Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Sam Conant owned 204 North Avenue from 1979 to 2002. The City of Burlington, Vermont assessed the property as a duplex in 1985. Conant converted the structure on the property from a duplex to a triplex in 1992 and began renting its three units in 1993. He obtained a building permit prior to construction, but he never obtained the required certificate of occupancy. In October 1993, City assessors inspected the property and found that the building contained three units. Pierre Gingue purchased 204 North Avenue from Conant in 2002 and continued to rent out the three apartments. The City issued a notice of violation to Gingue in July 2017 for “a change of use from a duplex to a triplex without zoning approval,” which the City stated was in violation of the City’s Comprehensive Development Ordinance. Gingue did not dispute that the property is in violation of the ordinance, rather, that the statute of limitations in 24 V.S.A. 4454(a) barred the NOV. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Vermont Supreme Court held the statute of limitations did bar the NOV and reversed the trial court’s decision. View "In re 204 North Avenue NOV" on Justia Law

Luke Purvis appealed the Environmental Division’s denial of his motion for relief under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (2). In September 2014, the City of Burlington Code Enforcement Office notified Purvis that it had received a complaint regarding unpermitted expansion of the parking area on his property. It ordered Purvis to restore the area to green space. Purvis appealed to the Development Review Board, arguing that the expansion of the parking area was an unenforceable permit because the expansion first occurred over fifteen years prior. After reviewing various affidavits, drawings, photos, and other exhibits submitted by the City and Purvis, the Board found no violation because it concluded that parking in the area had stopped. Because it found that parking in the area had ceased for a period in excess of sixty days, it held that Purvis had lost the benefit of the fifteen-year limitation on enforcement actions under 24 V.S.A. 4454 and any potential claim to reestablish the right to expanded parking. Purvis appealed that determination to the Environmental Division in May 2015. In August 2016, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which provided that the parties would dismiss the suit without prejudice. It also provided that the City and Purvis would meet again in another mediation no later than January 15, 2017, to attempt to resolve all disputes. That mediation never took place; no party moved to reopen or extend before August 1, 2017. In March 2018, Purvis moved for relief from the Stipulated Order pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), arguing that he should be granted relief because he had been represented by conflicted counsel at the time he entered into the Settlement Agreement and submitted the Stipulated Order, and because he had relied on the City’s expressed willingness to mediate after the August 2017 deadline. The Environmental Division held that the motion for relief was unwarranted because Purvis did not file a motion to reopen or extend the time for such a motion before the August 1, 2017 deadline contemplated in the Stipulated Order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Purvis argued his motion was not time-barred because the order from which he sought relief was not actually a final judgment. Finding no reversible error in the Environmental Division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Purvis Nonconforming Use" on Justia Law

Matheis, a retired police officer who has successfully managed a diagnosis of PTSD, routinely and safely donated plasma roughly 90 times in an 11-month period at CSL’s plasma donation facility. CSL barred him from making further donations when he brought his new service dog, Odin, to the facility, citing its policy to bar any individual who is prescribed daily more than two separate anxiety medications or who uses a service animal to manage anxiety. The company required Matheis to provide a letter from his doctor stating he had no need for a service animal before it would screen him for further plasma donation. He sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181. The Third Circuit reversed the district court. Plasma donation centers are “service establishments,” subject to the ADA’s prohibition on unreasonable discrimination. CSL violated the ADA by imposing a blanket ban on prospective donors who use a psychiatric service animal. Public accommodations like CSL must permit disabled individuals to use service animals unless they can show a regulatory exception applies, “based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.” View "Matheis, Jr. v. CSL Plasma Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Denis Girard and Florence Leduc appealed a superior court order upholding a decision of the Town of Plymouth Planning Board denying their subdivision application. They argued the trial court erred in upholding the planning board’s denial of their application because: (1) the board “engaged in impermissible ad hoc rule” and “decision making” when it relied upon an “overly broad” subdivision regulation; (2) the board relied on a subdivision regulation that did not specifically authorize the board to regulate wetlands; (3) the board’s regulation of wetlands is preempted by State statute; (4) the trial court unreasonably relied on certain evidence provided by a wetlands scientist; (5) the board’s decision to reject the application based upon the proposed subdivision’s impact on the wetlands was unreasonable; and (6) the board violated New Hampshire law by discussing the application at a hearing without notice to the applicants or the public. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Girard v. Town of Plymouth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and set aside the award of the condemnation commissioners to the Helmick Family Farm, LLC for a taking of slightly more than two acres of land along with some easements, holding that the reasonable probability of rezoning of property taken through condemnation may be relevant to the property's fair market value and that Helmick presented sufficient concrete facts to warrant submission of the question of reasonable probability of rezoning to a jury.On appeal, Helmick argued that exclusion of certain evidence prevented the commissioners from considering probative evidence concerning the fair market value of the land at issue. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) ample authority supports the admissibility of evidence that the property taken has a reasonable probability of rezoning; (2) nothing in prior cases forecloses the admissibility of such evidence; (3) there are certain parameters concerning such evidence; and (4) Helmick presented sufficient concrete facts to warrant submission of the question of reasonable probability of rezoning to a jury. View "Helmick Family Farm v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a disputed water right relating to the St. Joe River in Benewah County, Idaho, between a landowner and the tenants who put the water to beneficial use. The license at issue described the water right as “appurtenant to the described place of use.” The landowner argued the water right was appurtenant to his land, while the tenants contended the right was developed and owned by their predecessors in interest and now belonged to them by virtue of their having purchased the interest. The district court ultimately adopted the Special Master’s report and issued a partial decree, which listed the tenants as the owner of the license. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "McInturff v . Shippy" on Justia Law

Eagle Creek Irrigation Company (“Eagle Creek”) appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of A.C. & C.E. Investments, Inc. The dispute centered on 15 shares of Eagle Creek stock which authorized the holder to divert 30 cfs of water (or 15 miner’s inches) of Eagle Creek’s water right. AC&CE Investments purchased 15 acres (“the Property”) located within Eagle Creek’s boundaries. The prior property owners also owned 15 shares in Eagle Creek stock. The question presented on appeal was whether the 15 shares passed as an appurtenance to the Property. The district court ruled that AC&CE Investments acquired 15 shares in Eagle Creek when it acquired title to the Property because the shares passed as an appurtenance to the Property. Eagle Creek appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to AC&CE Investments because the district court did not look to Eagle Creek’s governing documents. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the portion of the district court’s final judgment which stated that the 15 shares of the Eagle Creek stock were appurtenant to the Property. View "Eagle Creek Irrigation v. A.C & C.E Investments" on Justia Law

Appellants, Neighbors for Healthy Communities (Neighbors), appealed the Environmental Division’s decision to grant an Act 250 permit application to appellees, North East Materials Group, LLC (NEMG) and Rock of Ages Corp. (ROA), for a rock-crushing operation in Graniteville in the Town of Barre. Neighbors argued the court erred in granting NEMG’s application because the proposed operation does not comply with either Act 250 Criterion 1, with respect to air pollution due to silica dust, or Criterion 8, with respect to noise from off-site truck traffic. The Vermont Supreme Court found the trial court committed no error in concluding that NEMG’s rock-crushing operation complied with Act 250 Criterion 1 and Criterion 8. View "In re North East Materials Group, LLC/Rock of Ages Corp. Act 250 Permit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling in favor of Henrico County and concluding that HHHHunt did not have a vested right to the continuation of Dominion Club Drive under Va. Code 15.2-2261 and that the County could rely on the abandonment provisions of Title 33.2 of the Code to eliminate the extension of Dominion Club Drive, holding that the circuit court did not err.HHHunt wished to extend Dominion Club Drive into Hanover County so that it might more profitably develop its properties in Hanover County. Henrico County and residents of the Wyndham development in Henrico County opposed extending the road. The County Board of Supervisors removed a portion of Dominion Club Drive from the County's major thoroughfare plan and voted to abandon a portion of the road pursuant to the abandonment provisions found in Title 33.2, effectively precluding HHHunt from extending the road into Hanover County. The circuit court sustained the Board's decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Loch Levan Land v. Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In this challenge to the action of the Prince George's County Council sitting as the District Council approving a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust regarding an existing store located in the Woodyard Crossing Shopping Center in Clinton, Maryland, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Council has extensive authority to regulate and establish zoning laws and procedure, which includes special exception and variance application. The ZHE issued a decision denied an application for a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart filed exceptions to the Zoning Hearing Examiner's (ZHE) decision and requested that the District Council hear the case. Petitioners responded in opposition to Wal-Mart's exceptions. The District Council proceeded to approve Wal-Mart's application for a special exception and variance. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed the District Council's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District Council is authorized to delegate the preparation of its opinion and order to its staff attorney; (2) the District Council rightfully exercises original jurisdiction when hearing zoning cases from the ZHE; and (3) Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that the District Council violated the Maryland Open Meetings Act. View "Grant v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law