Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs and appellants Luz Solar Partners Ltd., III; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., IV; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., V; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VI; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VII; Luz Solar Partners Ltd., VIII and Harper Lake Company VIII; and Luz Solar Partners Ltd., IX and HLC IX (collectively “Luz Partners”) challenged the assessment of real property improved with solar energy generating systems (SEGS units) for tax years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. They contended that defendants-respondents San Bernardino County (County) and the Assessment Appeals Board of San Bernardino County (Appeals Board) erroneously relied on the State of California Board of Equalization’s (Board) incorrect interpretation of the applicable statutes governing the method of assessing the value of the property. Finding that the Board correctly interpreted the applicable law in setting forth the method of assessing the value of the solar properties, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Luz Solar Partners Ltd. v. San Bernardino County" on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation, and application of Water Code section 51200 and articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution, as approved by California voters in 1996 as Proposition 218, and the interplay between them. Defendants and cross-complainants Reclamation District No. 17 and Governing Board of Reclamation District 17 (collectively "Reclamation") maintained levees and other reclamation works within the district’s boundaries. Plaintiff and cross-defendant Manteca Unified School District (School) owned real property within Reclamation’s boundaries. School filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing section 51200 exempted it from paying assessments to Reclamation and Proposition 218 did not confer such authority. School also sought recovery of over $299,000 previously collected by Reclamation. Reclamation answered and cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court found the assessments levied by Reclamation were invalid under section 51200 but denied recovery of assessment payments made during the pendency of the action and concluded School’s action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Reclamation appealed, arguing section 51200 and Proposition 218 allowed assessments against school district property unless the district could show through clear and convincing evidence that the property received no special benefit. School cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying recovery for assessments paid during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in declining to apply the constitutional mandate of Proposition 218 to the statutory exemption from assessments provided by section 51200. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal. View "Manteca Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reclamation Dist. No. 17" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

Two churches (the Churches) located in the City of Saint Paul were subject to a right-of-way assessment (ROW assessment) that the City assessed to nearly every owner of real property within the city limits to pay for public right-of-way maintenance services. The Churches appealed their 2011 ROW assessment, arguing that the charge was a tax and was not imposed uniformly upon the same class of property and that the assessed amount improperly exceeded the special benefit to the Churches’ properties. The district court upheld the assessments after applying a reasonableness test, concluding that the ROW was not a tax imposed under the City’s taxing power but was a fee imposed under the City’s police power and, therefore, was not subject to constitutional restrictions on taxation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ROW assessment was imposed as an exercise of the City’s taxing power rather than its police power; and (2) summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the extent of special benefits to the Churches’ properties attributable to the right-of-way services. View "First Baptist Church of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul" on Justia Law

Pike County's Sny Island Levee Drainage District was organized in 1880 to protect from Mississippi River flooding and runoff. The Kansas City Southern and the Norfolk Southern operate main line railways over the District's flood plain. Illinois law permits the District to assess properties within its territory in order to maintain the levees. A new method, ​adopted in 2009, purported to calculate assessments based on the benefits the District conferred on each property, rather than based on acreage. After the Seventh Circuit enjoined use of the methodology, the District discontinued collecting annual assessments and implemented a one-time additional assessment, 70 ILCS 605/5. The District filed an assessment roll based on new benefit calculations, identifying the tax on KC as $91,084.59 and on Norfolk as $102,976.18, if paid in one installment..The Railroads again filed suit, alleging that the District used a formula that discriminated against them in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 11501. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the District. The court rejected an argument that the comparison class against which their assessment should be measured is all other District properties, instead of the narrower class of commercial and industrial properties used by the district court. There was no clear error in the court’s assessment of a “battle of the experts.” View "Kansas City S. Ry. v. Sny Island Levee Drainage Dist" on Justia Law

A Suffolk developer set aside an Equestrian Center Parcel (ECP) for lease to a riding school and stable, with the stable to pay real estate taxes owed on the ECP. The lease expressly anticipated that ownership of the ECP would later be conveyed to a property owners’ association, which was subsequently organized. Although the stable could sell services to non-members, the lease required preferential treatment for Association members. The Association’s declaration included the ECP as Association’s property but noted that it was leased. The city began assessing real estate tax on the ECP in 2009. In 2012, the city exonerated the Association of liability for tax years ending in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The city again assessed tax on the ECP for tax years ending in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. No one paid the assessments. The city published notice that the ECP would be sold for non-payment of taxes. The Association sought a declaratory judgment that the ECP could not be directly assessed because, under Code 58.1-3284.1(A), any tax due was payable only by the Association’s individual members. The court ruled that the stable was a commercial enterprise and that the statute did not intend “open or common space” to include real estate used for commercial enterprises open to nonmembers of an owners’ association. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed; nothing in the statutory definition excludes commercial property. Association members who did not board horses at the Stable used its picnic tables, trails, and parking area. View "Saddlebrook Estates v. City of Suffolk" on Justia Law

Plains Marketing, LP and Van Hook Crude Terminal, LLC, appealed an order affirming a Mountrail County Board of County Commissioners' decision to deny their application for an abatement of 2013 real estate taxes for three parcels of land in Mountrail County. They argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should reverse the County Board's denial of their application for an abatement because the County Board incorrectly applied the omitted property provisions in N.D.C.C. ch. 57-14. After review of the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the order. View "Plains Marketing, LP v. Mountrail Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs" on Justia Law

The City of Eugene sued to collect from Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. (Comcast) a license fee that the city, acting under a municipal ordinance, imposes on companies providing “telecommunications services” over the city’s rights of way. Comcast did not dispute that it used the city’s rights of way to operate a cable system. However it objected to the city’s collection effort and argued that the license fee was either a tax barred by the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), or a franchise fee barred by the Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). The city read those federal laws more narrowly and disputed Comcast’s interpretation. The trial court rejected Comcast’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Eugene v. Comcast of Oregon II, Inc." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households for disposal of household hazardous waste, by enactment of an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee.” Crawley challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus, arguing that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution, requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, rejecting Crawley’s assertion that the fee is not incidental to property ownership and concluding that the fee falls within an exemption to the constitutional requirements. View "Crawley v. Alameda Cnty, Waste Mgmt. Auth." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Iowa City Board of Review reclassified eighteen properties from commercial to residential for property tax purposes because the properties had recently been organized as multiple housing cooperatives. Two Iowa corporations organized the cooperatives under chapter 499A of the Iowa Code. The City of Iowa City appealed, arguing that the Board’s reclassification was improper because two natural persons, not two corporations, must organize multiple housing cooperatives under the Code. The City also argued that the organizers did not properly organize the cooperatives because each cooperative had more apartment units than members and section 499A.11 requires a one-to-one ratio. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and the intervening housing cooperatives. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) two Iowa corporations may organize a multiple housing cooperative under chapter 499A; and (2) the Code does not require a one-apartment-unit-per-member ownership ratio for a multiple housing cooperative to be properly organized. View "City of Iowa City v. Iowa City Bd. of Review" on Justia Law