Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the proposed expansion of municipal geographic boundaries by minor boundary adjustment by the City of Summersville, West Virginia, as approved by the Nicholas County Commission. Petitioners brought this action against the County Nicholas Commission and its members (collectively, Respondents), alleging that certain statutory requirements governing annexation were not met during the approval process, the annexation was not in the best interests of Nicholas County, the annexation amounted to a public nuisance, and that the annexation resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The circuit court granted the County Commission’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that the County Commission complied with the statutory requirements in entering the order on boundary adjustment, which authorized the City’s annexation of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in affirming the County Commission’s determination to approve the City’s petition for an annexation by minor boundary adjustment. View "Coffman v. Nicholas County Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and City's efforts to build a new bridge across the North Fork St. Lucie River. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), allows the Secretary of Transportation to approve projects that use section 4(f) lands only if the agency first determines that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that land. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the FHWA abused its discretion in not selecting their proffered alternative that, when built with a spliced-beam construction, would avoid all use of section 4(f) lands. The FHWA concluded that the spliced-beam construction would be "imprudent" because it would cause significantly greater harm to non–section 4(f) wetland areas, as well as "severe social impacts." The court concluded that FHWA was thorough and careful in its analysis and thoughtful in its determination, and the court could discern neither an arbitrary or capricious action nor an abuse of discretion. In this case, the FHWA made its calculus carefully, giving thoughtful consideration to a wide variety of factors, and it worked with many agencies, even those that once opposed the project, to develop remediation plans that mitigate harms to the affected areas. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservation Alliance of St. Lucie County v. U.S. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Town of Cumberland applied for site plan review of a proposed development involving Broad Cove Reserve property that it owned. The Town of Cumberland Board of Adjustment and Appeals determined that the Town’s proposed development was permitted within the Low Density Residential district as a municipal use. The Estate of Merrill P. Robbins, which owned land abutting the Broad Cove Reserve property, appealed, arguing that the Town’s development was prohibited under the terms of the relevant ordinance. The superior court affirmed, concluding that the plain language of the ordinance supported the Board of Adjustment and Appeals’ determination. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the meaning of “municipal use” as used in the ordinance was unambiguous and that the Town’s proposed facility was allowed under the terms of the ordinance. View "Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Town of Cumberland" on Justia Law

Government Code section 53094(b) authorizes “the governing board of a school district” to “render a city or county zoning ordinance inapplicable to a proposed use of property by the school district,” under certain circumstances. The Santa Clara County Board of Education approved a resolution exempting from local zoning ordinances property to be used by Rocketship Education for a charter school. The San Jose Unified School District argued that county boards of education have no authority to issue section 53094 zoning exemptions and successfully sought a writ of mandate to set aside the resolution. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that section 53094 does not authorize county boards of education to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools. Empowering county boards to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools would not advance the purpose of section 53094—preventing local interference with the state’s sovereign activities. While county boards are authorized to issue charters and oversee charter schools, local school districts are obligated to provide facilities to charter schools. (Educ. Code, 47614(b).) The state has not tasked county boards with acquiring sites for charter schools; to the extent they do so, they are not carrying out a sovereign activity on behalf of the state. View "San Jose Unified School District v. Santa Clara County Office of Education" on Justia Law

Two companies applied for permits to expand their oil terminals on Grays Harbor. The issue here this case presented was whether the Ocean Resources Management Act (ORMA), applied to these expansion projects. The Shoreline Hearings Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals held that ORMA did not apply to these projects based on limited definitions in the Department of Ecology's (DOE) ORMA implementation regulations. The parties also contested whether these projects qualify as "ocean uses" or "transportation" under DOE's regulations. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation improperly restricted ORMA, which was enacted to broadly protect against the environmental dangers of oil and other fossil fuels. The Supreme Court also held that these projects qualified as both ocean uses and transportation. And though not discussed by the parties or the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found these projects qualified as "coastal uses" under DOE's regulations. Accordingly, it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further review under ORMA's provisions. View "Quinault Indian Nation v. City of Hoquiam" on Justia Law

After a public hearing, the Town of Stockton Spring’s Board of Selectman determined that a structure owned by Hollie Beal was a dangerous building or nuisance pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 17, 2851. The superior court affirmed the decision of the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Beal’s contention that the Board violated her due process rights when it allegedly denied her the opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have an impartial fact-finder was unavailing; and (2) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings. View "Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs" on Justia Law

This case arose from the Preservation Society of Newport County’s (the Society) application for the construction of a Welcome Center near the entrance of a well-known Newport mansion. Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Association (BOPNA) initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking various declarations that the Welcome Center was prohibited under the City of Newport Zoning Ordinance. The Society filed a motion to dismiss. The hearing justice granted the motion, concluding that the issues presented in the complaint were within the jurisdiction of Newport zoning officials to determine and were inappropriate for a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice correctly determined that the issues raised in BOPNA’s complaint were within the zoning board’s authority and jurisdiction and were therefore inappropriate for resolution in an action seeking declaratory judgment. View "Bellevue-Ochre Point Neighborhood Ass’n v. Preservation Society of Newport County" on Justia Law

21 Seabran, LLC applied for two permits necessary to renovate a garage on a lakefront parcel. The Town of Naples Code Enforcement Officer denied the permits, concluding that the parcel would have insufficient shore frontage to comply with state and local law. The Town of Naples Board of Appeals denied 21 Seabran’s appeal, concluding that the proposed renovation would add to the parcel a second “residential dwelling unit” for purposes of the Town of Naples Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which would render the parcel noncompliant. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) the Board’s determination that the proposed structure was a residential dwelling unit was erroneous; and (2) the Board’s conclusion that the parcel failed to comply with the minimum lot size law and rules was erroneous. View "21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of the Local Improvement District No. 1101 and the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the Boards) in a case regarding assessments levied on properties within the Sage Acres Local Improvement District. Appellants also appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to the Boards. Ada County Ordinance No. 780 established the Ada County Local Improvement District No. 1101, known as Sage Acres Local Improvement District (LID). The ordinance was adopted in 2011. The purpose of the LID was to construct a water delivery system for residential and irrigation use by properties within the Sage Acres Subdivision (Sage Acres) in Boise. water system was completed in 2014. Appellants challenged the creation of the LID and Ada County Ordinance No. 809, which confirmed the assessments levied on properties affected by the LID. In 2013, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from Assessments; the district court set the matter for trial in 2014, and ordered the parties to mediate no later than 90 days prior to trial. Prior to mediation, the Boards moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants’ claims were not legally or factually supported. Finding no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Boards, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hoffman v. Bd of Local Improvement Dist No. 1101" on Justia Law

Western Petroleum, LLC, and Maxum Petroleum Operating Company, Inc., doing business as Pilot Logistics Services (Pilot), appealed a district court order affirming their appeal of the Williams County Board of County Commissioners' decision to penalize Pilot for violating the county's temporary housing regulations. In September 2011 the Williams County Board of County Commissioners adopted temporary housing regulations relating to the use of "man camps" or "crew housing facilities" in the county. The use of temporary housing on property within the county was prohibited without a conditional use permit. In 2014 the Board became aware that Pilot was using its property for temporary housing after Western Petroleum's permit expired. Pilot was out of compliance on 40 RVs since September 6, 2012, and on seven mobile home units since September 6, 2013. Pilot also had two two-story framed houses on the property that were not permitted under Western Petroleum's conditional use permit. At its July 2014 meeting, the Board assessed a $29,635,000 penalty against Pilot for violating the temporary housing regulations. The Board calculated the penalty by treating each non-permitted use as a violation subject to a $1,000 penalty per day. The Board calculated the $1,000 penalty on a per housing unit, per day basis. The Board offered Pilot a reduced penalty of $1,885,000 if paid within 10 days. Pilot did not pay the reduced penalty and the Board imposed the full penalty. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding the penalty against Pilot was supported by the evidence and was not an unreasonable interpretation of the temporary housing regulations. The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, reversed and remanded because the Board unreasonably interpreted the regulations. View "Western Petroleum, LLC v. Williams Cty. Bd. of Commissioners" on Justia Law