Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Roca Solida, a non-profit religious organization, purchased a 40-acre Nevada parcel. A desert stream flowed across the property, the water rights to which Roca also purchased. The water supplied a recreational pond, used for baptisms. Roca’s property is situated within a national wildlife refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. An FWS water restoration project completed in 2010 “restored [the] stream to its natural channel,” the effect of which was to divert the stream away from Roca Solida’s property, depriving it of water it would have otherwise enjoyed. In federal district court in Nevada, Roca sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief on the basis of alleged violations under the First and Fifth Amendment and “at least $86,639.00 in damage[s]” under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–80. It also sued in the Claims Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages on the basis that the diversion project constituted an unlawful taking and asserting FWS negligently executed the water diversion project, causing $86,639 in damages to “land, structures, and animals.” The Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the pending district court action under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. United States" on Justia Law

Munoz replaced the carpeting in his upstairs condominium unit with hardwood flooring because of his wife’s allergies The Homeowners Association (HOA) obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Munoz to remedy the unauthorized modification of the flooring to reduce the transmission of noise to the unit below. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the superior court improperly balanced the prospective harm to each party and erroneously concluded that plaintiff would prevail at trial. View "Ryland Mews Homeowners Ass'n v. Munoz" on Justia Law

This issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a challenge under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project to build a new entertainment and sports center (ESC) in downtown Sacramento. The project, a partnership between the City of Sacramento (City) and Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a downtown arena at which Sacramento Kings would play. To facilitate the timely opening of a new downtown arena, the Legislature modified several deadlines under CEQA by adding section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code. In a prior appeal, Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other petitioners argued section 21168.6.6 violated the constitutional separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature restricted the grounds on which the courts may issue a preliminary injunction to stay the downtown arena project. Saltonstall also argued the trial court erred by refusing to grant a preliminary injunction despite harm to the public and the environment due to demolition of part of the Downtown Plaza shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena in its place. The Court of Appeal concluded section 21168.6.6 did not violate separation of powers and the trial court properly denied Saltonstall’s request for a preliminary injunction. In this appeal, Saltonstall argued: (1) the City violated CEQA by committing itself to the downtown arena project before completing the EIR process; (2) the City’s EIR failed to consider remodeling the current Sleep Train Arena as a feasible alternative to building a new downtown arena; (3) the EIR did not properly study the effects of the project on interstate traffic traveling on the nearby section of Interstate Highway 5 (I-5); (4) the City did not account for large outdoor crowds expected to congregate outside the downtown arena during events; (5) the trial court erred in denying her Public Records Act request to the City to produce 62,000 e-mail communications with the NBA; and (6) the trial court erred in denying her motion to augment the administrative record with an e-mail between Assistant City Manager John Dangberg and a principal of Sacramento Basketball Holdings, Mark Friedman (the Dangberg-Friedman e-mail) and a 24-page report regarding forgiveness of a $7.5 million loan by the City to the Crocker Art Museum. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment dismissing Saltonstall’s challenge to the sufficiency of the City’s EIR and approval of the downtown arena project, and (2) the trial court’s order denying her motion to augment the administrative record. View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 1509 gives state government “sole and exclusive authority” to regulate the permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations within Ohio. Beck Energy Corporation obtained a permit from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources in order to drill an oil and gas well on property within the corporate limits of the City of Munroe Falls. When Beck Energy began drilling, the City filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief and alleging that Beck Energy was violating several provisions of the Munroe Falls Codified Ordinances. The trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Beck Energy from drilling until it complied with all local ordinances. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 1509.02 prohibited the City from enforcing the five ordinances. In so holding, the court rejected the City’s argument that the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution allowed the City to impose its own permit requirements on oil and gas drilling operations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Home Rule Amendment does not grant the City the power to discriminate against, unfairly impede, or obstruct oil and gas activities and production operations that the State has permitted under chapter 1509. View "State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied to the Town Planning Board for the Town of Hopkinton for a preliminary plan approval of a minor subdivision. The Town Planner stated that he would certify the subdivision application as complete once Plaintiff submitted proof that it had paid certain outstanding personal property taxes. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Town Planner to certify its subdivision application as complete (the mandamus count) and amended its complaint to add a count seeking a declaration that the requirement for an applicants such as Plaintiff to pay “property taxes” refers only to real property taxes (the declaratory judgment count). The trial justice dismissed the mandamus count but for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies but summarily ruled that the declaratory judgment count survived. The trial justice subsequently denied, sua sponte, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the trial justice abused his discretion when he sua sponte invoked the administrative exhaustion doctrine in the course of denying Plaintiff declaratory relief where neither party had briefed or argued that doctrine. View "Bruce Brayman Builders, Inc. v. Lamphere" on Justia Law

Nandan, LLP, and Border States Paving, Inc., (collectively, "Border States") appealed a district court judgment dismissing its amended complaint against the City of Fargo for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Nandan, LLP, and Border States Paving, Inc., owned real property in Fargo. In 2012, a landslide occurred along 32nd Street North adjacent to the industrial facility of Border States. According to a report, the landslide likely originated from a stockpile of granular material located on Border States' property. The landslide ruptured a water main and storm sewer, and damaged 32nd Street North and Drain No. 10. Drain No. 10 was owned, operated, and maintained by the Southeast Cass Water Resource District. Fargo owned the street, water main, and storm sewer. Border States received a notice from Fargo stating that it created "Improvement District 6237" to fund a portion of the local share of a project that would provide for drain, water main and sanitary sewer repairs on a portion of Drain No. 10. The notice indicated Fargo would contribute approximately $600,000 to the project, paid for through special assessments assessed to real property owners within the improvement district. The only real property within the improvement district to be assessed was owned by Border States. In September 2013, Border States sued Fargo to determine whether Fargo properly created Improvement District No. 6237. Border States' amended complaint sought relief asserting the improvement district was made without a resolution of necessity and without providing Border States adequate notice and depriving it of the right to protest the creation of the improvement district. Fargo moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and for judgment on the pleadings. Border States opposed Fargo's motion. The district court concluded Border States' amended complaint provided no right to relief under N.D.C.C. sections 40-22-06 and 40-22-15. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the part of the district court judgment that concluded Border States had no right to relief against Fargo under N.D.C.C. 40-22-06, relating to when a resolution of necessity was required and the right of public protest arises under an agreement between a municipality and another entity. The Court reversed and remanded the part of the judgment concluding Border States had no right to relief under N.D.C.C. 40-22-15, relating to the requirements for resolutions declaring an improvement necessary, because viewing the allegations in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court was not certain of the impossibility of proving a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nandan, LLP v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, the cities of Harwood and Reiles Acres entered a series of agreements to address common waste water treatment problems. In June 1985, they agreed in writing to construct and operate the Harwood Lagoon near the municipalities. Under that agreement, Harwood was responsible for 68 percent and Reiles Acres for 32 percent of the acquisition and construction costs of the Harwood Lagoon. Each municipality was responsible for maintenance and operational costs of their own collection system, and Harwood was responsible for administering and managing the operation of the facility. Their agreement allocated 68 percent of the maintenance costs for the facility to Harwood and 32 percent of those costs to Reiles Acres and also allotted 68 percent of the facility's capacity to Harwood's customers and users and 32 percent of the facility's capacity to Reiles Acres' customers and users. The agreement ultimately resulted in Harwood owning an undivided 68 percent interest and Reiles Acres owning an undivided 32 percent interest in the Harwood Lagoon. In July 1985, Lake Shure Properties purchased from Reiles Acres the right to use 50 percent of Reiles Acres' volumetric capacity in the lagoon, which constituted 16 percent of the total capacity of the lagoon. The agreement between Lake Shure Properties and Reiles Acres permitted each party to buy, sell, or otherwise deal with their respective share of the facility's volume. In 1993, Lake Shure Properties transferred 56.5 percent of its interest in the volumetric capacity in the Harwood Lagoon to Lake Shure Estates, Inc., a North Dakota nonprofit corporation consisting of homeowners residing in the Lake Shure Estates' subdivision near Harwood and Reiles Acres. The transfer resulted in Lake Shure Estates obtaining 9.04 percent of the total waste water treatment capacity of the Harwood Lagoon. Harwood's state certified operator for the lagoon testified that the facility was designed to provide waste water treatment services for approximately 500 people, and the population growth of Harwood and Reiles Acres made it difficult for the municipalities to continue to provide the required 180 days of winter storage capacity for the facility. In 1998, Reiles Acres contracted with Fargo for treatment of Reiles Acres' waste water, and since that time, it has not used the Harwood Lagoon for waste water treatment services. In 2009, Harwood contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services, and in 2010, Lake Shure Estates contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services. Neither Harwood nor Lake Shure Estates has used the Harwood Lagoon for municipal waste water treatment services since they contracted with Fargo for those services. Harwood and Lake Shure Estates sued Reiles Acres and all other persons unknown claiming any interest in the Harwood Lagoon, seeking a declaration of the parties' interests and obligations under their contracts and a partition of the Harwood Lagoon property. Reiles Acres appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial declaring the contractual obligations of Reiles Acres and the City of Harwood under the 1985 contract for construction and operation Harwood Lagoon were discharged by frustration of purpose and the order confirming a partition by public sale of the land encompassing the Harwood Lagoon. Reiles Acres argues the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment nullifying the parties' contractual obligations and to order a partition sale of the land. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court had jurisdiction to construe contracts in the declaratory judgment action and the court did not err in construing a 1985 contract between Harwood and Reiles Acres and determining the principal purpose of the contract was frustrated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in ordering partition by public sale of the land. View "City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City of Bothell assumed responsibility for maintaining a drainage pipe installed in a residential subdivision in Snohomish County. The subdivision, Crystal Ridge, was developed from two residential plats that the County approved in 1997. The area was incorporated into the City in 1992. One of the plats contained a drainage easement within a tract owned by the Crystal Ridge Homeowners Association. The plat dedicated the drainage easement to the County. The City argued that the disputed drainage pipe was outside the scope of the drainage easement that the City inherited from Snohomish County. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the Crystal Ridge plat is that Snohomish County (and therefore the City) assumed responsibility for maintaining the drainage pipe. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. View "Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell" on Justia Law