioner James Boyle, as trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Transportation Appeals Board (TAB) affirming the denial of his application for a permit to construct a driveway onto a state highway. The TAB based its decision upon sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s (DOT) “Policy for the Permitting of Driveways and Other Accesses to the State Highway System.” Although the TAB concluded that petitioner’s proposed driveway would adequately protect the safety of the traveling public, because it also determined that there was sufficient support for the hearings examiner’s conclusion that the proposed driveway would cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public, it upheld the hearings examiner’s denial of the petitioner’s permit application. On appeal, petitioner challenged the finding of an unreasonable hazard, arguing that it was impossible for a driveway to adequately protect the safety of the traveling public and simultaneously cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public. Thus, petitioner argued that the TAB erred in denying his permit application. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, and, therefore, reversed. View "Appeal of Boyle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Township of Franklin (the Township) adopted an ordinance revising its regulation of signs, including billboards. The ordinance permits billboards, subject to multiple conditions, in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway but expressly prohibited digital billboards anywhere in the municipality. A company seeking to install a digital billboard challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Law Division declared unconstitutional that portion of the ordinance barring digital billboards. The trial court viewed the Township's treatment of such devices as a total ban on a mode of communication. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. Applying the "Central Hudson" commercial speech standard and the "Clark/Ward" time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral regulations affecting speech, the appellate panel determined that the ban on digital billboards passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court disagreed: "simply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day." The Court declared the 2010 ban on digital billboards as unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "E&J Equities v. Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township" on Justia Law

H&G Land Company, L.P. entered into a lease agreement with APAC-Mississippi, Inc. (“APAC”), whereby APAC would operate an asphalt plant and mining operation on H&G’s land for a period of twenty years. H&G then filed an application for a special exception to extract sand and gravel on its property. The application included documentation concerning property, including ownership, government permits, insurance, a bond for reclamation of the property, and site proposals. Thereafter, the Panola County Land Development Commission held a series of hearings to consider H&G’s application. At the last hearing, the Commission denied the application and informed H&G that it could appeal to the Board, which reversed the Commission. At its next regularly scheduled meeting, the Board held a hearing to consider H&G’s request. Several local businesses and residents attended the meeting to oppose H&G’s request, so the Board permitted each side time to present their arguments. Following the presentations, the Board voted to approve H&G's application. The businesses and residents appealed. But finding no reversible error in the Board's approval, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Como Steak House, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Panola County" on Justia Law

Citizens petitioned for a writ of mandate pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq., alleging several defects in the environmental documents the city certified when it approved a development project. The trial court denied the petition and Citizens appealed. The court affirmed the trial court's decision and rejected Citizens' arguments that: (1) The environmental impact report (EIR) certified by the city did not mandate adequate mitigation measures for the urban decay impact of the project; (2) the EIR did not sufficiently analyze the project's impacts on landfill and recycling facilities and did not mandate adequate mitigation measures for those impacts; (3) the EIR failed to contain adequate information correlating the project's air pollution impacts with resulting effects on human health; and (4) the city's statement of overriding considerations, a document that explains how the project's benefits will outweigh its significant and unavoidable environmental impacts, was not supported by substantial evidence. However, the court reversed as to Wal-Mart's appeal on the cost of preparing the administrative record, concluding that the trial court's application of Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. City of Hayward was erroneous. View "Citizens for Ceres v. City of Ceres" on Justia Law

The LaBerges appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued by the Town of Hinesburg Zoning Administrator (ZA) for violation of a Town noise ordinance arising from use of a motocross track on their property. On appeal, the LaBerges argued the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that the Environmental Division’s conclusion that the LaBerges violated the ordinance is clearly erroneous. Finding no such error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaBerge NOV" on Justia Law

Neighbor Mary Bourassa appealed the Environmental Division’s affirmance of a zoning permit application by Philip and Barbara Wagner and Christopher Guay, who wanted to build a single family residence and detached garage on two merged lots of a six-lot subdivision in Grand Isle. Bourassa, an owner of another lot in the subdivision, opposed development, chiefly on the ground that the proposed house would not be constructed within the “tree line” on the property, as required by the subdivision plat plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wagner & Guay Permit" on Justia Law

In 1975, TNMC purchased property in Cazadero, for use as a monastery and retreat center, including the printing of sacred Buddhist texts in the Tibetan language for shipment to Asia and free distribution to Buddhist practitioners whose libraries have been destroyed by Chinese authorities. In 1983, the county approved a conditional use permit for Timberhill, a Cazadero resort within an area designated as Resources and Rural Development in the county’s general plan. Timberhill’s permit allowed construction of a lodge, a dining room, and 15 guest cabins. In 2000, the county adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND), allowing five additional cabins, a new dining room and other guest facilities, and 10 staff dwelling units. In 2004, TNMC purchased Timberhill and designated it as the Ratna Ling Retreat Center. The county adopted an MND in lieu of a formal environmental impact report, approving a third master use permit for expansion of the Center. Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act, maintaining that an EIR was required because the proposed project greatly expands an existing printing operation and that the approval violated the general plan and zoning provisions. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the arguments, finding that the approvals did not constitute spot zoning and that the county imposed adequate mitigation measures. View "Coastal Hills Rural Pres. v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

The Permanente Quarry is a 3,510-acre surface mining operation, producing limestone and aggregate for the manufacture of cement, in unincorporated Santa Clara County. The Quarry has been in existence since 1903. The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors conducted a review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code section 21000, certified an environmental impact report, and, in 2012, approved a reclamation plan amendment for closing and reclaiming the Quarry’s mining operations over a 20-year period. Opponents challenged the approval, asserting claims under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA), Pub. Resources Code section 2710, and CEQA. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed the approval, upholding a determination that the reclamation plan amendment satisfied SMARA’s regulatory standards for water quality and wildlife habitat. Statements by the Office of Mining Reclamation were properly considered by the county and provided substantial evidence to support the county’s findings. The county’s findings regarding the direct and indirect environmental impacts from the reclamation plan amendment were sufficient under CEQA. View "Bay Area Clean Env't, Inc. v. Santa Clara Co" on Justia Law

In August 2014, the First Western Bank and Trust (Bank) applied for two variances from City of Minot zoning regulations for off-street parking after incorrectly calculating the size of an addition to its bank building. The Bank's application sought to reduce the required number of off-street parking spaces for its building from 131 to 110 and to reduce the required width of each parking space from 10 to 9 feet. After notice to the Bank's neighbors, the Minot Planning Commission met to consider the application, and several neighbors appeared to oppose the application. The Planning Commission approved the application, finding the existence of an exceptional topographical hardship and the variances could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without impairing the general purpose and intent of Minot's comprehensive zoning plan. The Planning Commission affirmed its earlier decision approving the application. The City Council later affirmed the Planning Commission's decision. Sixteen Minot residents living near the Bank appealed a judgment dismissing their appeal of the City Council’s decision to grant the Bank's application for zoning variances. The residents argued the district court erred in ruling they lacked standing under N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 to appeal the City Council's decision granting the variances. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. 40-47-12 as grounds for its standing decision. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded the residents were not aggrieved applicants authorized to appeal a variance decision under N.D.C.C. 40-47-11. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing their appeal. View "Schmidt v. City of Minot" on Justia Law