Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, this matter opposing the grant of a conditional use permit (CUP) to construct a commercial wind turbine, holding that the district court never acquired jurisdiction over this CUP appeal.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners granted the CUP to BSH Kilgore, LLC for it to construct and operate commercial grade wind turbines near Kilgore, Nebraska. Plaintiffs, parties who opposed the project, appealed the decision to the district court and later were allowed to amend their complaint to challenge the CUP pursuant to a petition in error. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jurisdictional requirements were not met in this case. View "Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County" on Justia Law

The City of Biloxi and Harrison County, Mississippi adopted a joint resolution that authorized the lease of a piece of property to RW Development, LLC, for the development of a joint public/private pier seaward of Veterans Avenue. As a result, the State initiated this case seeking a declaratory judgment that the State was the sole and exclusive authority to lease Public Trust Tidelands, that the City had no authority to lease the subject property to RW, and that preliminary and permanent injunctive relief should issue against the actions of the City and RW. The Chancery Court of Harrison County denied the State’s requested relief and ultimately determined that the City and County had statutory authority to lease the property to RW for public use. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed that Mississippi statutory law granted the City authority to build the pier, the court granted the chancery court's judgment. View "Mississippi v. RW Development, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

Olga Marcela Escobar-Eck was the President and Chief Executive Officer of Atlantis, a land use and strategic planning firm in San Diego. Atlantis helped submit an application, on behalf of All People’s Church (Church) to the City of San Diego (City) for the development of a church campus. The Church hired Atlantis around 2019 to guide it through the City's review and approval process. To this end, Escobar-Eck attended public meetings concerning the Church project and identified herself as a representative of the Church. Plaintiff Joshua Billauer lived in San Diego and worked for Wells Fargo. He was a neighborhood activist, and owned property in the Del Cerro area where the Church project was proposed. Billauer did not favor the Church project, emphasizing the project’s lack of housing despite the “ ‘major housing crisis’ ” in San Diego and speaking against it at community meetings. In 2020, Escobar-Eck was making a presentation on Zoom to a community planning group on behalf of the Church. During the a person who only was identifiable by the name "JJ" sent private messages to her through Zoom’s chat function, accusing Escobar-Eck of being dishonest about a house purchase that occurred near the Church. At the time of the message, Escobar-Eck did not know JJ’s true identity. Later, she learned JJ was Billauer. On December 10, 2020, Escobar-Eck posted a tweet on Twitter that was directed at Billauer’s employer, Wells Fargo, asserting Billauer was “[a] racist person who is engaging in cyberbullying.” On February 16, 2021, Billauer sued Escobar-Eck. The operative complaint includes a single cause of action entitled “Recovery of Damages.” Billauer claims that Escobar-Eck’s December 10 tweet constituted libel per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Billauer appealed an order denying his special motion to strike a cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. In denying the motion, the court found that Billauer’s alleged posts were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute, but Escobar-Eck had shown a probability of success on the merits for her libel per se claim. The Court of Appeal concluded Escobar-Eck has satisfied her burden to establish a probability of success on the merits, and Billauer has not provided evidence to defeat her claims as a matter of law. View "Billauer v. Escobar-Eck" on Justia Law

Objectors challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the long-range development plan for the University of California, Berkeley through the 2036-2037 academic year and the university’s immediate plan to build student housing on the site of People’s Park, a historic landmark and the well-known locus of political activity and protest.The court of appeal remanded. The court rejected arguments that the EIR was required to analyze an alternative to the long-range development plan that would limit student enrollment; that the EIR improperly restricted the geographic scope of the plan to the campus and nearby properties, excluding several more distant properties; and that the EIR failed to adequately assess and mitigate environmental impacts related to population growth and displacement of existing residents. However, the EIR failed to justify the decision not to consider alternative locations to the People’s Park project and failed to assess potential noise impacts from student parties in residential neighborhoods near campus, a longstanding problem. The court noted that its decision does not require the abandonment of the People’s Park project and that the California Environmental Quality Act allows an agency to approve a project, even if the project will cause significant environmental harm if the agency discloses the harm and makes required findings. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing an action seeking to enjoin two members of a county board of commissioners from voting on an application for a conditional use permit (CUP), holding that the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action.Plaintiffs, opponents of the CUP application, filed a complaint seeking an injunction and alleging, among other things, that two members of the county board of commissioners had conflicts of interest and should be enjoined from considering or voting on the CUP application. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the CUP and that the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Planning Board that Amazon Services, LLC's's proposed use of property it owned in Prince George's County fell within the definition of "Warehouse" under section 27 of the Prince George's County Code and was, therefore, permitted by right at the property, holding that the district court did not err.Amazon sought approval to make certain modifications and improvements to its property, which the Planning Board approved, concluding that the proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse" use under the applicable zoning ordinance. The District Council for Prince George's County affirmed. On review, the District Council concluded that the Planning Board correctly determined that Amazon's proposed use of the property qualified as a "warehouse and distribution facility" use under the zoning ordinance. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the District Council affirming the Planning Board's approval of Amazon's design plan for the property. View "Crawford v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying the petition for a declaratory judgment filed by Block Island Power Company (BIPCo), holding that there were no grounds to overturn the PUC's decision.In 2009, the legislature enacted R.I. Gen. Laws 39-26.1-7 (the enabling act) authorizing the Town of New Shoreham Project. In 2017, BIPCo sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the enabling act required the costs for BIPCo's interconnection facilities and backup transformer to be socialized across all electric ratepayers in the state, not just those in the Town. The PUC issued a judgment against BIPCo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PUC's reading and application of the statute was without error. View "In re Block Island Power Co. Petition for Declaratory Judgment" on Justia Law

In the late 1930s, Milwaukee County built a dam on the Milwaukee River in Estabrook Park, an urban green space that runs along the east bank of the river where the City of Milwaukee borders suburban Shorewood and Whitefish Bay. In 2017 the County transferred the dam to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District for the purpose of removing it. Demolition was completed the following year. With the dam removed, the water level immediately upstream fell by about four feet from its previous high-water mark. Kreuziger owns a home along this stretch of the river, and the drop in the water level exposed a ten-foot swath of swampy land on his waterfront that used to be submerged.Kreuziger sued the District and Milwaukee County, alleging that their removal of the dam amounted to a taking of his riparian right to the prior surface water level without just compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. the riparian rights of waterfront property owners are subordinate to the government’s authority to regulate navigable waterways under the public-trust doctrine. Kreuziger had no property right to have the river remain at the previous level. View "Kreuziger v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law