Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This protracted litigation arose out of a real-property exaction imposed on B.A.M. Development, LLC, as a condition of a construction permit for a fifteen-acre residential housing development. Twice the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. After conducting a third trial, the district court concluded that the County's exaction did not violate the Dolan v. City of Tigard rough proportionality standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects, holding (1) the district court did not err by including in its rough-proportionality analysis costs borne by state government entities; (2) the district court did nor err by limiting the scope of its review to B.A.M.'s thirteen-foot road dedication; and (3) B.A.M.'s remaining arguments were meritless or inadequately briefed. View "B.A.M. v. Salt Lake County" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned real property belonging to Admiral Beverage Corporation, and Admiral was entitled to compensation from the State for the taking of its property. During the condemnation proceedings, Admiral sought to introduce evidence of the fair market value of its property, including evidence of its damages arising from the loss of view and visibility of its remaining property. The district court ruled that evidence of the fair market value of Admiral's property was not admissible under the holding in Ivers v. UDOT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the part of Ivers that allowed severance damages only for "recognized property rights" was too restrictive to accord the full protection of the Utah Constitution, was inconsistent with both Utah statutes and the Court's prior case law, and was therefore overruled; and (2) Admiral had the right to recover from UDOT for the decrease in the fair market value of its remaining property resulting from the condemnation.

L.C. Canyon filed an application with Salt Lake County to rezone several acres of its property to allow the construction of a residence on the property. The County Planning Commission recommended its approval to the Salt Lake County Council. The Council then passed an ordinance amending the zoning map to grant L.C. Canyon's requested rezoning. Before the ordinance was to take effect, the Council rescinded the rezoning ordinance. L.C. Canyon filed a complaint against the County, asserting that the Council had no authority to rescind the rezoning ordinance and that the rescission effected a taking of L.C. Canyon's property. The district court entered summary judgment against L.C. Canyon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County had a rational basis for its zoning decision, (2) the Council had the authority to rescind its rezoning ordinance before it became effective, and (3) because L.C. Canyon had only a unilateral hope that the rezoning ordinance ultimately would take effect, it had no viable takings claim.

Appellants, Marion Energy and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, leased and owned oil and gas deposits lying underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership. In order to build a road to access those deposits, Appellants sought to condemn a portion of KFJ's land by relying upon a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of roads to facilitate the working of mineral deposits. The district court dismissed Appellants' condemnation action, concluding that the statute did not provide the authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the phrase "mineral deposits" in the statute was ambiguous, and because all ambiguities in a statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain are strictly construed against the condemning party, Appellants were not authorized by the statute to condemn KFJ's land.

Appellants Marion Energy (Marion) and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the Trust) leased and owned oil and gas deposits that lay underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership (KFJ). To build a road to access their deposits, Marion and the Trust sought to condemn a portion of KFJ's land. To do so, they relied on a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of roads to facilitate the working of "mineral deposits." At issue was whether the phrase "mineral deposits" as used in the statute was intended by the legislature to encompass oil and gas deposits. The district court granted KFJ's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute did not provide authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute is ambiguous as to whether "mineral deposits" includes oil and gas, and (2) because the Court strictly construes an ambiguous statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain against the condemning party, Marion and the Trust were not authorized by the statute to condemn KFJ's land.