Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Wisconsin Supreme Court
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A dispute arose between Sojenhomer LLC and the Village of Egg Harbor over the Village's decision to condemn a small portion of Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The Village aimed to improve safety at a dangerous intersection by constructing a sidewalk along County Highway G. Sojenhomer, however, contested the condemnation, arguing that Wisconsin statutes prohibit property acquisition by condemnation to establish or extend a "pedestrian way," which it claimed included sidewalks.The Door County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Village, holding that sidewalks are not pedestrian ways and thus the Village had the authority to condemn the property for sidewalk construction. Sojenhomer appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that sidewalks are indeed pedestrian ways as defined by Wisconsin statutes. The court reasoned that sidewalks fall within the broad definition of a pedestrian way as "a walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel."The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The court held that when read in context, the definition of pedestrian way does not include sidewalks. The court noted that the statutory language, history, and broader context indicate that sidewalks and pedestrian ways are distinct, non-overlapping categories. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutes did not prohibit the Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court declaring the Town of Buchanan's transportation utility fee (TUF) to be a property tax subject to the Town's levy limit, holding that funds raised for utility districts under Wis. Stat. 66.0827 are property taxes subject to municipal levy limits.After the circuit court concluded that the money raised for the district fund was subject to the Town's property tax limit Appellants appealed, arguing that the TUF was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Town did not follow the lawful procedures that a municipality must follow for funding public improvements because the imposition of property taxes over the Town's levy limits required the consent of the Town's voters and because nothing in the statutes permitted the Town to bypass those levy limits for the purpose of imposing a TUF on property owners in the municipality. View "Wis. Property Taxpayers, Inc. v. Town of Buchanan" on Justia Law

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In this special assessment appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the Village of Mukwonago as a defendant due to improper service of a notice of appeal, holding that Petitioner's failure to comply with Wis. Stat. 66.0703(12)(a) required dismissal of this action.Petitioner challenged the special assessment district created by the Village in 2019 alleging jurisdiction pursuant to section 66.0703(12). The Village filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or competency to proceed because Greenwald did not serve a written notice of appeal on the Village clerk. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 801.14(2) did not apply in this case; and (2) the plain meaning of section 66.0703(12)(a) mandates service of written notice on the Village clerk, and because Greenwald did not accomplish this requirement, dismissal was warranted. View "Greenwald Family Ltd. Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that rezoning by amending a local government's zoning ordinance is legislative in character, and therefore, due process did not require an impartial decision-maker.Trustee Jan Miller (Trustee Miller), who served on the Village Board of Lyndon Station, cast the deciding vote in favor of an application filed by her daughter and son-in-law to amend the Village's zoning ordinance to rezone their residential property for commercial development. Thomas Miller (Miller), a local business owner, sought certiorari review of the Village's Zoning Board Appeals' decision upholding the Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Trustee Miller was not a fair and impartial decision-maker, and therefore, her participation in the vote violated due process. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Village Board's action was legislative in nature, and therefore, Miller was not entitled to an impartial decision-maker. View "Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Lyndon Station" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court requiring Polk Properties, LLC and its sole member (collectively, Polk) to pay forfeitures for zoning violations, damages for the Village of Slinger's lost property tax revenue, and fees, holding that Polk did not abandon its nonconforming use.At issue was whether Polk abandoned the legal nonconforming use of the subject property after its zoning classification was changed from agricultural to residential. The circuit court enjoined Polk from using the property for agricultural reasons and imposed forfeitures, a monetary judgment for real estate taxes, and an order authorizing special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied against Polk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful nonconforming use for which Polk could not be penalized. View "Village of Slinger v. Polk Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order upholding the Town of Newbold's denial of Petitioner's attempt to subdivide his property, holding that the Town ordinance precluding the subdivision was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 236.45.The Town denied Petitioner's proposed subdivision because the two resulting lots would not meet the Town's applicable minimum shoreline frontage requirement, as set forth in the Town ordinance. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the minimum shoreline frontage requirement was unenforceable because it was a shoreline zoning regulation that the Town did not have the authority to enact. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that the ordinance was a permissible exercise of the Town's subdivision authority, and therefore, the Town proceeded on a correct theory of law when it denied Petitioner's request to subdivide his property. View "Anderson v. Town of Newbold" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a local zoning court of appeals approving homeowners' variance request, holding that, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 62.23(7)(e)10., certiorari review of the board's decision is triggered when a written copy of the decision is filed in the board's office.The homeowners in this case petitioned the Village of Williams Bay Extraterritorial Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance request. The Board unanimously approved the variance. Plaintiff, the homeowners' neighbor, filed for a writ of certiorari within thirty days after the Board orally voted to grant the variance but before the Board issued and filed a written copy of its decision. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals properly determined what constitutes the "triggering event" for purposes of appealing the Board's decision on a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an aggrieved party's right to certiorari review is triggered when a written copy of a zoning board of appeals' decision is filed in the office of the board; (2) the Board's written decision and approved minutes were properly included in the certiorari record; and (3) the Board acted under the correct theory of law. View "Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court striking two insurance conditions from a conditional use permit (CUP) Dane County issued to Enbridge Energy Company as unenforceable under 2015 Wisconsin Act 55, holding that because Enbridge carried the requisite insurance, Act 55 rendered Dane County's extra insurance conditions unenforceable.The two conditions at issue required Enbridge to procure additional insurance prior to Enbridge expanding its pipeline pump station. Dane County approved the CUP with these insurance conditions. Thereafter, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 55, which prohibits counties from requiring an interstate pipeline operator to obtain additional insurance when the pipeline operating company carries comprehensive general liability insurance with coverage for "sudden and accidental" pollution liability. Dane County issued the CUP with the invalid insurance conditions. The circuit court struck the two conditions from the CUP as unenforceable under Act 55. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Enbridge failed to show it carried the requisite coverage triggering the statutory prohibition barring the County from imposing additional insurance procurement requirements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Enbridge carried the requisite insurance, and therefore, Dane County's extra insurance conditions were unenforceable. View "Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of the Town of Rib Mountain's action seeking a declaration that Marathon County lacked the authority to establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns, holding that Wis. Stat. 59.54(4) does not restrict a county's authority to "establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns" to only rural areas within towns.In 2016, Marathon County decided to establish a uniform naming and numbering system. The Town of Rib Mountain was one of the towns required to participate in the addressing system. The Town filed this action for declaratory relief alleging that the statute confines counties to implementing naming and numbering systems only within "rural" areas of towns. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the use of the word "rural" unambiguously demonstrated that the legislature intended to restrict a county's naming and numbering authority to "rural" areas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory text provides that a county may establish a rural naming or numbering system "in towns"; and (2) accordingly, Marathon County acted within its authority by enacting an ordinance to create a uniform naming and numbering system in towns throughout Marathon County. View "Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's orders granting the City of Whitehalls' motion to dismiss the Town of Lincoln's action challenging the City's annexation of a portion of the Town, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the grounds on which the Town may challenge the annexation.On appeal, the Town argued that the decision of the court of appeals was based on the erroneous classification of the petition as one for direct annexation by unanimous approval even though the annexation petition lacked the required signatures of all landowners. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the annexation petition was not a petition for direct annexation by unanimous approval; and (2) because the limitations on annexation challenges set forth in Wis. Stat. 66.0217(11)(c) pertain only to petitions for direct annexation by unanimous approval, those limitations did not apply in this case. View "Town of Lincoln v. City of Whitehall" on Justia Law