Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In Puerto Rico, the Controlled Access Law (CAL) allows private citizens to protect themselves against violent crimes by maintaining gated residential communities that incorporate public streets. In 2004, two corporations operated by the governing body of the Jehovah’s Witnesses brought suit against municipal defendants alleging that the CAL unconstitutionally infringed on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to engage in door-to-door ministry. The district court established a remedial scheme that attempted to balance the competing interests of the parties. Both the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the municipalities appealed. The First Circuit upheld the district court’s solution but modified it in some aspects, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in crafting the remedy at issue. View "Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Colombani" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) procured some land from O.R. and Carylon Garretson via eminent domain in order to construct a bypass in Greene County. The Garretsons later filed a complaint against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT), alleging that the bypass construction had caused silt to flood onto their remaining land, damaging their timber. MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that it was immune under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1), subsections (d) (discretionary-function immunity) and (p) (design immunity). The Supreme Court agreed that MDOT was immune from liability under subsection (p) and affirmed. View "Garretson v. Mississippi Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between developer Killington/Pico Ski Resort Partners, LLC ("K/P") and the Highridge Condominium Owners Association regarding developer's proposal to construct additional units in the Highridge condominium development in Killington. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted declaratory relief to the Association on the ground that the declaration of condominium did not authorize the original developer to add additional units unilaterally, and thus the alleged successor to the original developer's rights, K/P, also had no such right. After its review of the dispute, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that K/P was the successor in interest to the original developer with respect to development rights, and was entitled to construct the proposed additional units under the declaration of condominium. View "Highridge Condominium Owners Assoc. v. Killington/Pico Ski Resort Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Land Use Commission (LUC) granted Horton-Schuler Homes LLC’s petition to reclassify certain lands in ‘Ewa District, O’ahu from agricultural to urban use subject to certain conditions. The Sierra Club filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court requesting judicial review of the decision, and Friends of Makakilo (FOM), a non-profit corporation, filed a notice of cross-appeal. FOM did not file its cross-appeal within thirty days after service of the certified copy of LUC’s final decision and order as required by Haw. Rev. Stat. 91-14(b). The circuit court held that FOM’s cross-appeal was not allowed by law because aggrieved parties have no right to cross-appeal and that FOM’s cross-appeal was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of FOM’s cross-appeal as untimely, holding that an “aggrieved person” seeking judicial review of an administrative decision under the Hawai’i APA must institute review proceedings within thirty days after service of the final decision and order. View "Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schulder Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Daryl and Marcy Dembiec appealed a superior court order dismissing their petition for equitable relief. In October 2011, petitioners obtained a permit from the respondent, the Town of Holderness to construct a single family home. Before the permit was issued, the only structure on the property was a two-story boathouse with living quarters on the second floor. In April 2012, when construction of the home was substantially completed, the Town's compliance officer advised the petitioners that he would not issue a certificate of compliance for their new home because the existing boathouse contained a dwelling unit, and the applicable zoning ordinance allowed two dwellings on a lot only when they are in the same structure, such as in a duplex. The compliance officer informed petitioners that, before he could issue a certificate of compliance, they would need either to obtain a variance or remove "all plumbing" from the boathouse. Petitioners then applied to the zoning board of adjustment for an equitable waiver from the ordinance. Two intervenors objected to the petitioners' request. The board originally granted the waiver, but on rehearing, denied it. Petitioners later sought a variance. The board denied their application. The superior court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' municipal estoppel claim because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over their claim because they were not required to first raise it before the zoning board of adjustment. The Supreme Court was persuaded that appealing the compliance officer's decision to the zoning board would have been useless because the zoning board lacked the authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, exhaustion is not required. "The plain language of the pertinent statutes does not confer general equitable jurisdiction upon a zoning board. Nor could the zoning board have granted any relief to the petitioners under the applicable statutes or the Town's ordinance because their new home violated the ordinance, and they failed to meet the requirements for either a variance or an equitable waiver from dimensional requirements. Under those circumstances, we conclude that further pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile, and, therefore, exhaustion of remedies is not required." Accordingly, petitioners' assertion of a municipal estoppel claim for the first time in the trial court was not barred by the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. The superior court's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dembiec v. Town of Holderness" on Justia Law

Appellants, Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Fairview Hospital, sought approval to build a helipad on the roof of a new two-story addition on the Hospital. The Cleveland Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) denied a permit to construct the helipad, determining that the Cleveland zoning ordinances did not permit the building of the helipad. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas reversed, concluding that the helipad was permissible under the ordinances. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review in reversing the trial court; and (2) the trial court correctly found that under the current version of the Cleveland zoning ordinances, a helipad was a permitted accessory use for the Hospital. View "Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Arundel reissued a conditional use permit to Dubois Livestock, Inc. In 2012, the Town’s code enforcement officer issued to Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit. The Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) upheld the code enforcement officer’s notice of violation because Dubois admitted to violating the conditions of the 2011 permit. Dubois appealed, arguing that the Town did not have the authority to regulate Dubois’s operation because the Town of Arundel Land Use Ordinance was preempted by state law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law does not preempt the Ordinance, and therefore, the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit was not ultra vires or beyond the Town’s jurisdiction. View "Dubois Livestock, Inc. v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Town of Madawaska filed an amended land use citation and complaint against Richard and Ann Cayer for violations of a shoreland zoning ordinance. The Cayers filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the land use citation was a retaliatory effort by the Town to punish them for exercising their right to petition local government. The trial court denied the special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, except possibly in extraordinary circumstances not presented in this case, the anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants’ alleged violations of law. View "Town of Madawaska v. Cayer" on Justia Law

Eastern Farmers Cooperative (EFC) applied for and was granted a conditional use permit to build and operate an agronomy facility on sixty acres of land near Colton, South Dakota. Appellants’ residence was directly across a county road from the proposed facility. Appellants appealed. The Minnehaha County Commission upheld the decision to grant the conditional use permit to EFC, as did the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County Commission’s decision to uphold the approval of the permit was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of Appellants’ due process rights; and (2) any alleged due process concerns arising out of a certain commissioner’s participation in the County Commission’s action were remedied by invalidating that commissioner’s vote. View "Hanson v. Minnehaha County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law