Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Appellant AIDS HealthCare Foundation (AHF) challenges land use decisions by the Los Angeles City Council planning and land use management (PLUM) committee, made while two of its members allegedly were the beneficiaries of an extensive, ongoing bribery scheme directed at PLUM committee projects. AHF contends the three-year catch-all statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), applies to those PRA claims. Respondents City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles City Council (collectively the City) asserted that the more specific 90-day statutes of limitation in Government Code sections 65009 and 66499.37 apply. The trial court, following precedent involving a predecessor statute to section 65009, agreed with the City, sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the case.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the application of the pre-existing shorter statute of limitations does not “practically amend” section 91011 subdivision (b), or any other part of the PRA. Section 65009 does not conflict with, or otherwise take away from, the original PRA, practically or otherwise. Further, the court held that the trial court properly dismissed AHF’s complaint as time-barred by section 65009, the applicable 90-day statute of limitations in this action. View "AIDS HealthCare Foundation v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2003, JCJIC proposed a 312-unit apartment complex on 15.45 acres of vacant land along the Petaluma River. In 2008, after starting a draft environmental impact report (DEIR), for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), Petaluma adopted General Plan 2025. In response, JCJIC submitted an application for a 278-unit complex. After conducting site visits, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service identified the issues the EIR should address. A “Habitat Mitigation Monitoring Plan” was incorporated. In 2018, the DEIR was published. JCJIC provided consultant studies regarding environmental impacts, including on “Special Status Species.” The Planning Commission considered traffic impacts, floodplain impacts, and decreased quality of neighborhood life. City Council members requested supplemental documentation and authorized the preparation of a final EIR. JCJIC further reduced the proposal to 205 units; reduced the height of buildings; increased setbacks from the River; and implement a “Traffic Calming Plan.” The Final EIR concluded the revisions eliminated or reduced several potential significant impacts. In 2020, JCJIC submitted another plan with 180 units.Objectors disputed the adequacy of the EIR’s special status species analysis and failure to analyze emergency evacuations. The City Council certified the EIR and approved zoning amendments. The trial court and court of appeal upheld the approvals. View "Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a column heading in a schedule contained in a township zoning resolution was substantive and must be read as part of a resolution especially when the heading contains a term that is defined in the resolution and when ignoring the heading would change the resolution's meaning completely.The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirmed the zoning inspector's decision denying Willow Grove's application for a zoning certificate. The court of common pleas reversed in part and affirmed in part and ordered the BZA to issue a zoning certificate. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a zoning certificate could not be issued because the proposed development was deficient in its plan for off-street parking. At issue on appeal was whether the minimum parking-space requirements set forth in Schedule 310.04 of the Olmsted Township Zoning Resolution (OTZR) applied to the swimming pool and community center in Willow Grove's proposed development plan. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the column headings in Schedule 310.04 are substantive and cannot be ignored or used as a mere guidepost when applying the off-street parking requirements of the OTZR; and (2) therefore, Willow Grove was entitled to approval of its application for a zoning certificate. View "Willow Grove, Ltd. v. Olmstead Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2019, an Idaho district court granted Respondents Matthew and Bonnie Latvalas’ claim for a prescriptive easement over a road known as “South Camp Bay Road” to reach their property located on the shores of Lake Pend Oreille. Because the prescriptive easement was created by the operations of an active mine, the district court determined that the scope of the easement included the ability to transport labor and materials to build a home on the Latvalas’ property. In Latvala v. Green Enterprises, Inc., 485 P.3d 1129 (2021) (Latvala I), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the Latvalas had a prescriptive easement over South Camp Bay Road. However, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment after concluding it had impermissibly expanded the scope of that easement. On remand, the parties disputed whether the Supreme Court’s decision prohibited the Latvalas’ proposed residential use of South Camp Bay Road, or only the construction of a residence on the Latvalas’ property. The district court entered a second amended judgment that prohibited the Latvalas from using South Camp Bay Road to construct a residence on their property, but did not restrict the Latvalas from using the road for residential purposes. Appellants Green Enterprises, Inc., James and and Julie Frank, and Larimore and Kathryn Cummins (neighboring landowners) timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the latter district court judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed: “Because possibly driving across South Camp Bay Road will do nothing to increase the burden on the servient landowners, we affirm the district court’s second and third amended judgments because they are consistent with our holding in Latvala I. The Latvalas may not use South Camp Bay Road to build a residence; they may drive along Camp Bay Road to access a residence. Whether and to what extent that burden may or could change in the future is a question for another day. On the record before us we will not hypothesize on what the outcome would be under those theoretical scenarios.” View "Latvala v. Green Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The school's athletic stadium seats 2,008 persons and is surrounded by single-family homes. The school sought approval to add four permanent 90-foot tall outdoor light standards to enable its nighttime use. The planning department determined that the project was categorically exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). The planning commission approved a permit, limiting the hours during which the lights could be used, and prohibiting use by groups unaffiliated with the school. The permit required the distribution of a large-event management plan and a code of conduct for students and others attending events. The board of supervisors affirmed, further restricting the hours that the lights could be used, requiring the school to report the dates and times the lights are turned on, dimmed, and turned off, requiring that for certain events, the school provide off-site parking, and requiring that trees be installed for screening.The court of appeal reversed. The project is not exempt from CEQA under the class 1 exemption for “existing facilities.” The project will significantly expand the nighttime use of the stadium. Nor does the class 3 exemption, entitled “New Construction or Conversion of Small Structures,” apply. View "Saint Ignatius Neighborhood Association v. City & County of San.Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant Department of General Services and real party Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS) prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) to determine the environmental effects of a project they proposed that would "significantly" affect the California State Capitol Building in Sacramento (Historic Capitol). Plaintiffs Save Our Capitol! and Save the Capitol, Save the Trees filed petitions for writ of mandate contending the EIR did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) the EIR lacked a stable project description; (2) the EIR did not adequately analyze and mitigate the project’s impacts on cultural resources, biological resources, aesthetics, traffic, and utilities and service systems; (3) the EIR’s analysis of alternatives to the project was legally deficient; and (4) DGS violated CEQA by not recirculating the EIR a second time before certifying it. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court found the EIR’s project description, analyses of historical resources and aesthetics, and analysis of alternatives did not comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Capitol v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

Detroit prohibits street vendors from selling their goods within 300 feet of sports arenas or stadiums. After the completion of Little Caesar’s Arena in 2017, the new home of the Red Wings and Pistons, Detroit refused to renew three vendor licenses for locations that fell within the 300-foot exclusion zone. The licenses had been in place since 2008. The displaced vendors sued, claiming due process violations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. The ordinance does not create a property interest in a vendor’s license; it never says that applicants will receive licenses for the places they choose but requires that they apply “for an approved location,” and warns that the city may “terminate[] or eliminate[]” a vendor location. Detroit retains the discretion to deny or suspend licenses to prevent a violation of the rules or to protect public safety. Even a protected property interest would not suffice to defeat Detroit’s decision. Detroit had rational reasons for denying these vendor applications: its interest in preventing congestion on its sidewalks, ensuring sidewalk safety, eliminating blight and litter, and protecting arena operators from competition. A 300-foot buffer zone around arenas is a rational way to advance Detroit’s interest in preventing congestion. View "Williams v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for Defendants following the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial justice did not err in ruling that the disputed land was a paper street and in finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain property was a public road that ran to the boundary of Plaintiff's property and that Plaintiff had the right to use the full length of the property and the right of access to his property. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

O’Brien submitted an application in March 2011 for approval of a 315-unit residential apartment development. O’Brien’s application was deemed complete in July 2011, including 14 residential buildings, a clubhouse, a leasing office, parking in carports and garages, and internal roadways on a 22.27-acre site. The site was then designated Administrative/Professional/Multi-Family Residential on the city’s general-plan land-use map and was zoned Administrative/Professional. The city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) in 2013. Before the project was approved, O’Brien and the city suspended processing the original project while O’Brien pursued an alternative, smaller proposal.In 2018, when it proved impossible to proceed with the alternative project, O’Brien and the city revived the original proposal, with some modifications. The city finally approved the resumed project in 2020, after the preparation of an addendum to the original EIR. A citizen’s group claimed that the project conflicted with the city’s general plan as it existed when the project was revived in 2018, that the EIR was inadequate, and that a supplemental EIR is required. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the mandamus petition. Despite the lengthy delay between certification of the EIR and project approval, the city properly applied the general plan standards in effect when the application was deemed complete. The court rejected challenges to the EIR. View "Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law