Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied as moot the writ of mandamus sought by Malcolm and Mary Wood seeking to compel Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals and its members (collectively, the zoning board) to stay their approval of a development plan and hear their appeals, holding that subsequent events had rendered the case moot.After the planning commission approved a proposed real estate development in Rocky River the Woods, who lived next to the site, filed an appeal. The zoning board declared the notice of appeal void on the grounds that the appeal was not completed or perfected within a timely fashion. The Woods subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the construction of the project was substantially underway. View "State ex rel. Wood v. Rocky River" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure to serve the Ohio Attorney General a declaratory judgment claim alleging an ordinance is unconstitutional at the inception of the action does not divest the trial court of its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2721.12.The City of Cincinnati filed an action for injunctive relief against Fourth National Realty, LLC alleging that Fourth National had installed an outdoor advertising sign without obtaining the necessary permit and variance. Fourth National filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the City's outdoor advertising ordnances violated its constitutional right to free speech but did not serve its counterclaim until two years into the litigation. On remand, the City argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Fourth National had not served the attorney general with notice of the pending constitutional claim at the inception of Fourth National's case. The trial court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2721.12(A) does not require service on the attorney general at the inception of the action. View "City of Cincinnati v. Fourth National Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied res judicata to Appellant's claim.Appellant went into the office of the Plain Township zoning inspector to complain about a neighbor's trees, and the inspector told Appellant that the trees did not violate the zoning code. Appellant later filed a mandamus action seeking to compel the inspector and the Plain Township Board of Trustees to enforce the zoning provision against his neighbor. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. Two years later, Appellant attempted to appeal the inspector's initial decision, but the board of zoning appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Appellant then filed a second mandamus action in the court of appeals seeking to compel the inspector to issue his initial decision in writing. The court of appeals held that res judicata barred the claim because Appellant could have asserted that claim in his first mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied res judicata to Appellant's claim against the inspector in this case. View "State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Township Board of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court determining that Defendant's use of its barn on property it owned in Litchfield Township was utilized primarily for the production of wine made from grapes and for the sale of wine produced therein in order for the use of the barn to be exempt from zoning regulation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 519.212(A), holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant owned a barn on land designated as residential. The Litchfield Township Board of Trustees sought to enjoin Defendant from using its land for weddings and other social gatherings. On remand, the trial court determined that the barn met the "vinting and selling wine" exemption under section 519.21(A). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the primary-use test under section 519.21(A) in determining that the primary use of the barn was for vinting and selling wine. View "Litchfield Township Board of Trustees v. Forever Blueberry Barn, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the court of common pleas affirming the decision of the Harrison Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) denying Appellants' request seeking approval to engage in sand-and-gravel mining, holding that the BZA erred in denying the request.Appellants filed an application for a conditional use permit to conduct sand-and-gravel mining. The BZA denied the application based on general conditions applicable to all conditional uses set forth in a Harrison Township zoning resolution. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a general standard that does not relate to public health or safety may not be applied to deny an application to conduct mining as a conditional use. View "Columbus Bituminous Concrete Corp. v. Harrison Township Board of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas concluding that the Streetsboro Planning and Zoning Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying Appellant's application for a conditional-use permit, holding that that court of appeals exceeded its scope of review in this case.Finding that Appellant's expert lacked credibility, the Commission determined that Appellant did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant's proposed conditional use met the relevant standards outlined in the relevant ordinances. The court of appeals pleas determined that the Commission's denial of the application was arbitrary and capricious. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commission could have justifiably concluded that Appellant's expert lacked credibility. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had no authority to second-guess the court of common pleas' decision on questions going to the weight of the evidence supporting the Commission's findings. View "Shelly Materials, Inc v. City of Streetsboro Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus to compel the Sandusky County Board of Elections to place a referendum petition concerning a city zoning ordinance on the November 2019 general election ballot, holding that the board's decision was contrary to law.The board excluded the petition from the ballot upon finding that the city zoning ordinance was properly passed as an emergency measure and was therefore not subject to referendum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance failed to state an emergency under Ohio Rev. Code 731.30 and was not properly enacted as an emergency measure. Therefore, the ordinance was subject to referendum. View "State ex rel. Hasselbach v. Sandusky County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting declaratory judgment ordering the planning commission of the city of Broadview Heights to issue a certificate of approval to Gloria Wesolowski, holding that the thirty-day time limit set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 711.09(C) applies to a city planning commission and prevailed over the municipal subdivision regulation at issue in this case.After the commission denied Wesolowski's application seeking to subdivide property Wesolowski filed an administrative appeal alleging that the commission failed to comply with section 711.09(C), which requires that the commission either approve or deny a subdivision application within thirty days after its submission. The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment in Wesolowski's favor. The commission appealed, arguing that section 711.09(C) does not apply to cities because the city's regulations, adopted pursuant to its home-rule powers, prevail over section 711.09(C). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the time limit set forth in section 711.09(C) applies to both cities and villages; and (2) a home-rule municipality's adoption of subdivision regulations is an exercise of its police powers, and therefore, section 711.09(C) prevails over any conflicting municipal subdivision regulation. View "Wesolowski v. Broadview Heights Planning Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writs of prohibition and mandamus sought by Relators to order the Warren County Board of Elections to remove from the May 7 ballot a referendum on a 2018 resolution adopted by the Wayne Township Board of Trustees relating to property on which Relators sought to construct a housing development, holding that the board of elections did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law.The resolution adopted by the township trustees amended the zoning district for the subject properties from residence single family zone to village transition PUD. Relators submitted a protest on the referendum. The board rejected the protest. Relators then filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus ordering the board to sustain Relators’ protest of the referendum. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relators were not entitled to either writ. View "State ex rel. Federle v. Warren County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The 74-acre Washington County parcel, near the Ohio River, is subject to a 1980 oil and gas lease between the then-owners and Collins-McGregor, to permit “mining and operating for oil and gas and laying pipe lines, and building tanks, powers, stations, and structures thereon, to produce, save and take care of said products.” Collins-McGregor committed to make royalty payments based on the gas produced and to deliver a portion of the oil produced from the land to the lessors. The lease “shall remain in force for a term of One (1) years from [the effective] date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee.” A well was drilled in 1981 and has produced oil and gas in paying quantities since then from the “Gordon Sand” formation. The Landowners contend that production of oil and gas has occurred near their property from below that formation but Collins-McGregor has not explored deep formations for lack of equipment or financial resources. They sought a judgment that the portion of the lease covering depths below the Gordon Sand has terminated because it has expired or been abandoned and that Collins-McGregor has breached implied covenants, including implied covenants of reasonable development and to explore further. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed dismissal. Ohio law does not recognize an implied covenant to explore further separate from the implied covenant of reasonable development. View "Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co." on Justia Law