Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision.

Petitioners Kittitas County and several other parties challenged two final decisions and orders of the Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (Board). The Board found several provisions of the County's revised comprehensive plan (Plan) and development code noncompliant with the Growth Management Act (GMA). Petitioners argued that the Board misinterpreted the law and acted beyond its jurisdiction, without substantial evidence, and arbitrarily and capriciously in making findings related to rural and agricultural densities and uses, zoning techniques, land use near airports and water resources. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the Board did not improperly disregard evidence and appropriately found that the County violated the GMA by failing to: develop the required written record explaining its rural element; include provisions in its Plan that protect rural areas; provide for a variety of rural densities; protect agricultural land; and protect water resources. However, the Court found that the Board improperly found the County's airport overlay zone was noncompliant with the GMA. The Court remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings with respect to the airport overlay zone.

In 2007, the city council of Woodinville (City) unanimously denied two applications submitted by Respondent Phoenix Development, Inc. (Phoenix) to rezone a parcel of undeveloped property. The superior court dismissed Phoenix's petition, holding that Phoenix failed to establish that the City failed to follow its own procedure when it denied Phoenix's applications. The Supreme Court found that substantial evidence in the record supported the City's decision to deny Phoenix's requests under the controlling city ordinance. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Phoenix's applications.

In 2006, Defendant Whatcom County (County) approved three land use applications for development in the Birch Bay urban growth area. Petitioner Whatcom County Fire District No. 21 (the Fire District) filed a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition to challenge the approvals. At issue between the parties was whether the completion of the proposed developments would reduce fire protection services to below an âadequateâ level of service. On review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the County had assigned the responsibility for assessing the adequacy of fire protection services to the Fire District. Because the Fire District determined the services it could provide would fall below an âadequateâ standard, the lower court properly granted its LUPA petition. The Court reversed the Countyâs approval of the land use applications for Birch Bay.