Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The City filed a nuisance abatement action against several businesses and individuals related to medical marijuana dispensaries, which were prohibited by the Pasadena Municipal Code (PMC). Defendants in that action then filed suit against the City, and these two cases were deemed related. The trial court granted the City's request for injunctions, prohibiting defendants from operating their medical marijuana dispensaries in the City. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the PMC states that medical marijuana dispensaries were not permitted, and that non-permitted uses were a nuisance; because defendants operated medical marijuana dispensaries, which was prohibited, and the PMC stated that the operation of a prohibited use was a nuisance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the dispensaries were nuisances per se under the PMC; because defendants did not challenge ordinance 7018 within the 90-day period allowed by Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), their procedural challenge was time-barred; and defendants have not set forth any persuasive arguments that the legal actions here were not authorized by the City Council. View "Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action against the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County challenging the Teton County Land Development Regulation prohibiting fractional ownership of campgrounds, holding that the regulation was unenforceable because it exceeded the County’s zoning authority. Specifically, the Court agreed with Plaintiff that the regulation prohibiting fractional ownership did not regulate the use of the land, only its ownership, and was, therefore, beyond the County’s zoning authority and unenforceable. View "Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming v. Mackay Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action against the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County challenging the Teton County Land Development Regulation prohibiting fractional ownership of campgrounds, holding that the regulation was unenforceable because it exceeded the County’s zoning authority. Specifically, the Court agreed with Plaintiff that the regulation prohibiting fractional ownership did not regulate the use of the land, only its ownership, and was, therefore, beyond the County’s zoning authority and unenforceable. View "Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming v. Mackay Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed three orders of the district court that directed Southwest Montana Building Industry Association (SWMBIA) to transfer funds from the impact fee payer class refund account (refund account) to the City of Bozeman, to submit an accounting of the refund account, and for contempt of court. The Court held (1) the district court did not exceed its authority when it ordered SWMBIA to transfer the funds remaining in the refund account to Bozeman; (2) the district court’s order regarding the transfer of the remaining refund account funds was enforceable; (3) the district court did not err when it did not dispose of the remaining refund account funds in accordance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(i)(3); (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered SWMBIA to provide an accounting of the refund account; and (5) SWMBIA cannot obtain relief from the district court’s contempt order. View "Southwest Montana Building Industry Ass’n v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed three orders of the district court that directed Southwest Montana Building Industry Association (SWMBIA) to transfer funds from the impact fee payer class refund account (refund account) to the City of Bozeman, to submit an accounting of the refund account, and for contempt of court. The Court held (1) the district court did not exceed its authority when it ordered SWMBIA to transfer the funds remaining in the refund account to Bozeman; (2) the district court’s order regarding the transfer of the remaining refund account funds was enforceable; (3) the district court did not err when it did not dispose of the remaining refund account funds in accordance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(i)(3); (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered SWMBIA to provide an accounting of the refund account; and (5) SWMBIA cannot obtain relief from the district court’s contempt order. View "Southwest Montana Building Industry Ass’n v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

While a public entity may be liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of public property, the entity may avoid liability through the affirmative defense of design immunity. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Caltrans established, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense of design immunity. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that a public official’s approval of a design does not constitute an exercise of discretionary authority under Government Code section 830.6 if the official admits that he or she never actually considered whether to utilize the safety feature the plaintiff asserts would have prevented his or her injuries. Rather, the court held that the evidence established the shoulder that was actually constructed was the result of or conformed to a design approved by the employee vested with discretionary authority, which provided a basis for concluding any liability for injuries caused by the absence of rumble strips was immunized by section 830.6. View "Rodriguez v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the enforcement of a homeowner's association resolution banning short term rentals (STR ban) in Oxnard Shores. Plaintiffs alleged that the STR ban violates the California Coastal Act, which requires a coastal development permit for any "development" that results in a change in the intensity of use of or access to land in a coastal zone. The Act provides that any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief to restrain any violation of this division. The Act further states that, on a prima facie showing of a violation of this division, preliminary equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further violation of this division. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a prima facie showing has been made to issue a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the STR ban until trial. The court explained that the decision to ban or regulate STRs must be made by the City and Coastal Commission, not a homeowner's association. View "Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Community Assn." on Justia Law

Thorncreek, a Park Forest townhouse complex, applied to the Village for a permit to use a vacant townhouse as a business office but began to conduct its business from the townhouse without a permit. The Village cited it for zoning violations and operating without the required permit. The Village later filed suit to halt the zoning and operating violations and to redress certain building-code violations. Thorncreek counterclaimed against the Village and 10 officials, claiming civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 and the Illinois Civil Rights Act. Two Thorncreek "areas" went into foreclosure. Thorncreek blamed the Village’s regulatory overreach in denying a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical upgrades, based on irrational animus against Clapper, the owner, and racial bias against its black residents. A jury found the Village and Village Manager Mick liable for a class-of-one equal-protection violation; found Mick and Kerestes, the director of community development, liable for conspiracy (section 1985(3)); otherwise rejected the claims, and awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory damages. Because the jury rejected the race-based equal-protection claim, the judge struck the verdict against Kerestes. The judge awarded $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the judgment against Mick, the admission of evidence concerning Clapper’s wealth, and the admission of Thorncreek’s financial records. View "Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Village of Park Forest" on Justia Law

CRRD appealed the trial court's denial of its petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn the City of Covina's approval of an infill project located a quarter-mile from the Covina Metrolink commuter rail station. The Court of Appeal held that Public Resources Code section 21099, subdivision (d)(1), which took effect three months before the City approved the project, exempts the project's parking impacts, as alleged by CRRD, from review under the California Environmental Quality Act. Furthermore, the court rejected CRRD's contentions that the City's approval of the project violated the Subdivision Map Act and affirmed the judgment. View "Covina Residents for Responsible Development v. City of Covina" on Justia Law

SV Care has operated a medical marijuana collective in a San Jose commercial zoning district since 2010. The municipal code did not then list marijuana-specific uses in its table of permitted uses. That table stated that all uses not listed were not permitted, but listed “medical offices” as permitted. After the collective opened, voters passed a local measure adding a marijuana business tax, which is described as “solely for the purpose of obtaining revenue.” The tax certificate specifies that it does not indicate zoning compliance. In 2014, the city determined that a medical marijuana collective was not an authorized use and ordered the collective to close. SV appealed the denial of its petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the collective was a legal nonconforming use and that the city should be equitably estopped from forcing it to close. The court of appeal affirmed. Giving due deference to the city’s interpretation of its code, the medical office category does not include medical marijuana collectives. Because plaintiffs’ collective was not permitted when it opened, it cannot be a legal nonconforming use. In light of the express disclaimers, reliance on paying required business taxes as authorization to operate a medical marijuana collective is unreasonable as a matter of law. View "J. Arthur Properties, II, LLC v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law