Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers around an attempted annexation by the City of North Charleston of a one-acre parcel located near Highway 61 and the Ashley River. This parcel, purchased by North Charleston in 2017, is situated on the southwest side of Highway 61 and separated from both the highway and North Charleston’s existing city limits by a narrow strip of land owned by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. That narrow strip has been part of the City of Charleston since its annexation in 2005. The annexation ordinance at issue included 62 square feet of the National Trust’s strip—land within Charleston’s city limits—in its property description.The National Trust and the City of Charleston challenged the validity of North Charleston’s annexation ordinance, arguing that the parcel was not “adjacent” to North Charleston’s existing city limits as required by section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code. The Circuit Court for Charleston County dismissed the lawsuit, holding that neither the National Trust nor Charleston had standing to contest the annexation, but also found in the alternative that, if standing existed, the annexation was invalid because the parcel was not adjacent to North Charleston’s city limits. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing and declined to reach the merits of the annexation’s validity.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted review and held that both the National Trust and the City of Charleston had standing to challenge the annexation. The Court further affirmed the circuit court’s alternative ruling that North Charleston’s annexation was invalid because the parcel was not “adjacent” to its city limits, as required under state law. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the validity of the City of La Habra’s February 2023 revision to its housing element, arguing that the modifications were adopted by the City Manager rather than the City Council and without additional public hearings. The housing element, part of the city’s general plan, is subject to periodic revision and state review. In this instance, after several public meetings and hearings on earlier drafts, the City Council adopted the housing element in September 2022 and authorized the City Manager to make further technical or clerical changes necessary for state certification. The City Manager subsequently approved additional revisions in February 2023, which were submitted to and certified by the Department of Housing and Community Development.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the nonprofit filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to prohibit the City from treating the February 2023 version as validly adopted. The court denied the petition, finding that the City had met public participation requirements through hearings on prior drafts and online posting of the revised element. The trial court also ruled that the City Council validly delegated authority to the City Manager for minor revisions and determined that any procedural errors were harmless, as required by Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The court held that additional public hearings were not required for the February 2023 modifications since they constituted part of the ongoing revision and certification process, rather than a distinct amendment. It further held that the City Council’s delegation of authority to the City Manager was valid and consistent with local law. Finally, the court found no prejudicial error or substantial harm resulted from the process used, upholding the presumption of validity following state certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Californians for Homeownership v. City of La Habra" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the rezoning of 145 acres of farmland in Canyon County, Idaho for light industrial use. The property owners, the Judith A. Gross Trust and Douglas Gross, sought the rezoning to facilitate future industrial development. The Canyon County Development Services Department and Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, and the Canyon County Board of County Commissioners ultimately approved the rezoning with conditions, including restrictions on certain uses. Three local businessmen and their agricultural business objected, arguing the rezoning would harm their agribusiness interests by reducing available farmland and impacting crop isolation.After the Board declined to reconsider its approval, the petitioners filed for judicial review in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, Canyon County. They claimed standing as “affected persons” under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), asserting concrete adverse impacts on their businesses. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to establish “constitutional” standing under the traditional three-part test—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—and declined to consider whether the petitioners met LLUPA’s “affected person” standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that the applicable standing inquiry for judicial review under LLUPA is the “affected person” standard set forth in Idaho Code section 67-6521, rather than the traditional federal three-part test. The Court clarified that Idaho’s standing doctrine is a “self-imposed constraint” and subject to legislative definition. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of the petition for review and remanded for consideration of standing under the LLUPA standard. Attorney fees were denied, but costs were awarded to the petitioners. View "Crookham v. County of Canyon" on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

The case concerns the approval of the Giovannioni Logistics Center Project, a large warehouse development in the City of American Canyon, California. The project requires American Canyon to certify an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), specifically addressing water supply issues since the city relies on outside sources, including water purchased from the neighboring City of Vallejo under a longstanding agreement. Vallejo’s water comes from the State Water Project and its own appropriative water right (License 7848). Vallejo objected to the EIR, asserting that it did not adequately disclose limitations on water availability, including place of use restrictions on License 7848 and ongoing contract litigation between the cities.Vallejo filed a petition for writ of mandate in Napa County Superior Court, later transferred to Sacramento Superior Court, contending that the EIR failed to meet CEQA and Water Code requirements regarding water supply disclosures and contingency planning. The trial court reviewed Vallejo’s arguments, which included claims that the EIR did not account for actual water delivered, failed to assess legal restrictions on water use, neglected the implications of curtailments during drought, and ignored the impact of contract disputes. After argument, the trial court denied Vallejo’s petition and entered judgment for American Canyon and the project developer, Buzz Oates LLC.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the EIR and water supply assessment complied with CEQA and the Water Code. The court found that the EIR provided sufficient detail about water supply sources and reliability, reasonably addressed foreseeable uncertainties, and did not require more specific disclosures or contingency planning absent evidence of insufficient supply. The court also concluded that any technical omissions were harmless and that Vallejo failed to demonstrate prejudice or a legal deficiency in the environmental review process. View "City of Vallejo v. City of American Canyon" on Justia Law

Petitioners are owners and residents of units in SoHo and NoHo buildings designated under New York City’s Joint Living-Work Quarters for Artists (JLWQA) program, which, since 1971, has limited legal occupancy to certified artists or those who obtained amnesty through later amendments. In 2021, the City rezoned the area, allowing JLWQA units to be voluntarily converted to unrestricted residential use upon payment of a one-time fee calculated by square footage. The fee supports an arts fund. Petitioners challenged this fee, claiming it was an unconstitutional condition and a taking under the Fifth Amendment.The case was first heard in New York Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition, finding that the fee was a monetary obligation not subject to the Takings Clause. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding that the fee was a permit condition subject to heightened scrutiny under the Nollan and Dolan unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The court found that the City failed to show the fee had an essential nexus to a legitimate governmental interest or was roughly proportional to any harm caused by conversion, declared the fee unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners did not have a compensable property interest within the meaning of the Takings Clause regarding the opportunity to convert their JLWQA units. The fee did not constitute a taking because it did not diminish or extinguish existing property rights, nor was it imposed in lieu of a direct appropriation of property. The Court further clarified that a standalone monetary fee for conversion does not implicate the Takings Clause and that heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan only applies to direct exactions or in-lieu-of-property conditions. Judgment was granted for the City. View "Matter of Coalition for Fairness in Soho & Noho, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Craig and Michelle Opperman sought approval from their homeowners association to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) by converting their garage and building a new garage on their property within a planned development managed by Portola Ranch Association. The Design Review Committee, lacking expertise on ADUs, referred the application to the Board of Directors. After retaining an independent consultant and reviewing the application, the Board denied the proposal, citing concerns about traffic and fire safety. During this period, adjacent property owners, Martin and Anna Eng, filed a quiet title action against the Oppermans regarding a non-exclusive easement affecting the area in front of the Oppermans’ garage.In response to the Engs’ action, the Oppermans filed a cross-complaint against the Association, asserting claims including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectancy, and declaratory relief. The Portola Ranch Association moved for summary judgment, arguing its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was within its authority under the governing documents. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted summary judgment for the Association, finding that the Board acted properly and that the business judgment rule applied. The court later awarded attorney fees to the Association.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the consolidated appeals. It applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Board had authority under the Association’s governing documents to review and deny the ADU application based on safety concerns and that its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and the doctrine of judicial deference articulated in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. The court further affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Association. View "Eng v. Opperman" on Justia Law

A joint drainage district, managed by the boards of supervisors for Floyd and Cerro Gordo Counties, sought to require a railroad company to install a new, larger drainage culvert through a railroad embankment to improve water flow and address aging infrastructure. The existing culvert, over a century old, was deteriorating and positioned too high to drain water effectively. The proposed construction involved a trenchless “jack and bore” method designed to avoid any interruption to rail service. The railroad company objected, arguing that federal law preempted state drainage law and that the construction would jeopardize railroad operations.After a remand from the Surface Transportation Board, the Iowa District Court for Floyd County conducted a bench trial and concluded that federal law—the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act—preempted the drainage district’s authority. The district court found that the proposed installation posed risks to rail operations and issued a writ of mandamus preventing the project. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the federal statute did not categorically preempt state drainage law in this context and that preemption would only apply if the project imposed more than incidental interference with rail operations. After a de novo review of the evidence, the court determined that the proposed culvert installation would have only incidental effects on rail transportation and that the railroad had not met its burden of showing unreasonable interference. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the drainage district, dissolving the writ of mandamus. View "Iowa Northern Railway Company v. Floyd County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to develop a parcel of land in a town, which required rezoning and environmental review. In 2017, while preparing its zoning petition, the owner and the town entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that purported to bind the town and its successors to continue reviewing the zoning petition until a final determination was reached, based on empirical data. The owner submitted its petition and participated in the environmental review process, investing significant resources. After local elections in 2019, a new town supervisor and board, who opposed the project, voted to terminate review of the zoning petition and the related environmental process.The property owner filed suit against the town, its board, and the supervisor, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, based on the town’s termination of the review process. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the MOU was unenforceable under the term limits doctrine and contract zoning doctrine. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dismissed the complaint, holding the MOU invalid. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed that decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case after granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the MOU was invalid and unenforceable under the term limits doctrine because it impermissibly bound successor town boards in the exercise of their legislative discretion over zoning matters. The Court found that such an agreement was not specifically authorized by statute or charter, and did not fall within an exception for proprietary acts. As a result, the property owner’s contractual claims failed as a matter of law. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "Hudson View Park Co. v Town of Fishkill" on Justia Law