Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Appellants petitioned the Commission to revoke a coastal development permit (CDP), alleging that MVF's CDP application contained intentional misrepresentations regarding approvals it received from the Los Angeles County Environmental Review Board (ERB), the California Water Resources Control Board (Water Board), and the California Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game). After the Commission denied the petition, appellants petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the Commission's decision.The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's denial of the petition and held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that accurate or complete information would not have caused the Commission to act differently in ruling on MVF's CDP application. In this case, the Commission correctly interpreted and applied section 13105, subdivision (a), and substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that although MVF's application contained intentional misrepresentations regarding the approvals by the ERB, Fish and Game, and the Water Board, the Commission would not have imposed additional conditions or denied the CDP if accurate information had been provided. View "Hubbard v. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed petitions for writs of administrative mandamus and sought declaratory relief requesting a finding that the Board was equitably estopped from asserting that rental properties were subject to rent control. The trial court granted the petitions and the requested declaratory relief.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by applying equitable estoppel to require the Board to act beyond its statutory authority and in contravention of the Rent Control Law. The court also held that the Board did not revoke or modify the removal permits; the doctrine that an administrative agency may not reopen or reconsider a prior decision did not compel affirmance; and a landlord's entitlement to a constitutionally fair return was not affected by the Board's interpretation of section 1803(t) of the Santa Monica City Charter, article XVIII. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "1041 20th Street v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd." on Justia Law

Andrea and Kevin Martin appealed a district court judgment ordering the removal of a fence on their property after finding the fence violated restrictive covenants recorded against the property. The Martins argued the restrictive covenants did not apply to their property because they agreed to purchase the property before the covenants went into effect. They also claimed the restrictive covenants were unconscionable. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wachter Development, Inc. v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants, the City of Rochester (City) and Michael and Stacey Philbrook, appealed superior court orders : (1) requiring the City to reacquire title to a parcel of land it previously conveyed to the Philbrooks and transfer title to plaintiffs Donald and Bonnie Toy; and (2) awarding attorney’s fees to the Toys. In May 2015, the City took title to a 1.8-acre parcel of land located in Rochester (Lot 54). The Philbrooks owned a lot adjacent to Lot 54. The Toys owned a manufactured housing park known as “Addison Estates” and an additional, smaller lot located nearby. In 2015, the Toys purchased an additional lot, which shared boundaries with Addison Estates and Lot 54. Lot 54 was located in a zoning district in which the development or expansion of manufactured housing parks was prohibited. The Rochester City Council voted to sell Lot 54 through an advertised sealed bid process. The Toys submitted the highest bid and represented that they intended to “annex the property” to their adjacent property. The Philbrooks submitted the lowest bid stating that they intended to “[a]dd this abutting land to [their] land.” The city council reached a “‘consensus’” that the City would sell Lot 54 to the Toys, provided that they agreed to a restrictive covenant in the deed prohibiting the owner of Lot 54 from ever using the property for manufactured housing park development or to expand Addison Estates. The city council also agreed that, if the Toys did not accept the restrictive covenant, it would sell the lot to the Philbrooks. The Toys’ attorney declined purchase with the covenant. The City then sold the property to the Philbrooks with a warranty deed that did not contain any restrictive covenants. The Toys filed a complaint against the City and the Philbrooks, seeking damages, a declaration that the Toys were “lawfully entitled to the right of first refusal” on Lot 54, an order concluding that the City “breached the Conditions of Sale by transferring” Lot 54 to the Philbrooks and requiring the Philbrooks to convey Lot 54 to the Toys, and attorney’s fees. The defendants moved to dismiss. Although, ideally, the City should have included the restrictive covenant in the Notice of Sale or the Conditions of Sale, the New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that the City could not subsequently revise the terms of sale to include the restrictive covenant. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that, in contravention of controlling case law, the City failed to treat the Toys “fairly and equally” when it did not require the Philbrooks to accept the same restrictive covenant demanded of the Toys. Therefore, the City's covenant requirement was “outside the bounds of fairness.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the City did not treat the Toys “fairly and equally” — but only to the limited extent that the City failed to require that other bidders, including the Philbrooks, accept the restrictive covenant. The attorney fee award was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Toy v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

Real party in interest and respondent Genesee Properties, Inc. (Genesee) sought tentative map approval from respondent County of San Diego (the County) for a 24-lot subdivision on 1416.5 acres of land in San Diego County known as the Hoskings Ranch (the property). The property was within a County-designated agricultural preserve and a majority of it was subject to a Williamson Act contract requiring that the land be restricted to agricultural and compatible uses. The County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution conditionally approving the tentative map, finding in part that the subdivision "will not result in residential development not incidental to the commercial agricultural use of the land" pursuant to section 66474.4 of the Subdivision Map Act. Plaintiffs-appellants Cleveland National Forest Foundation and others (collectively, Cleveland) unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandate and injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the legality of the Board's approval. On appeal, Cleveland contended the County's approval of the tentative map violated section 66474.4 and undermined the Williamson Act by permitting a residential, rather than agricultural, subdivision on the property and giving the property developers a valuable residential entitlement while they were still receiving a taxpayer subsidy intended for those who maintain the land in agricultural or compatible nonurban uses. The County and Genesee jointly responded that Cleveland's failure to exhaust administrative remedies effectively negated the appeal, and that Cleveland improperly raised new arguments that it did not make in the trial court during the administrative process. They maintained the subdivision complied with the Map Act, Cleveland did not overcome the legal presumption that the project will sustain agricultural uses, and substantial evidence otherwise supported the Board's findings. Construing section 66474.4 in keeping with the land preservation goals and intent of the Williamson Act, whose principles the Legislature incorporated into that section, the Court of Appeal concluded the Board's finding was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. As a result, the County's conditional approval of the proposed tentative map did not comply with the Map Act, and constituted an abuse of discretion. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

David and Helen Goyings designed and built a retirement home on a lakefront lot. Their neighbors insisted the Goyingses violated the subdivision’s restrictive covenants that barred “pre-fabricated or modular home[s]” and had to tear it down. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court found no cause of action and dismissed the case. But the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred when it held that the covenants “did not contemplate a home of the type built by Defendants.” The Court of Appeals reasoned the Goyingses’ home unambiguously fit the commonly understood definition of “modular” but never construed the disputed term used in the covenants, “modular home.” The panel reversed and held that the trial court should have granted judgment in the neighbors’ favor and ordered the Goyingses to tear down their new home. After review, the Michigan Supreme Court disagreed: "The materials, workmanship, quality, and outward appearance of the defendants’ home are indistinguishable from a site-built home. And modular components don’t necessarily make a modular home. The covenants give us text and context to determine what a modular home is. A fair reading of those covenants prohibits a home that is more modular than not. And the Goyingses’ home is mostly not modular." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case. View "Thiel v. Goyings" on Justia Law

In 2006, taxpayer University Ventures, LLC purchased a vacant lot in Charleston County, South Carolina (the Property). In 2008, Taxpayer received building permits to construct a hotel and pool on the Property. Construction began, and the hotel and pool were completed in April 2009, at which time a certificate of occupancy was issued. As a result of the completed improvements and pursuant to law, the Charleston County Assessor (the Assessor) reappraised the Property, which resulted in an increase in the value of the Property, which in turn increased the Taxpayer's 2010 property tax bill. The Taxpayer paid the increased 2010 tax bill without objection. This case centered on Taxpayer's challenge to the 2011 tax bill. In 2011, the Assessor continued to value the Property as an improved lot, which it in fact was. The Taxpayer protested and claimed its 2011 tax bill should have been based on the Property's value as a vacant lot as of December 31, 2008. The court of appeals rejected the Taxpayer's argument, finding it would be absurd to value the Property as a vacant lot after improvements were completed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found, consistent with South Carolina's statutory scheme, that when the value set by a reassessment program's uniform date of value conflicts with the value set by the completion of improvements to property, the improvement value controls. View "Charleston County Assessor v. University Ventures" on Justia Law

Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, Tennessee Gas holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, authorizing it to construct natural gas pipelines in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Tennessee Gas sought easements over King’s 975-acre Pike County, Pennsylvania tract. After unsuccessfully attempting to purchase the easements, Tennessee Gas filed a condemnation action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1. The parties stipulated that Tennessee Gas could access and possess the easements, then engaged in discovery pertinent to determining the appropriate compensation. The district court ruled that federal law governs the substantive determination of just compensation and that, although King could recover consequential damages for professional fees and development costs under Pennsylvania law, it could not do so under federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. Because federal law does not supply a rule of decision on this precise issue, the court created a common law remedy, opting to incorporate state law as the federal standard. The court reasoned that fashioning a nationally uniform rule is unnecessary, incorporating state law does not frustrate the NGA’s objectives, and application of a uniform federal rule would risk “upsetting the parties’ commercial expectations” based upon “the already well-developed state property regime.” View "Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres" on Justia Law

Petitioners Northern Pass Transmission, LLC and Public Service Company of New Hampshire d/b/a Eversource Energy (PSNH), appealed the New Hampshire Site Evaluation Committee’s decision denying their application for a “Certificate of Site and Facility” (certificate) for the siting, construction, and operation of a high voltage transmission line (HVTL) and associated facilities from Pittsburg to Deerfield (the project). A subcommittee of the Evaluation Committee held 70 days of adjudicative hearings between April and December 2017. It received testimony from 154 witnesses and received 2,176 exhibits. At the conclusion of its proceedings, the Subcommittee voted unanimously that petitioners “failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the Project will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region” and denied the application on February 1, 2018. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the record and concluded the Subcommittee’s findings were supported by competent evidence and ere not erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court held petitioners did not sustain their burden on appeal to show that the Subcommittee’s order was unreasonable or unlawful. View "Appeal of Northern Pass Transmission, LLC & a." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sacramentans for Fair Planning contended the City of Sacramento violated zoning law and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved entitlements for real party 2500 J Owners, LLC, to construct a high-rise condominium building in the City’s Midtown area. The project was not consistent with the general plan and zoning code standards for building intensity and height. But the City approved it pursuant to a general plan policy authorizing more intense development than zoning otherwise allowed if the project provided a significant community benefit. The City also conducted a streamlined CEQA review. CEQA authorized the less intense review for a type of residential mixed-use development such as the proposed project which, because of its proximity to mass transit services, may help reduce regional greenhouse gas emissions by generating less use of motor vehicles. In a petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff argued that approving the project under the general plan policy violated constitutional law and an implied-in-law zoning contract that required identical uses in a zoning district to be treated uniformly and prohibited a delegation of legislative authority without sufficient standards to govern its use. Plaintiff also claimed the City violated CEQA because the streamlined review did not analyze all of the project’s environmental effects. The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order and judgment. View "Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law