Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Defendant Armand Brisson was the owner of a two-story brick structure built around 1850 and located in the Town of Milton. He had lived in that building for most of his life. At the time of the events in question, he was living on the second floor of the building and utilizing the large attic for storage, while renting the first floor for use as a small bar/restaurant. In 2012, the Milton Police Department notified the Town’s deputy health officer that bricks were falling off the western exterior of the building onto the street and sidewalk below. After confirming this and observing that a part of the western brick wall was bulging out, the health officer issued an emergency health order later that same day condemning the building and declaring it unfit for any use or occupancy. Defendant did not contest either the civil penalty or the compensatory costs for engineering fees assessed against him by the court, but contended that the court’s award of attorney’s fees was neither authorized under the applicable statute nor warranted under an equitable exception to the American Rule requiring each party to bear the cost of its own attorney’s fees. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and therefore vacated the attorney’s fee award. View "Town of Milton Board of Health v. Brisson" on Justia Law

Thomas owns hotels. He purchased 34 acres adjacent to I-24 between Nashville and Chattanooga in 2013 for $160,000, to develop a first-tier hotel. Most of the property is zoned agricultural-residential; a smaller portion is zoned rural center district. It has always been used for agriculture, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) filed a condemnation action (40 U.S.C. 3113) with a deposit of $15,500 as estimated just compensation, for an easement 100 feet wide (1.72 acres) along I-24 for above-ground electrical power transmission lines. Thomas requested a trial on just compensation and disclosed his intent to present expert testimony that the property was no longer feasible for hotel development, because “power lines create both a visual and psychological barrier to guests.” The court granted the TVA’s motion to exclude the testimony, based on reliability defects. At trial, Thomas explained that the power lines are dangerous and unattractive. Thomas had not sought a rezoning. TVA’s expert opined that it was not financially feasible to develop a hotel on the property because of soil conditions, frontage, and the need for a zoning change and utilities. The court awarded Thomas just compensation of $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Thomas’s arguments about valuation. Thomas, who bore the burden of proof, did not overcome the presumption that the highest and best use was the property's existing use as agricultural land. View "Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned two suits: one in state and one in federal court, and statutory limitations on the power of the federal court to enjoin the state court case. In the federal case, the Utah Attorney General and the Board of Tooele County Commissioners sued the federal government under the Quiet Title Act, attempting to quiet title in favor of Utah for hundreds of rights of way in Tooele County, Utah. Five environmental groups opposed this suit, and the federal district court permitted the groups to intervene. In the state court case, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Michael Abdo, a Tooele County resident, claimed that the Utah officials lacked authority under state law to prosecute the quiet-title action in federal court. The Utah officials asked the federal court to enjoin the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court case. The federal district court granted the request and entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo for an indefinite period of time. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) did the federal district court have the authority to enjoin the state-court suit? After concluding it had jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Tenth Circuit then concluded that the federal district court did not have authority to enjoin the Utah state court. "The All Writs Act grants a district court expansive authority to issue 'all writs necessary.' But the Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state-court suits." An exception exists when an injunction is "in aid of" the federal court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. This exception applies when: (1) the federal and state court exercise in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the same res; and (2) the federal court is the first to take possession of the res. These circumstances are absent because the state-court action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem. Thus, the district court’s order violated the Anti-Injunction Act. View "Tooele County v. United States" on Justia Law

The Town of Rutland and five adjoining landowners (“neighbors”) appealed the Vermont Public Service Board’s grant of a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC (“RRE”) for construction of the Cold River Solar Project (“Project”), a 2.3 megawatt (Mw) solar photovoltaic electric generation facility. The Town and neighbors argued that the Board incorrectly held that the project will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region, would not have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics, and would not have an undue adverse impact on historic sites. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Town of Fortville adopted an ordinance and resolution annexing 644 acres (the “Annexation Territory”) of land adjacent to the municipality. A number of landowners (“Remonstrators”) comprising ninety-three percent of the owners of parcels within the affected area filed a petition challenging the proposed annexation. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Remonstrators and ordered that the annexation shall not take place, concluding that the Annexation Territory was not needed and could not be used by the municipality for its development in the reasonably near future. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court fulfilled its obligation to consider only whether the statutory conditions for annexation had been satisfied; and (2) the trial court did not clearly err in upholding the remonstrance and denying annexation because Fortville failed to demonstrate that the Annexation Territory was needed and could be used for Fortville’s development in the reasonably near future. View "Town of Fortville v. Certain Fortville Annexation Territory Landowners" on Justia Law

Five corporate plaintiffs sued the East Greenwich Fire District and the Town of East Greenwich alleging that Defendants’ imposition and collection of development impact fees from developers who applied for a building permit to develop land within the Town violated Rhode Island’s Development Impact fee Act (RIDIFA). The fire district adopted the schedule of impact fees by a resolution rather than through an ordinance. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Defendants did not have the authority to impose development impact fees and, if they did, the process by which they imposed the fees was deficient. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the resolution adopted by the fire district was invalid because it did not comply with either RIDIFA’s mandate that the fees be imposed through an ordinance or the Town’s notice and public-hearing requirements for the enactment of ordinances. View "5750 Post Road Med. Offices, LLC v. East Greenwich Fire Dist." on Justia Law

A Guy Named Moe, LLC (Moe), a foreign limited liability company doing business in Maryland, and Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC both operate a chain of restaurants. In 2012, Chipotle applied for a special exception to build a restaurant approximately 425 feet from Moe’s Southwest Grill. The City of Annapolis’s Board of Appeals unanimously approved Chipotle’s request. Thereafter, Moe filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court dismissed Moe’s petition, finding that Moe lacked standing because it was not a taxpayer under Md. Code Ann. Land Use 4-401(a). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the petition was void ab initio because, at the time it was filed, Moe’s had lost its right to do business in Maryland because of its failure to register; and (2) Moe was not "a person aggrieved" for standing purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Moe can Maintain its suit; but (2) Moe was not aggrieved for standing purposes. View "Guy Named Moe, LLC v. Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, filed an inverse condemnation action against the City, seeking damages and injunctive relief based upon impairment of the views from their backyards by coastal redwood trees the City planted in Roxbury Park. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the judgment entered after a demurrer to their inverse condemnation complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiffs do not allege any physical intrusion, occupation, or invasion of their property or any physical damage to their property. The trees of which plaintiffs complain were not located on plaintiffs‘ properties and the first amended complaint does not allege that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrudes upon plaintiffs‘ properties. Because plaintiffs allege only impairment of their views and a speculative risk of fire danger, neither of which constitutes a taking or damaging of their property, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

The Gulfport City Council approved the City of Gulfport’s application to use the historic Grass Lawn Home as a recreation center upon its reconstruction after Hurricane Katrina. Peter and Fay Barrett appealed the City Council’s decision, arguing that Grass Lawn was zoned exclusively for residential use and that the City had abandoned any nonconforming use on the property in question. The circuit court dismissed the Barretts’ claim as moot, and the Barretts then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court correctly found that the Barretts’ appeal was rendered moot by the City’s withdrawal of its application, and the Barretts’ appeal did not meet an exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the Barretts’ appeal. View "Barrett v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law

In 1990, the City of Burlington obtained a land-use permit for the Waterfront Park (the Park). The City hosted a number of events at the Park in the summer of 1993 and may have hosted others prior to that time. In December 1993, the City applied for an amendment to its permit to allow for hosting of festivals and public events at the Park. During the amendment process, the City argued against any express permit condition regarding the timing, duration, and frequency of events and sound levels, taking the position that the City Parks and Recreation Commission should regulate these matters. In February 1994, after considering the impact on neighboring residents caused by noise and traffic from events, the district commission granted the amendment and imposed twenty-six conditions, some of which related to the maximum sound levels associated with events at the Park, when and where to measure those sound levels, and the timing and number of events that could be held at the Park. In August 2008, Allison Lockwood purchased her property located at 200 Lake Street, adjacent to the Park. Prior to purchasing the property, she researched and read the 1994 Permit, and specifically relied on the permit conditions governing the timing and frequency of events at the Park and the maximum allowed sound levels. At the time of her purchase, the neighbor was aware that festivals and events would take place at the Park, but she understood these events would be limited by the conditions in the permit. Neighbor was nevertheless significantly impacted by the events and festivals, experiencing loud noise for extended periods of time, significant vehicular and pedestrian traffic congestion, and limits on her ability to sleep, spend time outdoors, open her windows, and enjoy her property. This case began in November of 2012 when the City filed an application with the district environmental commission to amend a number of conditions in the 1994 permit. Lockwood appealed the amended land-use permit to the Environmental Division, then appealed when the Environmental Division awarded summary judgment to the City of Burlington. The Environmental Division ruled that the City is entitled to seek an amendment to its Act 250 permit covering the Waterfront Park located on the shores of Lake Champlain. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Waterfront Park Act 250 Amendment (Alison Lockwood, Appellant)" on Justia Law