Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This case centered on the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a variance request could be appealed to the superior court. Kerley Family Homes, LLC was granted a variance by the City of Cumming’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Neighboring homeowners aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA’s decision by filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction with the superior court. The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners because the zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that could be challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1. The Supreme Court concluded they were right, and therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. View "City of Cumming v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Boasso American Corporation appealed an adverse decision by the Zoning Administrator for the City of Chesapeake to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board affirmed. Boasso then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Zoning Administrator moved to dismiss on the ground that Boasso had failed to name or serve the City Council for the City of Chesapeake, a necessary party by statute. Boasso then sought leave to amend to include the City Council and the City Attorney. The Acting City Clerk, on behalf of the Mayor, moved to quash service of process and filed a plea in bar arguing that Boasso’s failure to name or serve the City Council within thirty days of the Board’s decision was fatal to the petition. The circuit court dismissed Boasso’s petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a litigant who appeals the judgment of a board of zoning appeals under Va. Code 15.2-2314 must identify the governing body as a necessary party in the petition and must do so within thirty days of the board’s final decision; and (2) if those requirements are not met, the circuit court lacks the discretion to permit amendment of the petition and, if asked, must dismiss the case for lack of a necessary party. View "Boasso America Corp. v. Zoning Administrator of the City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

Dustin Nelson filed an application for a conditional-use permit to construct and operate a concentrated animal-feeding operation in Grant County. The Grant County Board of Adjustment voted to approve the application. Geraldine and Barth Adolph petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to review the legality of the Board’s decision. The circuit court affirmed. The Adolphs appealed, arguing (1) the Board’s decision was illegal because Nelson’s proposed project violates the Zoning Ordinance for Grant County; and (2) Nelson presented a new waste-disposal plan at the public hearing, denying them an opportunity for meaningful participation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) although the Board regularly pursued its authority in most respects, it erroneously believed that past environmental violations of a prospective applicant are never relevant in considering whether to approve an application; (2) the Adolphs were not denied due process during the public hearing; and (3) the Board did not exhibit bias requiring a new hearing. View "Adolph v. Grant County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others filed suit alleging federal and state law claims arising from a nuisance abatement carried out on his land. The district court dismissed the claims based on the doctrine of claim preclusion. The court held that plaintiff's federal action challenging the nuisance abatement was precluded by the summary judgment granted in the Ramsey County District Court and affirmed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In this case, the actions involved the same set of factual circumstances, same parties or privies, there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation, and plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this matter in the prior action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anderson v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota" on Justia Law

The developer sought rezoning for a Rockford condominium project. Objectors filed a protest, triggering the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act's special approval procedure, which requires a super majority vote by the city council. The proposal failed; three of the council’s five members voted to approve rezoning. The developer sued, alleging due process violations and regulatory taking. The district court denied Objectors’ motion to intervene. The parties reached a settlement in mediation. The city council approved the settlement by a simple majority; the district court entered a consent judgment that ordered the property rezoned and the Planned Unit Development Agreement approved, dismissing the case. Objectors filed a state court suit, claiming that the city had circumvented the Act and its zoning ordinances and seeking a preliminary injunction. The city and developer returned to federal court, seeking to enjoin the state court from granting a preliminary injunction and to enjoin Objectors from otherwise seeking to invalidate the prior federal consent judgment under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the state-court proceeding. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the broad prohibition on such action under the Anti-Injunction Act and concluding that the “relitigation exception” did not apply because the state court issue was never raised in the prior federal proceeding and because Objectors lacked the requisite connection to that litigation to be bound by the consent judgment. View "202 N. Monroe, LLC v. Sower" on Justia Law

The Zoning Officer for the Town of Hopkinton issued a notice of violation to Todd and Tina Sposato for being in violation of the Hopkinton Zoning Ordinance by having four alpacas on their property, which was located in an R-1 zone. The Zoning Board overturned the Zoning Officer’s ruling, concluding that alpacas are “domestic animals,” and therefore, keeping them on the property was a permitted use. Thereafter, the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Hopkinton imposed four “conditions” on the Sposatos with respect to the continued presence of alpacas on the property. The fourth condition explicitly provided that “[t]he right to keep alpaca on this property does not run with the land; that is, if the [Sposatos] sell this property the next owners are not permitted to keep alpaca.” The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the last of the four conditions imposed upon the Sposatos by the Zoning Board was inconsistent with venerable and settled principles in the law of land use. View "Preston v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Hopkinton" on Justia Law

In 1991, the Georgia Supreme Court declared Bartow County’s zoning ordinance to be invalid. Two years later, Bartow County enacted a new zoning ordinance that, among other things, included a provision addressing vested rights for nonconforming use that were acquired during the absence of a valid zoning ordinance. Twenty-five years later, this case required a determination as to whether that 1993 vested-right provision was unconstitutional as applied to Appellant Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. Though the trial court concluded that the zoning provision in question suffered no constitutional infirmity, the Supreme Court disagreed. Because the zoning provision is unconstitutional as applied to Southern States, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm" on Justia Law

In this case, two townships disputed the location of their common boundary. Pursuant to the Second Class Township Code, the trial court appointed three commissioners to ascertain that boundary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether such commissioners, when tasked with determining the location of a municipal boundary but concluding that they could not do so with certainty, could consider the townships’ acquiescence to a line used as the boundary and relied upon by residents, and accordingly recommend the adoption of that alternative line as the municipal boundary. The Supreme Court concluded that, in such a narrow circumstance, the commissioners could rely upon the equitable doctrine of acquiescence in making their determination, and need not search indefinitely for evidence of the original boundary. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for reinstatement of the trial court’s order. View "Adams Twp. v. Richland" on Justia Law

Defendant, the owner of real property, filed a subdivision map that purported to subdivide the property into three new parcels. Defendant, however, did not obtain permission from the city planning and zoning authorities before filing the revised subdivision map. Defendant subsequently obtained a mortgage loan from a predecessor-in-interest to the substitute plaintiff. The loan was secured by a mortgage on two of the tracts. Defendant later defaulted on the mortgage loan, and plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest commenced this action to foreclose on the mortgage. Defendant objected to the foreclosure, arguing that a judgment of foreclosure would have the effect of validating an illegal subdivision of property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and ordered a strict foreclosure of the two tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a trial court may render a judgment of foreclosure on mortgaged property that consists of parcels of land within a subdivision that has not been approved by municipal zoning authorities. View "ARS Investors II 2012-1 HVB, LLC v. Crystal, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Powell City Council approved an ordinance rezoning certain property from planned commercial and residence districts to downtown residence district. Thereafter, Brian Ebersole sought a writ of mandamus to compel Powell City Council to place the new ordinance on the May 2017 ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Ebersole was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because, under the city charter, the City had no clear legal duty to place the matter on the ballot. Therefore, Ebersole’s proper course of action was to challenge the validity of the ordinance by way of a suit for declaratory judgment, a form of relief that this Court had no original jurisdiction to grant. View "State ex rel. Ebersole v. City Council of Powell" on Justia Law