Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The issue before the court in this case arose from a proposed housing development in West Woodstock. In a prior case involving this development, the Supreme Court affirmed permits for the project granted by the town development review board and the district environmental commission and affirmed by the environmental division of the superior court. In this appeal, brought by the owners of abutting properties to the land in question, more narrow questions related to easements and other property rights were brought before the court. After review of the trial court record and the arguments presented by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Roy v. Woodstock Community Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed a 2012 trial court order that upheld the Town of Underhill's decision to reclassify a segment of Town Highway 26 from a Class 3 and Class 4 highway to a legal trail. Petitioners argued that: (1) the trial court should have appointed commissioners to make a report concerning the reclassification decision pursuant to 19 V.S.A. sections 740-743 rather than reviewing the reclassification decision on the record pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75; (2) the court erred in declining to stay the appeal pending resolution of a related action concerning maintenance of the segment; and (3) the evidence did not support the Town's reclassification ruling. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the question of how non-rental residential properties subject to housing-subsidy covenants should be valued for property-tax purposes. Taxpayers in two cases consolidated for the purposes of this opinion contended that the governing statute mandates an automatic reduction in valuation for properties subject to these covenants or, (what is effectively) equivalent, a mandatory tax exemption on a portion of the property's value. The towns in which these properties are located contended instead that the applicable statute requires that municipal listers give individualized consideration to the effect these covenants may have on the fair market value of a given property when they determine the appropriate assessed value for the allocation of property taxes. The Vermont League of Cities and Towns and the Vermont Assessors and Listers Association joined the towns as amici curiae. The Supreme Court agreed with the towns that the existence of a housing-subsidy covenant was but one of many factors listers and assessors must take under advisement in ascertaining a property's fair market value.  View "Franks v. Town of Essex" on Justia Law

Appellees' (two brothers and a sister) family owned and operated a farm in Pomfret. In 2009, neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division from a decision by the Town’s zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) granting a construction permit for a planer building on farm property. They also appealed a ZBA denial of their request to enforce what they considered to be zoning violations concerning the building of a sawmill and kiln buildings on farm property. The trial court issued a written ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, concluding that the wood-processing buildings at issue did not satisfy the criteria for a permit exemption under the Pomfret zoning ordinance, but that factual issues remained as to whether they qualified as “farm structures” exempt from local zoning regulation under state law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found no basis to disturb the judgment the trial court's decision, and affirmed it. View "In re Moore Accessory Structure Permit and Use" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the common issue centered on whether Vermont laws allowed the Town of Colchester to consider certain intangible factors in assessing seasonal lakefront camps located on leased land. The Supreme Court held that the Town was not precluded from considering such factors in assessing properties. View "Lesage v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

The Town of Hartford and Marc and Susan Wood have been involved in a property dispute for over a decade. At issue: the construction of a large concrete retaining wall along the Woods property. They appealed the latest superior court decision in the matter. In 1999, the Town approved the Woods' application for a zoning permit to construct the wall. In early 2000, Woods began stockpiling recycled concrete slab sections in order to construct it. The Town served Woods a Notice of Violation (NOV) and filed an enforcement action, arguing that the concrete was not what was specified in the zoning permit. A court determined that Woods failed to meet the specifications for the permit. Woods appealed, and thus began the litigation that ultimately wound up before the Supreme Court in this case. In 2011, the superior court concluded that Woods still had not adhered to the permit's specifications. Woods raised thirteen claims of error on appeal, mostly challenging the sufficiency of evidence and errors in interpretation of the zoning code. Finding no error in the superior court's 2011 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wood NOV, Town of Hartford v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Town of Fairfax cited homeowner Leon Beliveau for changing the use of his property from a single-family dwelling to a rooming-and-boarding house without obtaining the necessary zoning permits. Beliveau argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his property was used as a boarding house, and that the Town's zoning laws were unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error in the trial court's view of Beliveau's property, and that the town's zoning laws were not unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Beliveau NOV, Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation involving developer Stowe Highlands and its Resort Planned Unit Development (PUD) in the Town of Stowe. The Stowe Development Review Board (DRB) denied Stowe Highlands' application to amend the PUD by subdividing and then merging certain lots, including one designated for a hotel. The DRB concluded that the amendment amounted to a change in the permit conditions and that such amendment was not warranted because Stowe Highlands had not demonstrated an unanticipated change in factual circumstances beyond its control. Stowe Highlands appealed this denial to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court, which reversed, concluding that the application required no permit condition change and that denial on that basis was therefore unfounded. One of the PUD lot owners and the Town appealed that decision, arguing that the original DRB decision was correct. Finding no error in the superior court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Stowe Highlands Merger/Subdivision Application" on Justia Law

Neighbors of a proposed affordable housing development appealed an Environmental Division decision affirming a decision of the Town of Woodstock Development Review Board (DRB) granting appellee-applicants Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont (WCT) a zoning permit and a decision of the District 3 Environmental Commission, granting an Act 250 Land Use Permit. The Environmental Division had reversed an earlier decision of the DRB granting a permit, but upon WCT’s reapplication, and another favorable decision from the DRB, the Environmental Division affirmed, finding that the deficiencies of the first application had been corrected. Following the second DRB decision, WCT went to the Environmental Commission and obtained an Act 250 permit; the Environmental Division also affirmed the grant of this permit. Neighbors argued that: (1) the successive-application doctrine should have barred the submission of the second zoning permit application; (2) the second application failed to correct the problems of the first application; (3) certain of the Environmental Division’s findings with respect to the Act 250 permit were clearly erroneous; (4) the court erred by denying a motion to stay this proceeding; and (5) the Environmental Division erred by conditioning approval on a water easement’s location being drawn on the plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "It is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Environmental Division to impose conditions on permits. . . .the Environmental Division was sensitive to the concurrent litigation when it imposed the condition, requiring that the pending litigation be noted on the plan. The condition was based on the requirements of the Woodstock zoning ordinance, and it was within the court’s jurisdiction and discretion to require it." View "In re Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont PRD" on Justia Law